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SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the existing theories
and practices of career development in Middle Eastern bureaucracies,
with special reference to Jordan. No comprehensive study exists
against which to measure the progress that has been made in this
respect and there are no 'norms' existing in Jordan with regard to
organisational behaviour in the government service. Therefore, the
survey has been concerned with description and analysis of what
exists at present.
The administrative system has been analysed by management level,
type of personnel, function of government and by types of organisational
activity. Research findings were based primarily upon a questionnaire
and supported by interviews and documentation. The results of the
analysis are presented in chapters which reflect understood and accepted
categories of organisational analysis. These include recruitment;
-Financial rewards; promotion and advancement; training and development.
They also include organisation and development of the Service; character-
istics of manpower within the Service; and 'environmental' factors
(geographical, historical, political, social, economic, demographic and
educational influences) within which the system operates.
From the findings it has been possible to draw conclusions about the
main features of the administrative structure  o-F the Service in Jordan. The
outcome of the survey gives a comprehensive picture which demonstrates
the strengths and weaknesses of existing arrangements and how they
compare with the government services o-F other states. Suggestions are
made for ways of improving career development in the bureaucracy of
Jordan to take account of changing needs and circumstances.1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 NATURE OF THE STUDY
In developing countries the role of government is very important.
Not much is written about the structure of the government in many of
these states. This is particularly true in the Middle East. 1 There
is also the disparity of literature relating to constitutional systems
on the one side and the organisation of the government sector on the
other. The latter tends to receive less than adequate investigation.
In the case of Jordan, it is especially so because it is a small
nation without oil wealth and therefore attracts less attention than
other middle east countries.
I
This study concerns career development in the bureaucracy of
Jordan. It evaluates the personnel system of Jordan within which the
Service has operated. It analyses the present policies, procedures
and practices in managing a service of some 70,000 employees under
the Central Civil Service Regulations. Their performance is critical
in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of the entire
government. 2 They run day-to--day affairs of the government. Because
of some serious concerns about their quality and quantity, their
knowledge, their skills and decisions, which have far-reaching effects
on the Jordanian Society, this study was made.
The speed of growth of the government service in Jordan will2
intensify existing concern and create new problems. Government spends
a considerable part of the national income and is by far the largest
employer of labour. No citizen, and certainly no tax payer, should
fail to take interest in the resources used by the government. The
government sector's use of resources is the only one which comes under
close public scrutiny. Any study which investigates such activities
might usefully produce findings on consequence of which more
effective provision of services can be offered.
Economy and efficiency have been objectives since the creation
of the government. Jordan, like other countries, faces the dilemma
of desire to limit the functions of government by keeping its cost at
a minimum white still developing the government sector rapidly, and
the idea still lingers in the public imagination.
Economy is careful management, effeCt#iJ is power to produce
desired results. This is as true of manpower as of services. One of
the most important factors in the economic and efficient use of
resources is the development of an effective career service. Conditions
and methods of work and professional ethics in the government service
LVunique. 3 Naturally public servants tend to over-emphasisethe
uniqueness a-F government employment, but there can be little doubt
that it takes some time for the government servant to acquire all the
characteristics expected of him. These characteristics are evolved
over the process of time.4
Contrary to the belief in certain Western societies, in Jordan
there is a traditional belief that an individual spends a life-time in
the public service and becomes progressively less fitted for outside3
employment. This belief dies slowly. The position has been greatly
changed. Outside employers now eagerly seek bureaucrats	 (the only
people who know the government inside). For this reason, inducements
are constantly being offered to attract them away from their public
service career. The question is whether there ctve some advantages to
the government, in general, if employees have had practical experience
outside the Service and if they had a break at some time during their
official career? Does the change of climate add to their facilities
of judgement and perspective, and reinvigorate them?
All advocacy of a career service depends not so much on its
outstanding advantages as upon the inherent disadvantages of a non-
career service - the loss of talent and ability, high turnover, the
sense of insecurity, unreliability and doubt, the necessary modifica-
tions in professional ethics, the time factor in filling positions;
difficulties over promotion and transfer: the loss of efficiency.5
Do these circumstances apply equally in societies like Jordan? Another
point to be investigated is the degree of impartiality, honesty,
efficiency, integrity and anonymity of the dedicated career servant,
and the factors which affect them.
A career service should give the individual employee opportunity
for development to the extent of his rapacities, furnish a climate
congenial to growth and provide incentives which will promote the
maximum of development. Everyone entering a career service does so
with the expectation that he should be able to reach the highest posts
if he has the resources of training, education, physical ability or
whatever it is that is required to get there, and there should be the4
reasonable expectation that increasinglresponsible work will be given
to him as his own personal abilities develop. 6 This implies permanency
and
of tenure tconditions of employment which must reflect the position of
public service in the public's esteem and the recognition of the rights
o-F any employee in relation to his employer .s conceived by the society
of which the public servant is part. It is to be investigated whether
these traditional attributes of the	 career service might be
sacrificed by wider career movement, additional mobility between the
private and public sectors in circumstances of a developing nation.
The two objectives - efficiency and economy, and a career
service - are not enough. The employees themselves must be satisfied
that they have chosen the right career and their satisfaction will be
reflected in the state of morale. Like the measurement of effCZi'e,2e5if,
morale can only be measured in terms of outcomes. Among the sample
questioned for this study, means investigated were staff participation
in the determination of their conditions and methods of work, rate of
turnover of the staff, absenteeism (suspected or otherwise) and
co-operation. In this study, concentration will be directed to the
principles and practices which appear to contribute to staff morale,
rather than on direct measurement, in which case personal impressions
and feelings must enter into judgement.
Morale, in the form of attitudes, ws analysed because it affects
the quality and quantity o-F work. I-F the personnel are not given
opportunities,they cannot contribute. The work of the official is
closely bound with the welfare of society. A discontented public
service reflects greatly upon the prestige and status of government as
an institution, and of the politicians and politics in general. The5
consequences may undermine the social and political system. High
morale will be reflected in the government dealing with the public.7
Indeed much has changed in the government service of Jordan in
the past decade and major changes are taking place at the present time.
This study examines an important side of administration in this state
of change - the individual in the Service. Who is he? 	 What does he
do? What does he think? Is he satisfied? What is his working
environment like? How does he get to the top? How does he see the
bureaucracy of which he is a part? The study attempts to describe the
dominant characteristics of manpower within the bureaucracy.
The study attempts to relate personnel policies to individual
expectations. The quality of any administrative system depends, in
large part, upon the type of people staffing the Service, 8 what they
think of the structure and effectiveness of organisation within which
they work9 , and their ability to develop and implement policies.10
This includes the process of interaction with the persons, units,
regulations and institutions that constitute his immediate environment.
This raises also questions about "relativities" between careers within /without
the Service. In Jordan, government still continues to be regarded as
the "model" employer. The institutional negotiation and arbitration
procedures in Jordan are therefore yet to develop on a satisfactory
basis.
An interesting question to the student of bureaucratic organisations
such as government service is how long does it take to become
"bureaucratised" (i.e. to absorb its customs, habits and attitudes)?11
Some have held that the only democratic civil service is a "representativeB
bureaucracy": reflecting the structure of the society in general to
such factors as age, social origin and educational background. The
argument is that only a body of government servants recruited in this
way can understand the needs of society and respond to its legitimate
demands. 12
II
This study attempts to analyse the government service in terms
c-F its environment, organisational pattern and historical perspective,
recruitment, financial reward, advancement, training and development.
To do this, the author has scrutinised the career patterns of a sample
of government serv'S to see whether roads to the top are many or few,
and whether any are notably more travelled than others. He compares
the careers of bureaucrats who have reached the top with those of
colleagues who came into the Service during the same period but have
made less progress up the ladder.
This is all interesting evidence on a relatively unstudied
occupational group. No previous research has been done in Jordan, gaps
therefore exist in our knowledge of the contemporary civil service
First of all, any study of a civil service must obviously treat all
officials o-F the government	 as a unit. A second gap is our knowledge
of career experience among members of different civil services. There
might be differences in careers within the Service. Posts differ
widely in the amount o-F specialised knowledge they require, extent of
advancement opportunities and type o-F organisations. Where a career
is limited to one department, it is reasonable to expect that department
to provide opportunities for development and recognition that will make
up for the lack of mobility. To the extent that circumstances in the7
department prevent recognition, development and advancement -For employees,
a decline in quality of staff may be expected. So far as relates to the
Jordanian situation, all of these factors will be examined. Finally,
with the advantage of evidence on both career experience within and
outside the Service, it would be pertinent to investigate the role of
both types of factors in influencing career "success". The study
attempts to link social environment and educational background to career
progress. Comprehensive studies of careers are rare in any overnment
$ervice context and a broader view of the working experience of
bureaucrats would obviously be o-F interest. This study attempts to
fill these particular gaps in our knowledge of the contemporary govern-
ment Service o-F Jordan. Apart from providing a description of the
background characteristics of the Civil Service, the Study concentrates
on two aspects of the bureaucrats	 - their career experience and
factors associated with success in the Service.
The political, economic and social importance of the bureaucracy
is manifest today in every nation which has passed beyond the tribal
stage of development. In developing nations, the bureaucracy almost
always bears major responsibility for whatever is or is not being done
for social and political modernisation. 13 In advanced nations, the
bureaucracy tends to expand in size, power and scope of activity,
entering increasingly into sectors previously regarded as private.14
Jordan has moved from the first to the second of these stages. Its
bureaucracy has been deeply involved into the development of industry,
commerce, communications, transportation, education and agriculture.15
This could be expected to influence the development of policy.
In theory, a bureaucracy merely implements policy decisions made by8
political leaders, but in practice it is hard to distinguish clearly
between the making and the carrying out of governmental decisions.
Laws and ordinances enacted outside the bureaucracy often originate
within it; policies announced by politicians have often proposed or been
influenced by career subordinates. In any case, statutes and policies
often have essential details to be determined by bureaucrats, and
execution often requires interpretations which can result in substantial
modification of legislative intent. Finally, the method and vigour
o-F execution can determine the effectiveness of political decisions.
For all these reasons, a bureaucracy possesses considerably more power
than the term "implementation" implies. 16 In Jordan, this might be
expected to be particularly true. This is an area which the study
investigates.
The study hopes to draw conclusionabout the situation which
currently exists and the wayshich more effective career development
can take place in the future. At the same time, the study hopes to
provide those outside the Service with a knowledge and appreciation of
what it is like to be a government servant in Jordan.
1.2 SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY
In a national study of government servants, selectivity is essen-
tial,	 because they are both numerous and dissimildr in function. In
legal terms, the Jordanian Civil Service covers a wide rane of personnel
paid from public funds including technicians, diplomats, judges, teachers,
clerks, etc. A study ignoring functional differences within such an
indiscriminate grouping would mean very little; yet one taking them all
into account would be prohibitively cumbersome. The present study9
therefore focuses mainly upon finding representative officials drawn
from the whole Service. These are personnel charged with planning,
executing, controlling	 , and approving the endless series of actions
by government workers which collectively constitute the process of govern-
ment	 administration. In defining the sample, additional criteria
must be introduced.
Selection of Organisations
Five departments have been selected, namely	 the Civil Service
Department, National Planning Council, Treasury, Ministry of Education
and Ministry of Agriculture. These departments illustrate different
forms of organisation and management: line and staff, field administra-
tion, hierarchical and dispersed departments, etc. The study therefore
includes organisations which are executive, operational, supervisory,
political, ideological, some centralised and some decentralised. What
are their functions?
The Civil Service Department (CSD)
It is responsible for recruitment, promotion, training,
organisation and management o-F the Civil Service. It is also entrusted
with implementing the Civil Service Regulations, and providing the
departments with the relevant assistance and advice.
The National Planning Council (N.P.C.)
It is responsible for preparing long and short-term plans for the
country's economic development, for establishing priorities and
determining the projects to be implemented. It examines the country's
manpower needs and develops systems for the follow-up and evaluation.i:'.
10
It is directly associated with the Budget Department in setting up
development expenditures in the budget. It is also responsible for
making studies and drawing up, and signing agreements concerning all
loans and aid related to development o-F government administra-
tion	 . It also turned out to have other important functions -For
which we were not prepared.
The Treasury
The Treasury is an "umbrella" department consisting of six
sub-departments, namely, Finance, Budget, Income Tax, Customs, Land
and Survey, and G€#Jera/ Materials. It handles all revenues and expend-
itures of the State, including Civil Service pay. It is still regarded
as the "senior" central department. Its functions are fewer than they
were 20 years ago and particularly since the creation of the Civil
Service Department. But its responsibilities -For the control of public
spending and the general economic performance of the country mean that
it is still an enormously powerful and influential department.
The Ministry of Education
This Ministry is concerned with all forms of public education. It
is entrusted with the establishment, supervision, and administration
of various types and levels of education; the supervision and control
of all private, national and foreign educational institutions. It
encourages and organises youth activities, such as physical education,
military training, camping and boy scouts and girl guides. It
prescribes the curricula and textbooks to be used by all public and
private schools in the country and recruits all teachers to be appointed
in public schools through the Civil Service Department.11
The Ministry of Agriculture
This Ministry is concerned with agricultural development and
all matters related to it. It makes feasibility studies of agri-
cultural projects, co-operates with other sectors of the economy in
preparing the necessary agricultural plans, develops techniques to
improve agricultural methods and offers guidance to farmers. Further-
more, it controls animal diseases, and inspects meat and fish products.
Selection of Management Level
A second criterion used in selection is the position to which an
official is assigned within his organisation. This is considered in
terms of level of responsibility, level of position, function, special-
isation, salary and type of appointment based upon categories o-F the
general grades (i.e.. classified) and departmental grades (i.e. unclass-
ified and contractual) .	 Three basic position levels are here
referred to as "top", "middle" and "lower".
It should be noted that distinction is made between political
(or policy) and non-political (or career) posts. According to the Law
a political post is that of a cabinet minister. These are by
Constitution required to resign when the Cabinet falls. These are
political, not career posts. These posts therefore are excluded from
the study.
In spite of the rapid growth of the Jordanian bureaucracy, the
internal management structure of departments is similar. The highest
career position in a ministry is that of a Permanent Secretary and is
sometimes assisted by a Deputy Permanent Secretary. Each ministry12
also has directorates, headed by directors. 	 Their rank and type
of appointment vary with the size and importance of the agency.
These positions are included in the Study as the "top" level
management.
Directorates are organised into divisions.	 Each of these is
headed by a head of division.	 For the purpose of this study
these positions are classified as "middle" level management. Each
head of division supervises heads of section.	 The "lower" manage-
ment level consists of heads of sections.	 On this basis, 300
officials, divided into three categories were selected, twenty
officials from each level of the three management levels in every
department studied.
Study Methods
Various other methods were used by the Study. First,a
literature review was made of comparable studies and what literature
existed about the state of affairs in Jordan. 17	This included
extensive sets of unpublished reports and statistics.	 Second,	 a
number of key personnel in various departments were interviewed to
obtain "management" judgements on personnel management policies and
practices.	 Third, 300 employees were interviewed and answered 	 the
questionnaire.	 The questionnaire is contained in appendix (2).
Fourth,	 statistical analyses were made of personnel and career
data for the officials in the sample to -Find out how well their own
career goals had been met in the Service.13
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CHAPTER II
ENVIRONIIENT
INTRODUCTION
A fact of life for underdeveloped societies is that a vast
number of people are on the payrolls of their nation 	 governments.
Although the profession of government is reputed to 'be the oldest
of the world's professions, the large number of government employees
today is a relatively recent phenomenon. Jordan has not been
spared from this trend. In 1936 the government employed only 683
officials (civil and military officers) 1 . By 1982 the government
of Jordan at all levels paid the salaries of over 185,000 public
'i^ufr- nearly 47 per cent of the total labour force of the nation.2
Why has the Jordanian bureaucracy grown? How can one explain
why 47 per cent of the nation's labour force are paid out of public
funds? It will be the purpose of this chapter to place the Jordanian
public bureaucracy in its environmental setting - to present some
of the dominant features and influences that helped to shape it into
the complex entity it is today. 3 Five factors will be discussed:
geographical-historical features; demographic characteristics
economic context; social structure; political system; and impact of
cultural factors.
2.1 THE GEOGRAPHICAL-HISTORICAL FEATURES
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an extension of a League of
Nations Mandate which came into existence in 1921. The territorial
area (i.e. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) has not varied significantly15
since that time. But the land itself has a long history of civilised
development among nations of the Middle East. Since the time of the
Crusades the only continuous cultural influence has been the Arab
culture. Because of its position on the great trade routes of the
ancient world, external influences survive.
Until the First World War the area was part of the Ottoman
Empire, which in turn influenced the attitude towards the government
and administration.4 Until the end of the First World War in 1918,
Jordan was physically part o-F Syria. As part of the "carve up" of
middle east territories, Britain and France divided Syria into four
areas: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan.
To rule Trans-Jordan within the terms of British Mandate,
Prince Abdullah (grandfather of the present Monarch) was invited to
Trans-Jordan to establish a Princedom. 5 Jordan was able to achieve
its independence from British Mandate in 1946 and became known as the
Hashemite Kingdom o-F Jordan. Its	 first problem was to absorb
Palestinian Arabs from the newly created State of Israel. In 1950
the Palestinians on the West Bank were united with the East Bank of
B
Jordan.	 In 1967 when the West Bank fell under Israel s occupation,
additional strains were placed upon the government, the availability
o-F resources and their diversion to cope with new problems. A new
Ministry of Occupied Territories was even created to deal with these
problems.
The geographical location of Jordan as a modern State lies
0	 0
between longitudes 39 and 34 east and latitudes 29 and 33 north.
It is situated off the south-east of the Mediterranean sea and extends16
eastward into the Syrian Desert. Its total area is 96,188 square
kilometers (of which the West Bank forms an enclave of 6,644 square
kilometers	 Over 80 per cent of that is desert or semi-desert.8
Nearly 7/Bths of the people live in less than 1/8th of the land,
(the population density at 24 persons per square kilometre). 9 which
is mainly around the Jordan Valley in the north western corner  a-F
the country.
The lands of Jordan can be divided into four major groups. First, there
are	 the arid, desert plains of eastern Jordan suitable for limited
grazing of sheep and goats. Second, the semi-arid plains located
between the desert and the highlands which comprise about 2/3rds of
the land area of Jordan in which the cereal crops, tobacco, some
fruits and vegetables and livestock are raised. Third, the highland
areas are located on both sides of the Jordan Valley in which cereal
crops, olives, and grazing are the principal farming practices. This
area contains public domain lands and generally small village areas.
Fourth, the Jordan Valley area includes a low, flood plain of
approximately 500,000 dunums. In this area are grown citrus,
vegetables, and other types of intensified agricultural crops. This
area offers the greatest agriculture production.1°
According to FAD estimates for 1974, only 12.0 per cent of the
area was arable land, 1.9 per cent under permanent crops and a further
2.3 per cent was used as permanent meadow, pasture or forest. 11 The
climate of Jordan is generally arid and the annual rainfall is
exceedingly variable. There are also great regional differences;
while more than half of the country receives less than 100mm of17
precipitation a year, the northern highland may receive as much as
12
600mm.
Jordan has only one point of access to the sea at the Red Sea Port
of Aqaba. The country is bounded on the north by Syria, on the north-
east by Ira q, on the east and south by Saudi Arabia, and on the west
by Israel. Amman is the capital city, as well as the nation's industrial
and financial centre, with a population of 648,500 in 1979. Other
urban centres include Zarka (215,600), Irbid (112,800) Salt (32,800)
j
and Karak (11,800).13
The people of Jordan are predominantly Arab. There are, however,
a few small non-Arab communities, such as Armenians, Kurds, and the
largest among them, the Circassians who were settled in Jordan during
14	 ,	 .	 .	 . the last century.	 The official' religion of the State is Islam.
The majority of the population are Muslims, though about 7 per cent
are Christian. 15 Arabic is the official language and is universally
spoken by the inhabitants.
2.2 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Population Growth
The population of the East Bank of Jordan is divided into three nearly
equal groups:	 he original inhabitants of Trans-Jordan	 inhabitants
16
of former Palestine; and the Palestine refugees.	 Table 2.1 represents
the population growth of the country.18
TABLE 2.1
Population of Jordan.
Year	 }	 East Bank	 West Bank	 Total
	
-_-	 (000)	 (000)	 (000)
1922	 250	 -	 250
1928	 350	 -	 350
1952	 587	 742	 1,329
1961	 901	 805	 1,706
1979	 2,147	 -	 2,147
Source: Department of Statistics, Annual Statistics Bulletins, Amman.
Table 2.1 demonstrates two main features. Firstly, the traumatic
affect of absorbing Palestinians and consequen	 effects on public
administration, education and social services. Secondly, the problem
facing government in dealing with rapidly growing population dependent
on native resources.
The annual growth rates on the east and west banks combined were
estimated at 2.8 per cent in 1952, and 3.1 per cent in  1961.117) In
the East BankLwere estimated at 3.6 per cent in 1970, 3.4 per cent in
1975 and 3.8 per cent in 1979.h1	 Thus, Jordan occupies the highest
growth rate in the world as shown by Table 2.2.
TABLE2.2
Population Growth Rate by Geographical Area
_______________________________________	 - percentage
Area	 Average growth rate
The World	 2.0
Developed Countries	 0.9
Under-developed countries	 2.4
Jordan	 3.8
Source: Ministry of Labour, Promotion of Population Education, Amman, 1980.19
The high rate of growth in Jordan is due to three principal factors.
First is the continuous influx of Palestinian refugees and other
displaced persons from the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Israeli
occupation of these two areas in 1967. According to the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), there were
about 378,000 registered refugees of 1948 and 295,000 registered
refugees of 1967 on the East Bank of Jordan at the beginning of 1978,
and 193,000 displaced persons (from 1967) were registered with the
19	 -
Jordanian Government only.	 Second is the increasing number of Arab
and non-Arab workers who entered East Bank, especially since 1976.
(20)
The estimated number of these workers was 70,000.	 Third, there
has been an increase in birth combined with a drop in death rates
which resulted in a high natural increase of about 3.8 per cent of
21
population annually, apart from the neg migration factor.	 This is
due to marked progress and expansion of the health and sanitary services.
The crude death rate dropped from 21 per thousand in 1952-54 to 18 per
thousand in 1961, then to 3 per thousand in 1979. The life expectancy at
birth rose from 49 years in 1961 to approximately 57 in 1977. It has shown
a slight increase from 47.3 live births in 1960 to the level of 48 per
thousand in 1978.
Age Structure
The Jordan society is characterised as a "young" one, where those
who are under the age of 15 constitute more than half of the total
population in 1979 (see Table 2.3). The high fertility accompanied
by recent reductions in infant and child mortality have given Jordan a
high proportion of children in the population. The young age compo-
sition means a very high ratio of child dependency. On the other20
hand, the proportion of those who are in the working age (i.e. 15-64)
has declined to 45.4 per cent of total population as shown by Table
2.3, whereas in developed countries this proportion reaches more than
65 per cent of total population.22
TABLE 2.3
Age Distribution of Jordanians (East Bank),1961.
percentages
Age Group	 I	 1961	 1979
Less than 15	 I	 45.5	 1	 51.8
15 - 64	 50.7	 I	 45.4
65 and over	 I	 3.8	 2.8
Sources: Department of Statistics, First Census_of Population and
Housing 1961, Amman, 1961.
Department of Statistics, Housing and Population Census. 1979,
Amman, 1979.
This economically unfavourable age structure has affected greatly
the dependency ratio in Jordan, 120:100 persons in the working age.
This high ratio is further aggravated by the fact that not all of those
in the working age are productive or working. A later chapter
demonstrates that age structure has important consequences for public
pay and pension policy.
In general, the ratio of productive persons  h the household in
the developed countries is 1:3 persons, where it is 1:5 persons in
Jordan. 23 Twenty per cent of the total population in Jordan are working
(see Table 2.4). This is , in turn, mainly due to the low participation
rate of females who are in the working age group in economic activity.21
Although the participation of women (47.7 per cent o-F population) in
the labour force has increased three-fold in the past -Five years, it
was still only about 14 per cent of their total in the working age
124) group in 1979.
TABLE 2.4
Population and Labour Force c-F Jordan, 1975
	
Population	 Work Force	 Crude partici-
____________________ ______________ _____________ pation rate
Inside Jordan	 1,953,061	 382,800	 19.6
(East Bank)
Outside Jordan	 663,700	 150,000	 22.6
All Jordanians	 2,618,700	 532,800	 20.4
- ___________ ______________________
Source: ILO, International Migration Project, Geneva, 1978.
Urban/Rural Distribution
The urban/rural distribution of population reveals that the
urban sector constitutes about 60 per cent of total population (see
Table 2.5).125) This distribution reflects the pattern of rainfall
and cultivation, but other factors have also come into play. The
influx into the country of several hundred thousand reFugees as well
as rapid urbanisation have exacerbated the conditions. About 87 per
cent of the population is concentrated in less than one-eighth of the
land area, in the northwest uplands, while most of the remaining
inhabitants live in scattered areas in various parts of the country.26
This becomes a problem when staffing posts to rural areas, especially
in the Ministry of Education. Internal migration from rural areas is
an important factor in the rapidly increasing population density in22
TABLE 2.5
Population by Governorate and Urban/Rural Area, 1979
(East Bank)
Governorate	 Total	 Urban	 Rural
East Bank	 2,147,065	 1,277,954	 869,111
Amman	 1,185,181	 966,507	 21B674
Irbid	 609,251	 192,648	 416,603
Baiqa	 151,543	 36,694	 114,849
Karak	 126,114	 37,357	 88,757
Ma'an	 74,976	 44,748	 30,228
Source: Department of Statistics, Housing and Population Census 1979,
Amman, 1979.
urban areas. 27 Some of the reasons behind the rural exodus are: the
smallness of individual farm holdings which generate insufficient
income to meet family needs; the unavailability of low-cost agricultural
inputs; and the lack of rural social services.28
Overall, the available statistics indicate if this growth continues
at the present rate until 1990, and it is expected to do so, the
population of the East Bank will become 3.3 million. 29 Assuming a slight
decline in the rate of growth, to 3.8 per cent per annum, the population
will more than double at the end of this century (to about 4.Bm). The
consequence of this for the structure and complexity of the government
is obvious. Also the flow of migrants from rural to urban areas will
certainly continue to pose the greatest socio-economic problems.23
2.3 ECONOMIC CONTEXT
The modern Jordanian economy reflects historical and political
developments as well as showing the aspiration of the new independent
State. The Jordanian economy is considered a growing economy. In
the last quarter century, the economy of Jordan has experienced
comprehensive and structural changes.
The period of 1948-1961 witnessed effective State control of the
Jordanian economy. The 1948 crisis with its economic and population
problems and the inflow of Palestinian refugees to the East Bank
created a setback to economic growth. However, the Confederacy of
the East and West Banks resulted not only in population explosion and
the need for government assistance in social services, but also
created market expansion and the increase of money supply which led
to more investment opportunities. These factors have been conducive to
the creation of various industries such as cement, phosphates, oil,
30
crude oil refining and tanning, vegetables, etc.	 The participation
rate of workers to non-workers was in the range of 23 per cent to
25 per cent at the end of this phase. The labour force was distributed
among the economic activities as follows: Agriculture 3E per cent;
Mining, Manufacturing, Electricity and Construction, 21 per cent; and
Services 44 per cent.131
Although economic growth had been achieved during the period
to 1963, the real need was for an economic national plan. This led to
the setting up of the Economic Development Programme for the period
of 1964-1970. This programme aimed at reducing foreign financial
assistance to the budget and increasing the gross national product by
32
7 per cent per annum as well as reducing the level uemp1oyment.
Despite the development of industrial activity during this plan,24
the distribution of labour force showed that the S ervices Sector
absorbed most of the increase in the labour force and the labour
surplus realised from the Agricultural Sector.33
The Development Plan -For 1973-1975 aimed at increasing employment
opportunities by creating 70 thousand new jobs, achieving an B per
cent annual growth of GOP, developing economic and social activities
in different areas especially rural areas, increasing the reliance of
the general budget on domestic revenues, strengthening the balance of
payment, and reducing the relative increase in the trade deficit.34
The Plan period witnessed a growing activity in the Industrial Sector.
The productive capacity of factories was utilised and the increase of
job opportunities and execution of projects was affected. Annual
growth averaged 23 per cent which exceeds any previous rates. However,
the value added in the Services Sector showed a moderate increase of
3 per cent per annum.35
The Development Plan for 1976-1980 aimed at furthering the
development momentum attained during the previous planforl973-1975
within a comprehensive framework of development strategy, with the
objectives o-F achieving an annual rate of growth of 12 per cent in
GOP, developing social and economic activity in the various regions
of the nation, increasing the reliance of the general budget on
domestic revenues and reducing the deficit in the balance of trade.36
In this phase, the economic performance was characterised by a realiza-
tion of growth rates which were quite close to the targets set by the
plan 37
The Development Plan for 1981-1985 is based on those principles25
and general developmental framework that Jordan had pursued, namely,
a liberal economic system, an appreciation of private initiative and
maintenance of a favourable investment climate, with adequate
incentives to encourage the private sector to play a proper role in the
38
development process.	 The Plan aimed at achieving a real growth
rate in GOP of 10.4 per annum, increasing productive sector's share
in GOP to 44.8 per cent, increasing the  government's domestic revenues
to 35.4 per cent in 1985, reducing the ratio of the deficit in goods
and service balance, providing basic necessities to the citizen and
improving the labour force.39
In 1982, the estimated general budget was JO 765 million. Estimated
domestic revenues reached JO 338, whereas loans and financial assistance
estimated by JO 391 million. Estimated current expenditure was JO 420
million, while estimated capital expenditure was JO 345 million. Table
2.8 represents the distribution of the estimated expenditures (current
and capital) by activity.
TABLE
Estimated Budgetary Expenditure, 1982.
Activity
Public Administration
International Affairs
Culture	 In-Formation Services
Communication	 Transport Services
Social Services
Financial Administration
Oefence	 Security
Economic Development Services
Total
Expenditure	 Percentage
(000)
	
4180
	
0.5
	
5614
	
0.7
	
12999
	
1.7
	
32530
	
4.3
	
94116
	
12.3
	
184028
	
24. 1
	
189750
	
24.8
	
241803
	
31.6
	
765000
	
100
Source: Budget Department, Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 1982, Amman, 1982.26
2.4 SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Jordan -Falls within the scale of social structures of tradition-
transition-modern scale.	 While Jordan might be considered traditional
on the basis of the degree of personalism of social relationships, most
of it qualifies as modern on the basis of its attitude to other
cultures and transitional on the basis of the rate of' change -From
illiteracy. 40	"In Jordan, one passes through the looking glass into
a magic world where extreme modernity rides hand in hand with the
desert 5fiei*s and the old ways of Arabia."41
Traditional societies are typically personalistic and adhere,Ce
to such values tendSto give more importance to who a person is rather
than to what he is capable of doing or has done; to whom one knows
rather than what one knows; and to who are affected by particular events
rather than what the events are. This value orientation is also
reflected in a greater concern for problems of local importance, those
in other words, which affect known people and involve known things,
rather than for issues that are of national and international significance.42
The individual Jordanian can be described as particularistic and
persona]Jstic in ethical orientation, a characteristic which implies
a greater loyalty to one's own group or family than to one's class or
nation. 43 Patai points out:
"In the field of social culture, the most important complex
which is basically similar all over the area (the Middle
East) is undoubtedly the family. The family occupies a
focal position and its structure and functioning are
practically identical not only among nomadic and settled
peoples, but among the majority of urban population in
which Westernization has not yet made appreciable inroads." 44
One of the most salient Jordanian values is a high regard for
authority. Authoritarianism in Jordan is rooted and exemplified in27
the Jordanian family structure. For the -Family to remain close and
secure, the -Father, typically, exerts firm authority and he is to be
respected and obeyed.45
"The father in the Jordanian family plays a dominant role,
and his image is that of a patriarch presiding over his
family's affairs. Once, his authority was rarely ever
questioned and his judgements were -Final." 46
This characteristic also obtains on the societal level and manifests
itself by the tendency for one to look to authority figures for help
in obtaining employment and other benefits.47
• .It would appear to be more than coincidental that countries
with this family system complain of lack of individual init-
iative and pioneering spirit and of nepotism in both business
and government."	 48
Another notable Jordanian trait is the predisposition toward
subordinating one's personal interests and goals to the welfare of
one's family or group.49
"The individual, in Arab thinking, in general, is regarded
as subservient to the group. He is to be developed or,
alternatively, sacrificed for the glory and power of the
group .... What is even more apparent is that the individual
in Arab Society philosophy .... is not regarded as the last
judge of what is good or bad for himself." 50
An important consequence of group-centredness is the lack of a sense
of individual autonomy which reFlects the greater importance placed on
group effort and group prerogative in Jordanian society. 51 Berger
points out:
"Through most of their history, despite the recent intro-
duction of Western political forms, Arab communities have
been collections of groups rather than of individuals.
The family and the tribe have been the social units through
which the individual has related himself to others and to
governments." 5228
Jordanians are generally known -For their excessive concern -For
status in the community. The importance of status consideration can
readily be inferred, for example, by the way people are addressed or
introduced even in social and informal gatherings. 53 An important
consequence of this concern for status is a concern for a hierarchy,
for bureaucratic organisation and hence -For red-tape. 54 Such a
demonstration of formalism is not,however,the way in which the
Jordanian public official does business. On the whole, personal
contact and direct relationship is the key to understand how business
is conducted.
People -From all over the world enjoy having prestige. Jordanians
are by no means different in this respect.	 erger mentioned three
sources of prestige in Arab society, namely: piety, education and
land. 55	To this list one might add the army officers, the higher
public servants, and independent professions (e.g. doctors,
•	 56
engineers, lawyers).
Perhaps the most salient aspect of Jordanian society is the
extent of its segmentation. 57 This structural characteristic has
long been associated with traditional societies, which according to
Lerner:
"deploys people by kinship into communities isolated
-From each other and from a centre	 lacking the
bonds of interdependence, people's horizons are
limited by locale and their decisions involve only
other known people in known societies." 58
Rooted in the kinship system and the personalistic value orientation
of the Jordanians, the segmentation of Jordan society has both vertical
and horizontal manifestation. 59 Jordanians form more or less self29
contained social enclaves which are made up of people from all socio-
economic classes.	 The apex of such social formations is typically
occupied by the wealthiest and, to a large degree,	 the most
powerful.	 This stratum is typically represented by tribal chiefs,
big landlords, entrepreneurs, professionals and, above all y some
members of the Royal Family to whom all otherS are expected to owe
60 loyalty,allegiance.
An important consequence of the kinship based on vertical, ego-
centred segmentation of Jordanian society is the absence of an over-
riding feeling of class identification among Jordanians. 61 It might
be convenient to regard Jordan as a two-class society defined in
economic terms. This might be true in the remote rural areas, but
there also seems to be an emergent middle class in the cities and
towns. 62	This development however has not changed standards of
behaviour and values.63
2.5 POLITICAL SYSTEM
Constitutional Development
The form and pattern of a political system or a government largely
depend upon its constitution. The stages of the constitutional
development in the State of Jordan are as follows.64
The first stage is the period extending from 1921-1928. The first
central administration in the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was established
in 1921.65 During this stage there was no written constitution. The
country was under the League of Nations Mandate, administered by Britain.30
The Mandatory power recognised Prince Abdullah as the Prince of Jordan.
The Prince was empowered by the Mandatory power, to legislate on internal
matters by royal decrees, which had the force of the law. The internal
administration of the country was personally entrusted to the Prince.
Foreign affairs were within the province of the Mandatory power. The
judiciary, although independent in name, did not enjoy the privileges
as an independent organ of the State.
The second stage extended from 1928-1947. The main feature of
this period is that although the country was under British Mandate,
66
there was an Organic Law.	 The Prince was recognised as the Sovereign
and Head of the State. 67	His powers, under the Organic Law, were
very wide. 68 He appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister, civil
69
servants, judges and dissolved the Legislative Council. 	 The
executive power was vested in the Council of Executives, who were
appointed and dismissed by the Prince and were jointly and severally
70
responsible for the administration of the country, to the Prince.
The legislative power was vested in the Legislative Council, whose
members were mostly elected by direct ballot and partly appointed by
71
the Prince.	 The Judicial Power L exercised through courts by
judges whose independence ,L guaranteed by the Organic Law.72
During the third stage (1946-1952), Trans-Jordan achieved
independence and Prince Abdullah was proclaimed King of Jordan. A
(73)
written constitution was promulgated in 1946.	 The King was
recognised as the Sovereign and Head of State and was immune from
74
political liability.	 His powers, under the Constitution, were wide,
but such powers were to be exercised through royal deprees and were
to be signed by either the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister.7531
These powers included: the right to appoint and dismiss the Council
of Ministers; and the right to dissolve the House of Representatives.
The executive power was vested in the Council o-F Ministers who were
jointly and severally responsible to the king for their policies and
77
activities.	 The legislative power was vested in the National
Pssembly. This consisted of two Houses: the House of Representatives,
whose members were elected by direct ballot; and the Senate, whose
members were appointed by the King. 73 The judicial power was vested
in the law courts, whose independence was recognised by the constitution.79
The fourth stage commences in 1952 when a new Constitution was
promulgated. 80 It had become imperative to have a new Constitution
due to the political developments in the area, and also to meet the
changing requirements of the nation.
The King is recognised as the Head of the State and is immune
from political liability. 81	He appoints and dismisses the Prime
Minister or accepts his resignation. Ministers are appointed and released
or their resignation accepted by the King on the recommendation of the
Prime Minister. 82 The King orders the elections for the House of
Representatives with the provision of the law. He convenes, opens,
adjourns. prorogues and dissolves the House of Representatives under
83
the Constitution.	 The King exercises his judicial authority by
84
Royal Decrees.
The legislative power resides in the King and the Parliament.85
The Parliament consists of two Houses: The House of Representatives,
whose members are elected on the basis of direct ballot; and the Senate,
whose members are appointed by the King on the basis o-F meritorious32
86
service and other special qualifications.	 The judicial power is
87
vested in the courts of law.	 The judges are independent, and in
the exercise of their judicial functions, they are subject to no
88
authority but that of the law.
The executive power is vested Ifl the Cabinet. The Council of
Ministers, being the supreme executive body, presides ovet' and controls
government. It does so through Ministries, headed by Ministers; and
independent Agencies, headed by very senior members of the Civil
Service, attached to the Prime Minister. 89	Each Minister is responsible
for the department under his control, and the Cabinet is collectively
90
responsible to the Parliament.
Features of the Political System
The political system o-F Jordan demonstrates several salient
*
features. At the local level, government authorities are numerous,
weak and fragmented. There is a limited degree of parliamentary democracy
91
at the national level. The Parliament is small; there are only
sixty members in the House of Representatives and thirty members in
the Senate. The MPs themselves have a relatively high status in
Jordan. The position's remuneration IS high; selection procedures
screen out the brilliant, innovative and uncontrollable. Thus, the
MPs probably represent a cross-section of Jordan society as opposed
to forming a group of the "best" of the nation's citizens.
Political parties have been banned since the late 1950s. The
members of the Cabinet formed by the King, with complete discretion,
are allocated the portfolios of the various departments and ministries.
The Cabinet is entrusted with the administration of the internal and
*Local Government (i.e. Municipalities and Local Councils).33
external affairs of the State, and with the formulation and implementa-
tion of the country's general policy. The ruling Cabinet o-F twenty three
members is not necessarily selected from the members of Parliament.
A feature of the political system of Jordan is the relatively
low level of conflict. The successive governments differ very little
on basic policies, although one may tend to be more for or against
something than the other. Because Jordan is a small nation where there
is much -Face-to-face contact between policy-makers and the influential,
low conflict and a spirit of consultation may be necessary in order -For
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the political system to survive.	 However, the tendency is -For
business to be done secretly. Laws and ordinances 	 allow or require
the government to keep records, information and procedures from public
scrutiny and some departments carry this restriction to ridiculous levels.
The press is notorious for its spiritless, Cc'-.'4'I	 approach to public
issues. For the most part, reporters fail to search for news and are
content to rewrite press handouts from Ministers, government departments
and interest groups. The radio and television media in Jordan ave
government-owned and, therefore, have never questioned government
decisions and practices.
Jordan's political system does display one great advantage over
many others - stability. With rare exceptions during the 1950s, the
political leaders have shown little inclination to tamper with the
basic machinery and process of government. Perhaps the Jordan social
and political environment do not urge restructuring and perhaps because
MPs are somewhat less than imaginative or dynamic, the basic political
system has remained intact for decades.34
2.6 IMPACT OF CULTURAL FACTORS
Economic, political and other environmental factors are a reflection
of the culture of a middle eastern society like Jordan. In such
societies the most important determinant of progress and development is
the influence of Islam, communicated through the educational system
to those who are to become leaders of the nation. To this extent,
there is a direct relationship between the development of forms of
administrative organisation, behaviour, attitudes and structures and
the way in which people are educated. Present arrangements for
education therefore deserve some discussion.
Demography and Education
One way of analysing the educational achievements of a country
is to present them quantitatively vis-a-vis the demographical facts
of the country. According to the statistical data of 1976, 29.3 per
cent of the population surveyed were illiterate (yearly 41 per cent
of women compared with 17.8 per cent among men') . The incidence of
illiteracy was found to be greater in rural areas at 44.3 per cent than
[.93)
in urban areas where the frequency was 26.0 per cent.
On the East Bank in 1976, ninety per cent of children in the
6-11 age group were attending primary schoolo, 77 per cent in the 12-14
age group were attending preparatory schools, and 53 per cent in the
(94)
15-17 age group were attending secondary schools .	 At the higher level
o-F education ,the enrolment ratio for the 18-22	 age group was
(95)
estimated at 21 per cent which is one of the highest in the world.
Table 2.7 shows school enrolment in 1976.35
TABLE 2.7
School Enrolment by Sex and Level of Education, 1976
(East Bank)
Level	 Age	 Males	 I Females	 Total
_________________ Group	 ______________ ______________ _____________
Primary	 6-11	 214,570	 187,831	 402,401
Preparatory	 12-14	 71,733	 53,249	 124.982
Secondary:	 15-17
General	 31,450	 21,711	 53,121
Vocational	 5,430	 2,117	 7,547
Higher Education 18-22
University	 4,373	 2,465	 6,839
Teaching
Institutes	 4,283	 2,723	 7,006
Vocational	 1,487	 403	 1,890
Institutes____________ ______________ ______________ _____________
Total	 333,337	 270,499	 503,536
ources:	 Ministry of Education, Education in Jordan in Figures 1976-77,
Amman, 1977.
I.S. Sha'Ban, Development of a Plan for Evaluating the Secondary
Education System: The Diversification Programme in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, Paris, 1979.
In 1980 over one-third of the population was reported to be
(96)
attending schools.	 Exactly 93 per cent of children in the 6-11 age-
group of the population were attending primary schools and 87 per cent
in the 12-14 age group were attending preparatory schools. 67.3 per
cent in the 15-17 age group were attending secondary schools, and 21 per
(97)
cent in 18-23 age group were attending higher education.36
The Structure of the Educational System
Education in Jordan is centrally controlled by the Ministry of
96
Education.	 It is free for all. Girls and boys have equal
opportunities to learn, and there is no discrimination whatsoever in
education among people of different creeds and religions.
Pre-school education in kindergartens is provided by private
agencies.* Children are accepted in these institutions if they are
over three years of age. The Ministry of Education has issued
regulations concerning the administration of kindergartens. According
'5
to these regulations, attendance at kindergartens/-For two years
preceding primary education.
At the age of six, children normally start the six years of
primary education. The primary level is followed by three years of
preparatory level. All students who pass their school exams at the
end of the third preparatory class are advanced to the secondary level.
The duration of the secondary level is of three years. Education
at this level is provided by secondary general schools (i.e. secondary
comprehensive schools)and secondary vocational schools. The latter
include the commercial, agricultural, industrial, postal and nursing
schools. Students for all types of secondary schools sit for the
General Secondary Education Examination. Those who pass the examination
are entitled to pursue their education in institutes of higher learning,
both in Jordan and abroad.
Higher education in Jordan is provided by higher institutes.
These include teaching institutes and professional institutes of two/three
*Kindergarten means noneducational child supervision.37
year education;	 and universities.	 Presently, there are three
universities in Jordan: the University of Jordan, the University of
Yarmouk, and the University of Mu'ta.
Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 show some characteristics
of the education system in Jordan.
TABLE 2.8
Comparative Statistics of Population, Students, Teachers and Schools
1922* 1	 1930*	 1940*	 1950	 1960	 1970* 11980*
Population	
250,000 350,000 700,000 1,250,000 1700000 1508000 2227000
Students
	
2,316	 4,698	 10,150	 76,957 189138	 261000 778733
Teachers	
81	 122	 184	 1,723	 5875	 8021	 27039
Schools	
44	 54	 74	 402	 1141	 1170	 2691
*East Bank only
Sources: Ministry of Education, History of Education in Jordan 1921-1970,
Amman, 1971.
Ministry of Education, Statistical Educational Yearbook 1950/51
1970/71 and 1980/81. Amman.
All Maha-Pdah, Contemporary History of Jordan, The Era of the
Emirate of Trans-Jordan, Amman, 1973.
Department of Statistics, Annual Statistics BulletLns, Amman.	
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TABLE 2.10
Students Population by Level of Education, 1980/81
tast UanKJ	 Vercentages
Level of Education	 Total	 Male	 Female
Total	 100	 53.7	 46.3
Kindergarten	 2.5	 1.4	 1.1
Primary	 58.3	 30.5	 27.8
Preparatory	 21.2	 11.5	 9.7
Secondary	 13.1	 7.5	 5.6
Higher Education	 4.9	 2.8	 2.1
Source: Ministry of Education, The Statistical Educational Yearbook 1980/81,
Amman, 1981.
TABLE 2.11
Illiteracy Ratios Among Population by Sex, 1961 and 1979
(East Bank)	 Percentages
Year	 I	 Total	 I	 Male	 Female
1961
	
67.6
	
49.9	 84.8
'1979
	
34 . 6
	
19.9	 49.5
Source: Department of Statistics, Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic
Characteristics of Women in Jordan, Amman, 1981.
TABLE 2.12
Graduates by Academic Qualification and Sex, 1950/81
(East Bank)
Qualification	 Graduates	 Percentage	 Male 1 Female
Secondary Certificate	 23,366
	
75.4
	
42.3
	
33.1
Teaching Institute Diploma	 4,810
	
15.5
	
7.7
	
7.8
University Degree	 2,824
	
9.1
	
6.2
	
2.9
Total	 31,000
	
100
	
56.2
	
43.8
Source: Ministry of Education, Statistical Educational Yearbook 1980/81,
Amman, 1981.40
Identification of Major Problems
The major issues and problems of education could be identified
as follows. First, there are imbalances of provision of education between
urban and rural areas. That is all vocational secondary schools, of
three years duration, except the two agricultural schools which are
located in the southern part of the country, and all training centres,
of two years duration, are located in urban areas. Although male students
of rural areas join secondary vocational schools, most of them prefer to
join general secondary schools in their areas. Also, a high proportion
of those who join drop out through the three years for different social
and economic reasons. In general, girls from rural areas are completely
deprived of joining any type of vocational education.
Statistics o-F 1977 indicate that out of the 134 general secondary
schools in the rural areas, 55 only are completed secondary schools,
that is they contain tenth, eleventh and twelfth grades. The rest are
99 incomplete.	 As a result of these imbalances, rural students are
deprived of science and technology education except, on the one hand,
a small number from well-to-do families, who can continue or join scientific
education in urban schools. On the other hand, are those students, willing
to joint scientific and higher education who put pressure upon their parents.
Many families leave their villages for cities, thus evacuating rural
areas, which consequently adversely affects agriculture in the country.
Second, imbalance among schools themselves. Newly constructed
schools are of a high standard, well-equipped and furnished, and
provided with suitable libraries, laboratories and games fields, while
a high proportion of the owned old schools and all the rented schools41
are lacking adequate classrooms, equipment, furniture, libraries, etc.
The very high proportion of' rented premises and the inadequate
school buildings in which students have to learn is considered one of
the most disturbing -Features of' education in Jordan. The percentage
of rented premises at both compulsory and secondary levels 1980/81
was 41 per cent. The conditions of' these schools, particularly in
rural areas, are totally unsuitable for the learning process; they
do not meet the requirements of' education, and thus they must have
adverse effects on the quality o-F education.
Moreover, there is no satisfactory maintenance of school premises,
even the newly erected proper school buildings, with resultant
deterioration. So there is a need for a much larger capitalisation
element within the budget of the Ministry of Education than the 8.2
per cent (capital outlays 1980/81) which is allocated -For development
purposes.
Third, there is a shortage of' qualified teachers and personnel. Another
disturbing feature of education at the secondary level is the shortage
of' qualified teachers, particularly teachers of vocational education,
mathematics, sciences and English language. 10° Statistics of' 1981
indicate that the percentage of qualified teachers, "Holders of first
university degree and above, which their qualifications meet the
requirements of secondary school teachers as stated by the law of
education", was 78.5 per cent in general secondary schools and 41 per
cent in vocational secondary schools. 10'	The main reason is the low
scale of salaries in Jordan. As a result, university graduates are not
attracted to the prof'ession of teaching. Also, many qualified teachers
on the job and officials of' the Ministry of' Education in the area of42
administration, planning and technical work, leave Jordan for better
salaries abroad. Such a drain of qualified manpower puts the govern-
ment in a difficult situation, especially at the stage of implementing
development programmes, including educational reform.
Fourth, there is a gross imbalance between general and vocational
education at the secondary level. A ratio of 84 per cent general to
16 per cent vocational points out that the diversification of secondary
education: (a) will not be able to achieve the target of expanding
vocational education at the secondary level	 so as to raise enrolment
in the first secondary vocational class (Grade 10) to 30 per cent of
total enrolment of that class by 1985; (b) still falls short of
fulfilling the needs of the students and the country in occupational
training.
A critical shortage in the projected labour demand in the Five
Year Development Plan(1981-1985)exists in two occupational categories.
()	 technical and"sub-professional"occupations ai2d (6) skilled
102
manual occupations.	 It is worth noting that the supply for these
two categories is expected to be completely dependent on output of
the Jordanian educational institutions and schools. This shows the
importance of the problem, and the urgency of diversification of
secondary education and the expansion of vocational education.
Fifth, education is still of the traditional type. The curriculum
of general secondary schools which accommodate 84 per cent of the total
enrolment, is slanted very much towards "academic" education, and not
related to the world of work. For a high percentage of general43
secondary school graduates, secondary education will be terminal,
no opportunity existing to join higher education. Their low achieve-
ment in the General Secondary Examination Certificate is partly the
result of economical and social reasons. Also, a considerable
percentage o-F drop-out occurs during the three years of the level.
A major problem which arises is that these under-educated
young people have no training of any kind or occupational education
to help them enter the world of work. They are forced to adapt
themselves, for two or three years after graduation, to tasks and
jobs in establishments which would employ them, because of the
shortage of skilled needed labour force at that level, which in turn
adversely affects the quality and quantity of production.
Overall, clearly such a situation is not encouraging for real
development and improvement within the cycle of national planning.
A vicious cycle has been created as thousands of students continue to
be disadvantaged by an increasingly outmoded and useless system of
education. The longer the present educational system continues to
operate along these lines,the more difficult it will be for Jordan
to achieve a public service trained for the achievement of a
sufficiently rapid rate of growth.44
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CHAPTER III
ORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
By comparison with other organisations in Jordan society, the
public bureaucracy is a large, complex and constantly changing
entity. Many of the government departments are larger than any
organisation in the private sector of the economy. Yet outside of
the government service, very little is known about the internal
process o-F the bureaucracy or about the personnel of the various
departments. In terms of the level o-F information and knowledge,
the bureaucracy is a "grey area" - unknown to those not a part o-F
it and obscure to many who work within it.
At the same time, a public bureaucracy has to be organised to
per-Form functions of varying kinds, requiring varying skills at
varying levels. Effective organisation is an essential ingredient
in any development programme. This has been found as true in
Jordan as in all developing countries, even countries which have
been independent -For many years. 1 The push for economic develop-
ment and innovations in government administration has produced a
critical need -For a steady pool of qualified manpower.
It is the purpose of this chapter to sketch the dimensions of
the Jordanian administrative system. These include development of
the civil service and its structure demonstrated by growth patterns,
size and distribution of manpower, structure and functions, and
the present system of service-wide position classification.51
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE STRUCTURE
The Ottoman Law was operated in Trans-Jordan until 1925. In
that year	 new Civil Service Regulations were enacted in the
2 Emirate.	 One of the conspicuous features of the organisation
structure provided for by these Regulations 	 the division of the
career ladder into ten grades.3
After independence the government increasingly realised the
necessity for change. 4 Between 1949-1952 several regulations were
passed which attempted to adapt the civil service to changing needs.5
The regulations require both central and departmental appointments.
as follows: 5 (a) the appointment of class I (Grades 1 - 5) is made
by the Council o-F Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister
concerned with the approval of the King. (b) Each Ministry has its
own committee for selection and promotion. 7 Class II (Grades 7 - 10)
is appointed by the Minister concerned on the recommendation of the
selection committee in the department concerned. (cj The appoint-
ment o-F the unclassified class is made by the Minister concerned on
the recommendation o-f the head of the department concerned.
However, these regulations appeared to be defective for many
14
reasons. Most important	 the inability to provide for a public
service equipped to meet current needs. This, in turn. limitedthe
ability to meet increasing public demands for more jobs and better
services, etc. As a result, the increased importance of specialisa-
tion within the government is not reflected by the numbers of52
specialised personnel. Manpower development has been sacrificed
because of limited funds. 8 In addition, politicians wanted their
own civil servants as consultants and advisers by setting up
"political jobs" through a "contractual" scheme. As a result,the
Cabinet asked all departments to introduce suggestions in order to
'9
formulate a new career ladder .	 Some ministers suggested that
wages and salaries should be fixed on the basis of performance,
responsibilities and value of the work, together with the academic
qualifications. Permanent secretaries and heads of departments on
the other hand,proposed to give L greater authority and higher
responsibilities; to reduce the grades within the "ladder" to seven
instead of ten; to make ineligible for promotion officials to the three
most senior grades without a university qualification; and to establish
a Central Selection Board for appointment and promotion.10
By 1952 certain problems became evident. A joint cormiittee of
the Cabinet and Parliament was formed to look specifically and
systematically at the relationships between grades, jobs and
appropriate salaries. 11 The Organisation Law of Government Apparatus,
No. 57 of 1953 required appointment of committees whose decisions
about appointment were obligatory. In reality, however, those
committees had not any practical influence.12
Between 1953 and 1958 other problems began to emerge. These
included relating salaries to cost of living, providing appropriate
pension, death benefits and benefits for dependents. A further
serious problem which had arisen by this time was the growth of53
unclassified employees and the creation of a contractual class.
These developments were a result of using the departments' dis-
cretion to employ additional staff as required. This increase was
made possible by the willingness of the Budget Department to
provide additional payments for th	 employment of specialised
staff to be known as a "contractual class" in departments with
expanding development programmes. 13 This development demonstrates
the weakness o-F the control of the Central Personnel Agency.
These and other problems brought about the decision of the
government in 1961 to invite Sir Eric Franklin, a United Nations
Adviser, to prepare a report on what changes should be made in the
structure of the Civil Service to accommodate the many problems
which had arisen, and to provide a basis for future development.
The most significant result of his report was the Civil Service Law
No. 26 of 1961.(14) The Law established a Central Selection Board
for all classified officials under the Chairmanship of the Head of
the Civil Service Department. It makes binding decisions.15
In 1963 members of the Central Selection Board were reduced
from 5 to 3 members. The significant feature of this reduction is
the exclusion of the Head of the Audit Bureau - who reports to the
16 Parliament rather than to the Prime Minister.	 Without the
parliamentary watchdog to take note of expenditure and the way
appointments are made, the government had created greater flexibility
in taking decisions about the management of the Civil Service. The
Civil Service Law, No. 48 of 1963 which restructured the Civil
Service, demonstrates a new approach to civil service management.17
New duties were given to the Central Personnel Agency which was
established in 1955, but had not enjoyed great power to supervise54
the administrative apparatus of the government.
From this date (1963) the role of the Civil Service Department
which already existedwas to be much increased. Together with the
8udget Department, it was to make regulations to control civil service
affairs, including organisation and grading. This decision gave rise
to dispute between government and Parliament in connection with the
interpretation of Article 120 o-F the Constitution. The latter
provides government administration and civil service matters shall be
governed by regulations made by the Cabinet with the approval of the
19	 .	 .	 .	 .
King.	 It has been argued that this provision limits civil service
matters to the regulatory field and tocontrolth B Executive
Authority, to the exclusion of the legislature.
In accordance with Article 122 of the Constitution, the matter
was presented to the High Tribunal for the Interpretation of the
21	 . Constitution.	 They laid down that the legislative body may not
legislate on matters covered by Article 120 c-F the Constitution.
These relate to any law dealing with such matters and state that they
will be deemed unconstitutional. 22 Accordingly, the Civil Service
Law No. 48 of 1963 was considered invalid and was replaced by the
Civil Service Regulations, No. 74 o-F 1965. (23)
This dispute about management 42f control of the Civil Service
obscured the problem about structure and salaries. In 1966 the
government set up a commission to review the conditions of service
for government servants. The commission was required to make
recommendations for ensuring a high and uniform standard of education,
qualifications and competence on the part o-F employees, and to suggest55
methods of regulating such matters as standard of recruitment,
training, promotion, pay, discipline, etc. As a result, the Civil
Service Regulations, No. 23 of 1966 were introduced. These
continue to the present day.24
The main fault of the Jordan Administration has generally
been defective application of the principles on which the Service
is based, not the principles themselves. The essence of the
current dilemma is the implication which a small change in the
mode of application of regulations has for the whole government
service. This problem grows as the Service expands.
3.2 GROWTH, SIZE AND DISTRISUTION
Since creation of the State there has been a considerable
increase in the size of the government service in Jordan from 683
employees (civil personnel and military officers) 25 to more than
70,500 employees in 198226)	 In a country with a population of
2,375,000,the structure of the government is exceedingly complex
and the huge numbers of officials scattered in an intricate
assembly of departments and corporations. This is due to the
expansion of government activities to the point where the public
sector occupies the highest percentage of labour among all the
main groups of economic activities. 27 (See Table 3.1).1970
1971
1975
1980
1982
Sources:
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TABLE 3.1
Labour Force and Employment by Economic Sector on the East Bank, 1982
Economic Sector	 Number of Workers	 Percentage of
______________________________	 (000's)	 Total Employment
Public Sector	 186.2	 47.5
Construction	 53.3	 13.5
Agriculture	 40.3	 10.3
Wholesale and Retail Trade	 36.0	 9.7
Mining and Manufacturing	 36.7	 9.4
Transport and Communication	 32.5	 8.3
Electricity	 5.1	 1.3
Total Employment	 392.0	 100.0
Seeking work	 6.0	 2.0
Total Labour Force	 400.0	 102.0
Source: Department of Statistics, Annual Statistics Bulletin 1982, Amman,1982.
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 34 indicate growth and size of the government
service.
TABLE 3.2
Growth Of the Civil Service on the East Bank
Year Population	
Employees	
Percentage of increase
(000's)
1500
	
27023
1560
	
28174
	
104
1820
	
38329
	
141
2227
	
65041
	
240
2375	 70540	 261
Statistics Department, Annual Statistics Bulletins, Amman.
Budget Department, Annual Posts' Establishment Regulations, Amman.57
As Table 3.2 indicates the extent of central government employ-
ment and its growth increased 261 per cent during the previous decade.28
This is accounted for mainly by operations related to the economic
development and other public service provision required by citizens
in a growing State. The introduction of the development programmes
ha	 led to an increase in the size of the Service. The size of the
successive soclo-economic plans is an indication of the expansion of
the bureaucracy.	 Their application create new jobs and opportunities
for work.29
I
From Table 3.4 two points are notable. The total size of the
Civil Service looks much as one would expect for a developing nation
like Jordan. This is attributable to the fact that the bulk of the
people regard working for the government as the main source of
employment. Over a quarter of the people questioned during the field
work survey said that what they most valued from a government service
job was the status which gives them prestige, power and ability to
influence others. Second, departments range in size in relation to
functions being performed. This is emphasised with the increasing
intervention of the government in the development of national resources.
For example, the Ministry of Youth and Culture, relatively unaffected
by the scale of national development, still maintains only 23
officials. By contrast, the Ministry of Education now employs nearly
41,000 people. Over 85 per cent of employees are working for
Ministries of Education, Health, Communications, Agriculture and71
60
81
76
93
112
115
191
268
272
346
399
468
516
831
1004
1028
1118
1238
1357
2414
3198
5688
8942
40672
70540
0.1
0.09
0.09
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.7
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.9
3.4
4.5
8.0
12.7
57.7
100.0
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TABLE 3.4
Size of Government Departments, 1982*
Department
	
Employees I Percentage
Royal Hashemite Court
Parliament
Cabinet and Prime Ministry
Civil Service Department
Ministry of Occupied Territories
National Planning Council
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Labour
Audit Bureau
Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs
Ministry of Youth and Culture
Ministry of Tourism
Ministry of Supply
Ministry of Industry and Trade
Ministry of Information
Ministry of Social Development
Ministry of Public Works
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Communications
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Education
Total
*Figures include departments affiliated to the Ministries. For
example: the Ministry of Youth and Culture (23 employees) has three
departments affiliated to it, namely, Youth and Sports Organisation
(188 employees), Culture and Arts Department (93 employees) and Dept.of
National Libraries and Documentation (44 employees). For details
see: Government of Jordan, Budget Department, Posts Establishment
Regulations 1982, Amman, 1982.60
Treasury, and nearly 14 per cent in the remaining departments.
Jordan possesses a big educational system. Eight per cent
of the total general budget goes to education, which is the largest
single item of the national expenditure. 30 Not all of this
education provision is made directly by the State, although the
Ministry of Education has the responsibility for determining the
curriculum and for co-ordinating the various providers of educa-
31
tion services.
The government is also responsible for the Health Service,
Post and Telecommunications, Railways and Communications, apdiAgri-
cultural services. All these activities are also labour intensive.32
The large size of the Treasury is accounted for by the variety of
functions which is performed beyond the central management of the
economy. For example, it is responsible for collection of taxes,
customs and excise duties, lands and survey services. However,
not all the important functions of the government have grown as
rapidly as the Ministry of Education and others. Central manage-
ment departments like the Budget Department remain small. Another
strategically important department like the National Planning
Council does not need to grow beyond a certain size.
To indicate functional distribution of government employees,
departments have been categorized into eight major functional
33	 . groups.	 (See Chart 3.5). The Chart indicates the overwhelming
majority o-F permanent employees engaged in three major areas:
social services; transport and corrniunications; development and62
conservation of resources. The other categories of function in
the Chart contain about 10 per cent of public service personnel.
Within the Service, several departments serve to control and
co-ordinate other departments. The most important are the Civil
Service Department	 (CSD), Budget Department and National
Planning Council. The main function of the CSD is reviewing the
machinery of government, the desirability of or need for creation
of new jobs, reviewing the efficiency and economy of each department,
approving and reviewing establishments of staff. To support this
work,the CSD is supposed to prescribe basic training programmes,
providing management consultation services and acting as the
central personnel authority for the public service. 33 By exer-
cising these functions, the CSD and its staff are often brought
into conflict and disagreement with personnel in other departments.
What the CSD may regard as properly carrying out its duties, the
affected personnel may interpret as bothersome red-tape and meddling.
While the Civil Service Department is concerned with personnel
and organisations structures, the Budget Department is responsible
for "establishment control". It is also responsible for matters
34
relating to finance and financial control.	 Though its respons-
ibility for supervising the financial activities of departments, the
Budget Department exercises a very important influence over
practically all State administration. Its power is evident at all
stages of the discussion of any proposal involving the expenditure
of public money, from the time of initial planning and Cabinet
approval, through the actual expenditure of the amount concerned. As63
with the Civil Service Department, the Budget Department and its
officials can generate ill-feeling in other departments as power
and authority are exercised. New programme proposals must be
checked out and expenditure on existing programmes co-ordinated.
The National Planning Council is responsible for longer term
development of the economy and basic resources, external funding,
contractual training and introduction of new ideas about public
sector management. 36 It is a body with unique status in the
Jordanian administration. No one can understand the government
service in Jordan without understanding the National Planning
Council. Indeed, almost all important decisions about use of
resources and manpower. development are arranged between the National
Planning Council and the Budget Department. This discussion
serves to emphasise that size and importance are not necessarily
synonymous. These departments are relatively small in size (Civil
Service Department, 76; 6udget Department, 59; National Planning
Council, 120 officials).
3.3 PDSITIDN CLASSIFICATION
Classification is an indispensable step in the building of a govern-
ment	 service. It involves the identification and description of
the different kinds o-F work in an organisation and thereafter the
grouping of similar positions into classes under common job titles.
A class in this sense is a group of positions sufficiently similar64
in duties and responsibilities that (a) the same title can
appropriately be used to describe them; (b) the same salary
range can be applied with equity among them. 37 In certain
instances, a -Further criterion might be the requirement to
possess the same standards of education and experience (or more
likely the same professional knowledge or academic qualifications).
In the public service context a classification system eliminates
the question o-F the pay of individuals -From the realm o-F political
controversy, inequality and favouritism.
Position classification is a concept which has not hereto-Fore
been applied to the government service in Jordan. There has been
use made of so-called "jurisdictional classification", which refers
to the grouping of positions on the basis of the degree of control
exercised by the Central Personnel Agency over such matters as
recruitment, appointment, tenure and security of employees covered.38
In Jordan, however, neither central control nor central classifica-
tion exist. The data shows for example, that three people working
for different departments - Education, Agriculture and The National
Planning Council, carrying out comparable jobs, are listed
respectively - Deputy of Assistant Undersecretary, Provincial
Manager and Inspector'. They belong to different categories -
classified, unclassified and contractual - with different bases of
recruitment (central or departmental). They do not have the same
level o-F salary, although they have the same degree of responsibility.
Thus jurisdictional classification is a concept which made them
separately different.85
The system of classification in Jordan is based on education
and qualifications, nature of work performed, level of respons-
ibility and level of salary,etc	 These provide the four main
jurisdictional classifications, but each of them is again subject
to a varying set of requirements on such matters as method of
appointment and promotion, appointing authority, fixing of salaries,
eligibility for pension and allied benefits, job rights and
disciplinary procedures, leave benefits and other conditions of
employment. 39 The result is a civil service divided into groups, namely
classified, unclassified and contractual officials (see Chart 3.6).
Classified officials are centrally appointed on a permanent
basis to "classified posts". These include the Higher Grade Posts;
*
Special Grades; Class I (Grades  I - 6); and Class II (Grades 7 - 10).
(See Chart 3.7). The members of the Higher, Special and Class I
Grades are "gazetted" officers, i.e. their names appear in the
Official Gazette. 4°	 They are invested with greater powers and
responsibilities for policy development and management and
constitute a 'top management team'. By far the bulk of the
government employees belong to Class II.
There are also "unclassified" officials who are appointed
departmentally on a permanent basis to posts with salaries specified
in the Posts' Establishment Regulations, on scale specified for
general grades, issued annually by the Budget Department or in the
regulations governing autonomous corporations for the posts in which
no grades exist. The data demonstrates that an officer who is in
Class I, Grade 5, occupying the post of Inspector in the Ministry of
*Classified officials of Grade  I and above are appointed by the Cabinet,
whereas officials below Grade I are appointed by the Selection Board
(CSD).86
Education, where the level of general grades is very high, is
equivalent to an officer who is unclassified, occup ying the same
post in the Ministry of Agriculture. However, both of these
categories of employee work under the control of the same 'top
management team' within each department. The creation of this
category is justified on the grounds that its members possess
lower academic qualifications at entry than those in other
categories. At the same time, the government is anxious to employ
personnel with a minimum cost. Since this category is non-
41 pensionable, a substantial long-term saving is made.	 (See
Chart 3.8).
Third come contractual officials who are appointed for a
limited period to specialised posts on fixed salaries through
contracts concluded between them individually and the Minister on
behalf of the government. This type of periodic employment is
especially prevalent in departments like the National Planning
Council. The survey data shows that jobs as dispersed as 'expert',
'consultant', 'adviser' and 'researcher', are performed on a
contractual basis. In addition, this category covers the employment
of outside officials drawn mainly from regional and international
organisations. 42 (See Chart 3.9).
Finally, there are temporary and daily wage employees,
consisting of unskilled manual workers hired as needed by the
departments. For the purpose of this study, however, these positions
are not considered.71
Effects of Classification System
Although the sample was designed primarily to overcome the
difficulty of classification by analysing the activities of
government servants in terms of level of management in particular
departments, the Charts and Tables in this Chapter indicate that
the sample is representative of the	 classification structure
*
throughout the Service. The attitudes expressed by officials in
the sample on the subject of grading and classification are,
there-Fore, made even more relevant.
Our sample were asked to express their view on the present
classification system. The majority of unclassified officials,
(75 per cent), strongly advocated the amalgamation o-F the two
major classes, i.e. classified and unclassified into an integrated
system a-F classification. Their argument is based on the grounds
that in the government bureaucracy there is not much difference
between classified and unclassified officials at the same level of
management, regarding the nature of the work they do, degree of
responsibility they hold and the basic educational and technical
qualifications they require. They also insist that so-called
"breadth of vision" which the members of general grades are expected
to bring to the Service are in reality synonymous with "inexperience".
On the other hand, members o-F unclassified classes point out that
an advantage of a single amalgamation grading and classification
structure would be to provide to the people In unclassified grades
the benefits of	 pensions and other fringe
benefits awarded to those in existing classified grades. However,
* The distrIbution a-F classes within the sample a-F 300 was: Class I
29.7 per cent, Class II 41.0 per cent, Unclassified 26.0 per cent,
and contractual 3.3 per cent.72
the Treasury states that the -Financial cost of such amalgamation
would be unacceptable. But already some members of departmental
grades, particularly technical and contractual personnel draw more
salary than classified grades (see Table 3.10). Hence the
financial effect of the proposed amalgamation might be negligible.
A final point made by unclassified officials relates to status
rather than financial rewards. They see themselves as a sort of
"second class" group of government servants, since only the
classified officials enjoy the fullest array of benefits and
protections.
Another view of the grading system is put forward by classified
officials in the sample. Over one half (58 per cent) of classified
grades advocate the retention of the present classification system
in Jordan. They advance the argument that the correct course is to
examine the criteria which underlie the -Formulation of each ôategory
and to make its retention or abolition depend upon the soundness or
otherwise of these criteria. They point out that classified members
of the Service have to possess high academic and professional
qualifications. They add that these are (or should be) appointed
on the basis of competitive examination or selection test, either
conducted centrally by the Civil Service Department or departmentally
by agreed procedures. In contrast, insofar as competitive examination
or selection test held either centrally or departmentally is a 'test
of man's general or technical ability'; the members of unclassified
grades lack that ability because, ex-hypothesi, they either failed
or did not attend at all to take the examination.* In other words
* The truth of this assertion could not be confirmed or denied
by the researcher by any sources.73
TABLE 3.10
Comparative Payment of Classes and Grades. 1982.
Percentages
Basic Salary	 Number
(J.D.)	 of
per month	 Employees	 Classified	 Unclassified Contractual
36-43
44-51
52-59
60-6 7
68-7?
78-89
90- 101
102-113
114-131
132- 149
150-168
169 -200
201- 300
301-400
401-500
501-6 50
9589
19069
9690
9566
9727
6080
3524
1606
711
331
366
83
123
34
26
13
13.5
64.0
76.0
86.0
90.0
88.5
91.6
91.5
88•0
83.4
65.5
50.6
64.2
Nil
Nil
Nil
82.0
34.0
21.4
10.0
8.4
8.6
4.5
2.7
4.0
4.0
0.8
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
4.5
2.0
2.6
4.0
1.6
2.9
3.9
5.8
8.0
12.6
33.7
49.4
35.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: Budget Department, Posts' Establishment Regulations for 1982,
Amman, 1982.
* The above table relates to Charts 3.7, 3.8. 3.9. It provides an
idea of government policy in terms of employment, relative costs
and salaries. It explains classified grades and their equivalent
in unclassified and contractual classes. For instance, the salary
range of Grade 10 in the classified class is 36-43 Jordanian Dinars
per month which is equivalent to the salary of similar positions
in other categories.74
members of classified category, who are young men o-F high academic
qualifications and technical skills are destined to rise to positions
of higher responsibility, while the members of other categories,
who are older with comparatively low academic and professional
qualifications fall in different distinct categories. The majority
o-F classified officials, therefore, are of the view that the
amalgamation of all classes in such a manner as will put them in
an equal position with regard to the right to transfer and promotion
to superior posts would be wrong in principle. It would affect
efficiency and be unfair to direct recruits to classified posts.
Also, the proposed amalgamation will impose additional burdens on
the exchequer as the present pay-scale of other classes is lower
as compared with the scale of classified officials. However,
despite this general view, as much as 30 per cent of the classified
officers are of the view that the claims of qualified unclassified
officials for promotion must be more clearly and liberally recognised.
One must,therefore,conclude that classification needs re-
examination. It may be necessary to elaborate the classification
of the Service further. It is open to question whether it is
any longer desirable and accurate to divide the administrative
hierarchy into four levels of responsibilities to correspond with
four categories of public servants. The increasing activities of
the government for socio-economic development of the country have
led to an expansion of the Service and introduced more functional
diversification within it. In addition, while some distinctions
among employees are necessary to recognise basic differences in
the nature of the employment relationship, the Service could move
in the direction of unifying the conditions of employment. This75
would help in: firstly, promoting equality of treatment, flexibility
of movement and the "career" concept among all employees; and
secondly, simplifying the administration of the government service.
Empirical investigations have thus led us to conclusions which
43 are confirmed by findings in other reports,	 and the opinion of
officials who have been interviewed during the field work survey.
There is a basic need for a position classification plan in the
government service. Such a classification should aim at overcoming
the five major deficiencies identified in the present classification
system in Jordan.
First, there needs to be a sound base for the scheme of salaries.
A position classification plan would provide a factual basis
for logically and consistently related scales of pay relative to
work assigned. The principle of "equal pay for equivalent work"
requires two determinations: (a) what the work of each position is,
and (b) whether the work is in reality equivalent. By grouping
comparable positions into a single class there is automatic
assurance that all positions in the class will receive equal pay.
Further, the class specifications will be of material assistance
in determining the "right" pay scale, clarifying the relationships
between positions and comparing pay rates of government jobs with
those in private employment and those offered by other governments.
The ranking of classes within occupational groups in the classifica-
tion plan facilitates the assignment of higher pay scales for the
more responsible and skilled work and lower pay scales for the less
responsible and unskilled work.76
Second, there needs to be uniform occupational terminology.
A position classification plan would establish a common language
consisting o-F a uniform, significant and defined terminology for the
naming of positions. It would designate positions by titles
corresponding to the work and level of each position. It will enable
all concerned to speak about positions in commonly understood terms.
Third, there needs to be a convenient source of in-Formation for
evaluating and controlling staffing authorizations in the budget.
When requests are made for either job replacement or addition,
a position classification plan will indicate the nature of the
service contemplated. The schedules of job titles, supported by
job specifications will have the same meaning to writers, reviewers
and readers of budget estimates. A classification plan will enable
the budget agency and legislative body to appraise more easily the
personnel needs of operating agencies and decide -For or against the
creation of new positions.
Fourth, there is required a systematically arranged source of basic
in-Formation for use in the recruitment of personnel and testing of
-Fitness.
The class specifications constituting the classification plan
will serve as a guide in publicising job openings and answering the
questions of applicants. The information shown on the specification
about job duties, responsibilities and qualification requirements is
essential to test preparation and the evaluation of training and
experience both by the Civil Service Department and the appointing77
authority. A classification plan will make possible the establishment
of registers of eligibility for a number of positions at the same
time and by the same means. This saves time and money.
Finally, sound decisions on promotions and transfers need to be
informed by details about the position involved.
Sound decisions relating to promotions, transfers, and secondment
cannot intelligently be made unless it is possible to compare the
position the employee is holding with the one he aspires to. A
classification plan not only facilitates these transactions but also
outlines career opportunities for employees. Conversely, a
classification plan will identify "dead-end" jobs thus making it
possible to take corrective measures.
Overall , there appears to be no question but that the
classification plan L provide a basic "tool" which	 fulfil
a number of now unmet needs in the field of personnel management in
Jordan. 44 1-lowever, there are a number of reservations about the
feasibility of developing and applying such a plan in Jordan. It
is argued that position classification and job analysis are not
suitable for introduction in a developing country such as Jordan
because they are complex and expensive to administer. It is also
claimed that those in authority in the Service would adhere to the
plan only when it suited their convenience, and/or that the government
of Jordan is not "ready" for position classification nor presumably78
-For other elements of a modern personnel system. 45	Nevertheless,
one would still have to conclude that there is the need -For some
kind of overall classification scheme as a first step to improving
public service management in Jordan.4B79
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CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF MANPOWER
INTRODUCTION
Government bureaucracies normally operate a career structure.1
A person may join a government bureaucracy and expect to remain in
the government's employ, regardless of changing political governments,
for the remainder of his working life. 2 He may expect to pursue a
career as a public servant and (whether in central or departmental
grades) progress from lower to a higher rank with consequent
increases of salary and responsibility.
This chapter deals with career patterns of civil servants, the
relationship between characteristics of the society and the Service,
and the dimensions o-F the civil servant's job. This includes
asking the official what he does, the number of persons he supervises,
his contact with the public, with other departments and Ministers
and his role in policy formulation
4.1 CAREER PATTERNS
Age of Civil Servants
The officers in our sample ranged from 18 to 55 years of age.
The minimum age for joining government service is eighteen. 3 The
retirement age, previously fixed at fifty five -For the classified
officials, has since been raised to sixty years. There were only84
two officers in the sample who had exceeded this age limit. They
had been allowed to continue in service after reaching the age for
retirement at their own request and on a contractual basis. Table
4.1 represents the age structure of officials in the sample.
TABLE 4.1
Age o-F the Respondents. In = 300)
Age Group	 Number	 Percentage
18-20 years	
7
	
2.3
21-25 years	
30
	
10.0
26-30 years	
46
	
15.3
31-35 years	
50
	
16.7
36-40 years	
61
	
20.3
41-45 years	
64
	
21.3
46-50 years	
28
	
9.3
51-55 years	
10
	
3.3
56-60 years	
2
	
0.7
61-65 years
	
2
	
0.7
More than @5 per cent of the respondents were between 21 and 55
years of age. The average age was thirty five years. In the case
of higher management officials, their average age fell in the range
o-F 41-45 years. Among middle management officers it was 31-33 years
and among the lower officers it fell in the age 26-30 years. These85
frequencies compare interestingly with experience of career in
Western bureaucracies.4
In the case of classes, the mean age of Class I members fell
in the age-group 35-40 years; Class II and unclassified officers
fell in the group 25-30 years; while for the contractual class
the mean was in the age-group of 31-35 years. As regards the
departments, the Civil Service Department and National Planning
Council contained a relatively high proportion of younger officials
with only a few years of experience. The mean age u-f the CSD and
NPC employees fell in the range of 31-35 years; the Treasury,
Education and Agriculture employees was in the range of 35-40
years. These figures support the findings made in the analysis of
the length of service.
Educational Attainment
Table 4.2 demonstrates that a vast majority of officials
possessed a higher education qualification. For this there appears
to be two major reasons. Firstly, the possession of a Bachelor's
degree is becoming the minimum academic qualification for appointment
to the senior posts of government service in Jordan. 5 Secondly, in
most cases the government servant work involves complex tasks of
planning co-ordination and direction o-F development plans requiring
a great range of knowledge and skills.85
The shift is also in part accounted for by plan as well as
by 'market drift' in Jordan on the part of well educated people.
However, some officers see university education as unnecessary.
Their argument is that anything one needs to know can be learned
on the job rather than from books and study. 6 Practical and
experienced men should be preferred. Nevertheless, the growing
complexity of society permeates the work of the bureaucracy to
the extent that practicality and experience will not be enough to
resolve problems, formulate policies and implement them efficiently.
TABLE 4.2
Level of Education of the Officials. (n = 300)
Level of Education	
Number	 Percentage
El ementary
	
5
	
1.7
Preparatory	
10
	
3.3
Secondary
	
57
	
19.0
Teaching Certificate	 40
	
13.3
Bachelor degree or equivalent
	
116
	
38.7
Post-graduate diploma	
26
	
8.7
Master's Degree or equivalent
	
38
	
12.6
Doctorate or equivalent
	
8
	
2.7
A closer examination of educational background reveals that
a significant proportion of the officers in the Civil Service87
Department and Treasury had not studied beyond undergraduate level.
The reason for this state of affairs is that many positions of
higher responsibility in these two departments have been filled by
promotion. As a result, the educational requirements for officials
in these two agencies are generally filled by officials educated
at a relatively low level at the time of appointment. This helps
to indicate how top bureaucrats got to where they are.
In contrast, the number of postgraduates is significant in
the other departments of the sample, i.e. National Planning Council,
Education and Agriculture. In view of the shortage of technically
qualified personnel and in view of the growing industrial bias in
the economy, technical education was especially promoted by the
government of Jordan. The existing institutions in technical fields
were reinforced and new ones were started. 7 In addition, a large
number of civil servants from the technical departments were sent
for education and training to institutions of higher learning in
foreign countries.8
Most officials who possess degrees from foreign universities
are located in technical departments. The relationship between
technical departments and foreign degrees is not purely one of
circumstance but something which is essential. It is illustrated,
for example, in the need to travel abroad for a medical qualification.
In this respect , the Department of Agriculture leads all other
departments studied in the number of foreign trained graduates it
employes, even though it also includes a relatively high percentage of
people who have no degrees.88
In short, though there is a relatively low number of officials
who have not attained a university qualification, there is evidence
to indicate that in the future university degrees will become
increasingly important as a passport to salaried government service
employment
With respect to specialisation, officials in the sample were
educated in a wide variety of fields (see Table 4.3).
TABLE 4.3
Field of Study o-F the Officials. (n = 228)
Field of Study
	
Number Percentage
Business/Law/Social Studies*
	
112
	
49.0
Engineering
	 30
	
13.2
Agriculture
	 26
	
11.4
Education	
24
	
10.5
Medicine/Veterinary
	
20
	
8.8
Physical Sciences/Computing	
16
	
7.0
Within the sample, a tabulation relating field of study to respon-
dents' occupation showed a tendency for men to work in the fields of
study in which they were educated. Of those in specialist work, over
eighty per cent had majored in engineering, medicine, veterinary,
*This includes: Arts, Politics, Administration, Commerce, Accountancy,
Economics and Statistics.89
computing and physical science, whereas o-F those in general admin-
istration, more had studied administration and social sciences.
This reflects a pattern of "preference -For relevance" in the
government service o-F Jordan more akin to the tradition of Western
9
Europe than to the British tradition.
Age o-F Entrance
For most civil servants in Jordan , a civil service career
begins when they are very young. The distribution of ages at
entrance among our sample is presented in Table 4.4. Over eighty
per cent joined before the age of twenty five. The range was from
a low of eighteen years up to a high of fifty years and the mean
age was twenty years. It is interesting to note that less than
3 per cent of the respondents had joined the Service after the age
of thirty years.
TABLE 4.4
Distribution o-P Ages at Service Entrance. (n = 300)
Age c-F Entrance	 Number	 Percentage
18-20 years	 118	 39.3
21-25 years	 125	 41.7
26-30 years	 50	 16.7
31-35 years	 6	 2.0
36-40 years	 1	 0.390
Evidently those wishing to reach the top needed to have
joined the Service early in life. Young people are subservient
and impressionable.	 They can be more easily socialised into
bureaucratic norms and ways of operating than can older individ-
uals who join a bureaucratic organisation after university or
extensive work experience.
Length of Service
The distribution of the number of years of government service
among the sample is presented in Table 4.5.	 Nearly 37 per cent
had up to ten years experience in the Service;	 17 per cent had
11-15 years of seniority;	 46 per cent had been working in the
Service more than sixteen years.	 Notably the top level	 had
16-20 years seniority.	 The middle level had an average 11-15
years,	 while in the lower level	 five years experience was the
norm.
Comparing classes, we find that on average Class I members
had fifteen years seniority, Class II five years experience,
unclassified had eleven years and contractual had twelve years of
seniority.	 As regards departments, the average seniority of
the Civil Service Department and National Planning Council
officials fell in the band of 6-10 years, and for the rest of
departments in the sample in the band 11-15 years of service.91
TABLE 4.5
Distribution of Numbers of Years' Seniority of the Officials (n 	 300)
Length of Service	 Number	 Percentage
Less than 1 year	 11	 3.7
1 - 5 years	 51	 17.0
	
6 - 10 years	 48	 16.0
	
11 - 15 years	 52	 17.3
	
16 - 20 years	 61	 20.3
	
21 - 25 years	 50	 16.7
	
26 - 30 years	 21	 7.0
	
31 - 35 years	 3	 1.0
	
36 - 40 years	 3	 1.0
Table 4.5 disguises the differences in career expectations
within and between departments. When the sample was analysed to
discover the relationship between seniority and length o-F service
the pattern which emerged is shown in Table 4.6.
TABLE 4.6
Seniority Related to Levels of Management in Selected Departments.
Department	 Years of Service Years of Service
______________________________	 Top	 Middle -
National Planning Council	 14	 8
Civil Service Department	 16	 g
Agriculture	 18	 10
Education	 23	 15
Treasury	 25	 1892
The differences in seniority required to attain different
levels o-F management responsibility in these departments can be
accounted -For in part by reference to the factors of growth and
development of the government service described in the previous
chapter. Other factors which appear to be involved include the
character of departments, the style of management and the
opportunity for mobility.
The data in Tables: 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, indicate the difficulty
someone would have coming -From outside employment to top or middle
positions in the Service on lateral entry. Even though persons
may apply in this way, indications are that few are appointed.
Indeed, if any career public servant does not receive an appoint-
ment for which he applies, and the appointment goes to someone
not already in the Service, the former has the right to challenge
appointment of the outsider to the position he desires. Outside
appointees must be exceptional to receive a top or middle level
position.
External Mobility
One of the aims of the questions was an attempt to assess the
extent and nature of non-governmental experience among government
servants. The distribution of scores is presented in Table 4.7.
The Table indicates that the vast majority of officials in the
sample (80 per cent) had no experience outside the government. But
once again the type of work and departmental needs accounted theU
differences among those questioned. Sixty people altogether in the
sample (20 per cent) had experience outside. Of these, 29 officials
were in the National Planning Council, 16 in Agriculture. 7 in
Treasury, 5 in Education and 3 officials in the Civil Service
Department. Most of them hold technical and professional qualifica-
tions in such areas as medicine, engineering, computing and law. The
majority of those had five or less years of outside experience.
TABLE 4.7
Number of Years of Non-Government Experience. (n = 60)
In this connection, those who had outside experience were
asked to indicate which employer they worked for the longest before
joining the Service.	 Responses are represented in Table 4.8.91
TABLE 4.8
The Longest Non-Government Employment.	 (n	 60)
Employer	
Number I Percentage
The Private Sector
	 40	
66.7
Regional/international organisations *
	
8
	
13.3
Quasi-government corporations **
	
B
	
10.0
Armed Forces	
3
	
5.0
Self-employment
	
2
	
3.3
Independent Profession	
1
	
1.7
* For example: United Nations, FAO, ILO, UNESCO, Arab League
and its Allied Agencies.
- ** Corporations in which the government has a controlling
interest which are enterprises of commercial character
(e.g. Phosphate Rock	 Industry).
The above Tables 4.7 and 4.8 suggest that the regular exchange
of personnel and experience between government and the outside
sectors are weak and limited. At the same time data shows that
the National Planning Council acts as an interface between the
public and private sectors; all but three of its 29 officials
who had non-government experience, worked in the private sector.
This indicates a degree of lateral movement into and out of the
NPC quite unlike the rest of the departments surveyed. This is
also reflected in the length of service of managers at different
levels indicated in Table 4.6.95
In an attempt to assess the usefulness and effectiveness of
outside experience, officials who worked outside the government
were asked to state the kind o-F relationship between their work
outside and inside the Service. Table 4.9 represents the
distribution of scores.
TABLE 4.9
Relationship Between Experience Outside and Inside the Service (n = 60)
Relationship	 Number	 Percentage
No relationship	 6	 10.0
Weak relationship	 8	 13.3
Strong relationship	 30	 50.0
Identical relationship	 1	 26.7
Comparing departments, data indicat that staff in the National
Planning Council maintain either identical relationship between work
outside and inside or at least stronger relationships than staff of
the other departments in the sample. ço.,'ee	 officials in the
NPC were doing identical work and eight more have strong relationships
with their present job and the previous non-government employment.
Specialist personnel generally have more direct link with their
previous experience than "generalists", particularly those performing
technical work and occupying comparable jobs.96
On the whole, the majority of those who had worked outside
stated that there was a strong relationship between tasks performed
within and outside the Service. This indication should give the
government encouragement to develop further exchanges of personnel
with the various types of employers outside the bureaucracy with
the aim of improving career development of serving officers.1°
Internal Mobilit
The respondents were asked how many departments they had
worked in during their career service. This was aimed at finding
out how wide is the experience of officials within the Service.
(See Table 4.10).
TABLE 4.10
Number of Government Departments in which Officials had Worked during
Their Career Service. In = 300)
Number of Departments	 Number	 Percentage
1	 231	 77.0
2	 39	 13.0
3	 19	 6.3
4	 6	 2.0
5	 3	 1.0
6	 2	 0.797
The distribution of scores represented in Table 4.10 shows
that government servants in Jordan do not move around very much in
the Service. Exactly 77 per cent of the sample had worked in only
one department. Thirteen per cent had worked in two departments,
but only 10 per cent of those asked had worked in more than two
departments.
A closer analysis of the data indicated that the Civil Service
Department officials have greatest movement between ministries and
departments. Twenty seven out of sixty officials of the CSD served
in different government departments. This is a far greater movement
pattern than that presented among the officials of the other
departments studied. The main reason, it seems, is that as the
central personnel agency, the CSD acts as consultant to the whole
Service. Its officials consequently perceive themselves as the
"leading cadre" of the 'civilian army', and therefore have a
different attitude to internal mobility.
Experience and Seniority
Officials in the sample also were asked how long they had been
in their current departments. The scores, as represented in Table
4.11, are somewhat influenced by age, level of management and
seniority of the respondents as well as by the type of organisation
they work with. A large number of the sample had spent ten or less
years in their departments.
Younger officers predominated in the group who had been in
their current departments less than ten years and the older officers98
made up those who spent twenty or more years in their current
departments. Over two-thirds of senior officials spent more than
fifteen years in their present departments. and one half of middle
level staff spent more than ten years. But the majority o-F junior
level staff spent only five years in their current departments
However, the average length of service within the current department
for the whole sample is ten years.
As regards departments, officials of the Civil Service
Department and National Planning Council have less seniority in
their current departments than the officials  a-F other departments
studied. It has been noted, however, that advancement to increasingly
senior positions in different departments is sometimes assumed to
include a greater than average amount of inter-departmental mobility.
TABLE 4.11
Years Worked in the Current Department. (n = 300)
Number o-F Years	 Number	 Percentage
Less than 1 year	 15	 5.0
I - 5 years	 72	 24.0
6 - 10 years	 60	 20.0
11 - 15 years	 49	 16.3
16 - 20 years	 47	 15.7
21 - 25 years	 36	 12.0
26 - 30 years	 15	 5.0
31 - 35 years	 3	 1.0
38 - 40 years	 3	 1.099
It is clear -From the above tables that a large number of
officials had joined a department at an early age and had spent
their entire careers working in one government department. It is
conceivable that such a career pattern is not conducive to
instilling a broad, well-rounded experience in a government servant.11
4.2 WORK PATTERNS
Duties of the Job
Each official in the sample was asked to describe his duties.
The self-ascribed duties were categorised into fifteen separate
"types" of work which are not mutually exclusive (see Table 4.12).
The descriptions provided by the respondents indicate the
diversity and complexity of government	 administration. Some
officials had straightforward easily understood and recognised
jobs, e.g. personnel officer, accountant or manager in charge of
a section in the department. Others did not, and -Found descriptions
harder. Whatever the kind of work being undertaken, the same
general rule was seen to apply: as rank increased so did
responsibility.
Some 62 per cent of the sample were engaged in work that
could be categorised as managerial or administrative. This might
consist of implementation of a particular policy, control over a
group of subordinates, a division or section within a department.
Eleven per cent were engaged in personnel management. About 8 per
cent had positions involving auditing or cost accounting. The same
number of officers were engaged in the areas of research, investigation100
TABLE 4.12
Duties of the Respondents' Jobs. (n = 300)
Frequency
186
14
25
33
25
25
22
20
14
12
10
9
8
15
12
Duty
Management/Administration
Political Advice/Legal Advice/
Administrative Consultant
Investigation/Inspection Advice/
Planning/Control
Personnel Management
Research and Intelligence
Auditing/Accounting
Teaching
Training
Veterinary/Medicine
Agricultural Service Workers*
Public Relations/Cultural Relations/
Labour Relations
Management Services, i.e. Organisation
& Methods Analysis, and Project Analysis
Computing
Secretarial/Typing/Cl en cal/Librarian
and related
Basic Services, e.g. drivers,
telephonists, etc.
Percentage
62.0
4.7
8.3
11.0
8.3
8.3
7.3
6.7
4.7
4.0
3.3
3.0
2.7
5.0
4.0
Note: responses are not mutually exclusive.
*These include agricultural advisers, property managers, agricultural
warehouse workers, technicians and transport workers.102
At lower levels staff classify themselves in equal numbers
as "managerial" and "specialist". In contrast, 60 per cent of the
middle level staff regard their tasks as managerial. At the top
level of management 85 per cent had become "generalist" against
15 per cent who still considered themselves "specialists". Thus
one of the features of the bureaucratic structure of the Jordan
system is the emphasis placed on generalist (i.e. non-technical)
qualifications as the official moves upwards in the hierarchy.12
Self-perception is strongly influenced by type of education
and by job specialisation. The majority of specialist groups have
scientific and professional qualifications such as medicine,
engineering, veterinary, physical science, computing and law. This
has its effect in the nature of work supervision. In departments
like Treasury where line managers having background in general
administration, economic studies and accountancy predominated
supervision tends to be formal and hierarchical with consequences
already noted for mobility and the relationship of seniority to
levels of management. In departments where specialists are employed
in large numbers and take much more responsibility for management
in every level, e.g. agriculture, style of management is somewhat
different. This is influenced by peer group relationship among
professionals and by the extensive control exercised, especially
in middle management level, by staff with specialist backgrounds.
Relations with other Government Departments
In addition to working within his own department, an official
might also deal with personnel in other departments. Several questions103
were asked on the subject of contact with other government departments.
In Table 4.14 a distribution of responses is tabulated on the frequency
of interdepartmental contact.
TABLE 4.14
Frequency of Contact with other Government Departments.
(n = 300)
Frequency
	
Number
	
Percentage
Never	
39
	
13.0
Not very often	
76
	
25.3
Frequently
	
135
	
45.0
Very frequently	
50
	
16.7
Only 13 per cent of the respondents declared that in the duties
of their present job,they did not have contact with other departments.
Nearly 62 per cent responded that they had frequent or very frequent
interdepartmental contacts. Also Table 4.15 demonstrates the extent
to which managers' time is taken up by interdepartmental contact
and negotiation.
TABLE 4.15
Frequency of Managerial Interdepartmental Contact In	 150)
Frequency	 Number	 Percentage
Never	 10	 6.7
Not very often	 29	 19.3
Frequently	 75	 50.0
Very frequently	 36	 24.0104
What the Table does not show is the importance of inter-
departmental contact as between managerial jobs in different
departments studied. From analysing these contacts the single
most important -Fact which emerged was that the extensive contact
between managers in the Civil Service Department and the Treasury
were due to the close liaison required between these central
management departments.
The number of government departments with which officials
in the sample had contact is displayed in Table 4.16. Half of the
officials had dealings with from two to -Four departments. Thirteen
of those asked declared they dealt with mast or all the departments
-From time to time.
TABLE 4.16
Number of Government Departments with which Officials deal
= 300).
Number of Departments	 Number of Percentage
Respondents
None	 39	 13.0
I department	 57	 19.0
2 departments	 66	 22.7
3 departments	 45	 15.0
4 departments	 37	 12.3
5 departments	 20	 6.7
B departments	 14	 4.7
7 departments	 7	 2.3
All departments	 13	 4.3105
As one would expect, the departments most frequently mentioned
by the respondents were Treasury, Budget Office and the Civil
Service Department. Other departments commonly dealt with by each
department were the Prime Ministry, National Planning Council, Audit
Bureau, and Income Tax Department.
Respondents overwhelmingly (61.7 per cent) felt that there
was a lack o-F co-ordination between departments. However, only
23 per cent of the sample agreed with the statement: "In any dealings
with officials from other government departments, I usually find
them unco-operative and not very helpful."
Dealing with the Public
In addition to contact with other departments, some officials
must also deal with the public at large or with representatives of
various interest groups. In order to assess the extent to which
the public servants deal with the public, those in the sample were
asked to indicate the percentage of time at work spent dealing with
the public (see Table 4.17).
TABLE 4.17
Amount of Time the Respondents Spend Dealing with the Public (n = 297)
Amount of Time	 Number	 Percentage
None	 45	 15.0
Up to 10%	 43	 14.3
Between 10-25%	 50	 16.7
25-50%	 44	 14.7
50-75%	 62	 20.7
LOver 75%
	 53	 17.6106
A substantial number, over one-third of respondents, have a
direct contact with the public in per-Forming their duties. Nearly
one-third (31.3 per cent) who deal with the public spend more than
10 per cent and some up to 50 per cent of their working time doing
so. Less than one-sixth admitted that their particular type of
work kept them from dealing with the public.
It is not surprising that Agriculture is the department closest
to the public. Forty per cent of its officers spend over 75 per
cent of their working time dealing with the citizens. More surprising
is the -Fact that in the Treasury one-third of the officials spend
50-75 per cent of their time in direct contact with the public. This
is accounted for by the Treasury work involving collecting taxes.
excises, customs, conducting land surveys, paying pensions, etc.
About 30 per cent of Education Department officers spend 25-50 per
cent of time dealing with people. However, the Civil Service
Department and National Planning Council spend less time with
citizens. The nature of their functions directs their attention
mainly towards the government apparatus.
Slightly more than one-third of respondents regarded inability
to communicate effectively with citizens and generally poor public
relations a major problem in their departments. However, most
departments have established active public relations programmes to
deal with adverse criticisms 3 The sensitivity to criticism from
the public and interest groups still causes concern. One senior
official remarked ".... in general,government servants are criticised
too much - especially by businessmen or people who should realise
that they (public servants) are only doing the job that their
representatives have formed policy for."107
Contacts with Ministers
Because they work in a political environment, bureaucrats
especially in the top echelons, must deal with the Minister in
charge of their department. However, it seems there is no tradition
of relations between officers and their political masters having to
be entirely hierarchical. As a result, the frequency of dealing
between officers in all levels of management and the ministerial
heads of departments is far greater than western observers might
expect (see Table 4.18). Fifty eight per cent of the respondents
indicated that they never have direct contact with their Ministers
in the formal course of day-to-day work. Only forty two officials
in the sample have frequent or very frequent contact. The most
commonly mentioned type of contacts deal with inquiries for information
on cases, submissions to the Minister regarding policy formulation
and development, and information during parliamentary debates on
expenditure proposals.
TABLE 4.18
Frequency of the Respondents' Contact with Ministers
In	 300).
Frequency	 Number	 Percentage
Almost every day	 18	 6.0
More than once per month	 24	 8.0
About once per month	 35	 11.7
Less than once per month	 49	 16.3
Never	 174	 58.0I OB
It is notable that the National Planning Council officers have
more direct contact with the political head - the President of the
Council	 than officers of other departments studied have with their
Ministers. This might reflect the phenomenon of a "human relations"
approach in this type of organisation and the policy of "team work".
It also reflects the importance of the Council's functions and its
centrality. At the other extreme, Treasury officers have less
frequent contact with the Minister than the officers of other
departments, representing a pattern more typical of large, dispersed,
hierarchical departments. In general, however, it is very likely
that bureaucrats in positions of directors (mostly third level in
the hierarchy) or above would have more contact with Ministers than
would the officers below that level.
Policy Role
In Jordan, the commonly-held view of public servants and
government policy is that officials only implement policies made by
the overtly "political" sector o-F the political system. 14 This is
a rather narrow view of the public policy process - a view that is
often perpetuated by ruling politicians eager to take credit for the
work of expert officials. While most officers undoubtedly administer
and implement policies, other officers are engaged in the formulation
and development of government	 policies. In government departments
a large number of officials provide the information and the alternative
policy proposals required by Ministers and the Cabinet to make policies.15109
In order to assess the policy role of the Jordanian bureaucrats,
the following question was asked. "Some officials are primarily
responsible for the formulation of policy while others are primarily
responsible for implementation of policy. With respect to your own
job, which of the following statements most accurately defines your
role in regard to policy?"
1. My job is almost exclusively that of developing and formulating
policy.
2. My job involves the formulation and implementation of policy.
3. I implement policies made by others.
Table 4.19 shows the distribution of scores. Less than half
of the respondents (49.3) indicated that their role was exclusively
devoted to the implementation of government policies. A relatively
large number of those asked indicated that they played an active role in
the formulation of government policies. Over 10 per cent of officials
in the sample identified their job as being 'almost exclusively that
of evaluating, revising, developing and formulating new policies'.
Forty per cent of the respondents indicated that their job required
both the formulation and implementation of policies.
TABLE 4.19
Policy Role of Public Servants (n = 300)
Role
Exclusively developing and
formulating policies
Formulating and implementing
policies
Only implementing policies
Number	 Percentage
32	 10.7
120
	
40.0
148
	
49.3110
There is variation between departments in regard to policy-
making. The National Planning Council plays a vital role in
developing and formulating policies. In fact,22 per cent of the
Council's officers are involved solely in developing and evalua-
ting policies and programmes.	 In contrast, Agriculture officers
have less chance than the officers of the other departments studied
to contribute to the policy-making process.	 This relative isolation
of professionals or specialists contributes to the view that they
are poor administrative decision-makers.	 As one senior official
suggests 'specialists promoted to administrative positions are
often very disappointing as managers'.
Although senior and middle management staff play a significant
role in the process of decision-making in regard to policies, some
staff at the basic level are just as essential. One-fourth of them
in the sample have a dual role in both formulation end implementation
policies in their departments. One young official was quite proud
of the role that junior staff played in formulating policy. He
commented: "The Minister must rely upon us to do his work for him.
Almost all the policies are developed within the Ministry and sent
up to the Minister to rubber-stamp. The Minister and the Council of
Ministers have the final say - but we provide them with what they
must accept or reject."111
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CHAPTER V
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION
INTRODUCTION
Government	 has a crucial place in Jordanian society and
it is increasingly obvious that Jordan's future depends on the
performance of both political leaders and the administrative elite.
As yet the cream of the society are not encouraged to devote
themselves to public service and no institutions have been
established to cater exclusively for the training of potential
recruits to the administrative elite. The government of Jordan
as an employer has to compete on its merits with other employers
and among the self-employed professions. In this respect its
recruitment problems are much the same as in older Western countries.1
The government is perhaps at an initial disadvantage because of
poor images of the public service.
It is the purpose of this chapter to explain government
recruitment policy. This includes the principles of recruitment;
how recruitment is organised and by whom it takes place; the
relationship between central recruitment and departmental recruit-
ment; and relationships between the public sector and the
educational system. It also reviews methods, techniques and size
of recruitment, and the problem of wastage. Finally, the chapter
examines the attitudes of officials towards their work in an
attempt to explain trends in joining and reasons for leaving the
government service.114
5.1 RECRUITMENT POLICY
Central Recruitment
Although there is common recruitment o-f all classified grades,
this does not mean that everyone starts at basic grade. First,
there is a distinction at entry between "generalists" and "specialists".
Second, since the basis of central recruitment is level and type of
education, there is a distinction between more and less educated
entrants which sometimes overlap the distinction between "generalists"
and "specialists". Third, there are two career hierarchies. The
first hierarchy is an open one which allows the people who start at
the bottom to get to the top. The second is based upon specific
appointments to specific posts. Appointment to a "career grade" beyond
the basic grade assumes the level of salary at entry which reflects
the responsibility of the posts. On the other hand, initial appoint-
ment at grades above the basic grade does not imply any automatic
seniority. The pattern of direct recruitment to classified grades
by entry qualifications is illustrated in Chart 5.1.
Most of the basic work of co-ordinating recruitment activity
for the whole Service is done by the Civil Service Department through
the Central Selection Board. 2 Departments tell the CSD what they
need, the sort of people they want, the type of qualifications they
are looking for and conditions of service they offer. 3 Accordingly,
the CSD advertises, seeking out qualified applicants, evaluating the
qualifications, preparing eligible candidate lists and certifying
eligible candidates. 4 Lastly, the CSD provides the department
concerned with the opportunity to decide or select from among the:-
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eligible candidates the one person whose combination of abilities
and background best matches the needs of the position to be
filled.
Thus the Civil Service Department is mainly performing a
technical service in the recruitment process. Whereas the real
power resides with the departments as they have the absolute power
to reject a proposed eligible list submitted by the CSD. It is
often a fact that departments take the step of nominating some
candidates to the Central Selection Board. Accordingly , it is
erroneous to say that the CSD has any real power and influence.
The present practice in Jordan is one of assigning the "final
decision" to the departments for appointment of both classified
officials (where the bulk of recruitment takes place) and depart-
mental staff.* This seriously impairs the authority of the Civil
Service Department at the point where its authority should be
unconditionally clear.
Departmental Recruitment
As we have seen, large numbers in the Service are in depart-
mental grades (i.e. unclassified and contractual) and Civil Service
Regulations assign primary responsibility for their recruitment
to the departments. 6 So the Civil Service Department does not
directly involve itself with their recruitment process. The
employing departments carry on this selection through rules of
* See Chapter III (Charts: 3.7, 3.8. 3.9).117
recruitment which should be made after consultation with the CSD.7
The power of making appointments has been given to the departments
mainly to militate against the delay which would result if these
appointments were made by the CSD. It also prevents overloading
the CSD with more work when it can hardly keep pace with its
present responsibilities. In our sample, over one-fourth (2f.3 per
cent) were recruited on a departmental basis as "unclassified"
and "contractual" officials. Most of them work within the Civil
Service Department, Agriculture and the National Planning Council.
Unfortunately. departments in Jordan do not always use this
power a-F appointment judiciously. In most cases the choice made
for departmental appointment posts smacks of favouritism, and
those responsible for making recruitment selection try to get in
their own -Favourites. There are complaints that tests and
interviews held by departments are unfair and not up-to-date.
Things, by and large, have been going on in old-fashioned ways.
Allegations about favouritism and nepotism are not rare in regard
to recruitment by departments. The merit principle in selection
is not observed as meticulously as might be desired.
In addition. the Civil Service Department have been making
serious complaints in their annual reports that Civil Service
Regulations are being extensively misused. In many cases
appointments were made by departments without any reference to the
CSD. The reports of the CSD contain a large number of cases of
such irregularities. 8 The CSD feels that instances are not good
signs of a good, healthy and progressive administration. 9 Some
departments do not even send any returns of such appointments.10118
The reader might thus conclude that present recruitment
practise is in a deplorable state. Despite the great growth in
its size, there has been no single office or agency responsible
for the appointment of persunnel in the Service. Recruitment
functions have been shared between the Civil Service Department
and individual departments. Such a lack of single organisation
capable of co-ordinating recruitment policies has often resulted
in considerable confusion.
5.2 PRINCIPLES OF RECRUITMENT
Recruitment in Jordan is governed by certain principles
which have always prevailed. First, recruitment is sufficiently
flexible to meet Service needs. Recruitment processes serve the
needs of departments, though on occasions inflexible procedures
seem to force employing departments to adjust to the needs of the
recruitment processes and the education system. The Civil Service
Regulations permit considerable flexibility. Legally, the
Service has never been wholly corritted to specific methods or
precisely defined standards.
Second, recruitment is open to all with merit as the only
Ljasis for slection.	 Before the creation of the Civil Service
Department in 1955, patronage debarred from the Service many of
those who did not know an influential person who would recommend
them for a position. 12 This closed the Service to many people
desirous of obtaining a secure, privileged and honoured position.119
The Service was opened to all corners with gradual abandonment of
patronage, the establishment of an independent central personnel
agency and the extension of public education. 13 However, the term
'merit' remains suspect, and its use in the Service has been confined
to proof of fitness for a position.
Third, recruitment is based on the concept of a "career
service", which concentrates on attracting young people and develop-
ing them through "on the job" experience to fill vacancies. In
Jordan, however, the career service concept has been given a peculiar
twist. It is expected that a career service should be recruited
from young people who would learn the requirements of their calling
on the job, and all the vacancies would be filled by internal
promotion. Three consequences follow: (a) the principle that
anybody who is suspected of not being able to spend his working life
in Service should be excluded. Hence,thooe likely to be "unsound"
in mind or body are excluded by vigorous health checks. In the same
way, women are not welcome, as they are likely to leave on marriage
or on bearing children, resulting in their internal education and
training being "wasted" (b) Lateral recruitment must be confined
to positions which become vacant and where no serving officer
possesses qualifications of an adequate level to fill the post. As
long as an officer could claim to perform the work, outsiders can be
excluded even if they might be more capable or display better prospects
for advancement.* However, when the Service fails to meet its
requirements from graduates and internal promotion, special appointments
are made to vacant positions. The extent of this type of recruitment
depends upon the structure o-F the work force, labour mobility, unemploy-
ment rate, etc. Lateral entry has been especially important in
*cf. Chapter IV, pp. B9-I2.120
raising the general standard of the Service and in -Filling top
positions. (c) No "barriers" should be placed between the basic
grade and the highest positions, so that anyone starting at the
bottom of the ladder should have the notional opportunity of
rising through the ranks to the top, on the basis of his work
performance alone.15
Fourth, recruitment is related to the educational system.
The entry into the Service primarily depends upon educational
achievements. 16 Thus the basic element in the process is the
recruitment of young people who complete the designated stages
in the education system. In other words, the public service of
Jordan is a true career service where recruits, from an early
age, should spend their working lives knowing both that they will
be secure in their posts provided that their work is satisfactory.17
However, in Jordan this principle is difficult to apply in
practice. The reason is that the exact relationships between the
public sector and the educational system is not clearly planned.
The general rule, at least in theory, is "preference -For relevance".
In addition, the national curriculum requirements are not directly
related to the needs of the public service. 18 In short, there is
no co-ordination between recruitment and education. 19 The Civil
Service Department has gone to great trouble to adjust its
procedures to accommodate changes in the general education at
schools, the universities and outside professional bodies.2012
In general, the Civil Service Department has not questioned
the value of outside qualifications and it has been prepared to
accept degrees at face value. Difficulty has arisen in assessing
the value of outside courses and the existence of diverse standards
has made the construction of common orders of merit hard. At the
same time, the dependence o-F the Service on the education system
means that its standards have declined as problems have arisen
within the educational system itself. These problems relate to
overcrowding, lack of equipment and facilities, traditional methods
of teaching, low teaching standards, psychological tension and
friction between principals and teachers, lack of suitable qualifications
21
and lack of	 professional education among staff, etc.	 In
other words, the majority of recruits enter the Service at a young
age.* They come almost immediately after leaving school or taking
a degree at one of the universities and the general quality of the
pre-entry education of recruits is rather low.
Fifth, recruitment does not end with the offer of employment
but with the certification of appointment following a probationary
period, as laid down in the Regulations. With the exception of Nigher and
Special Grades, employment in Jordan is offered in the first instance
-For a probationary period of two years during which an official
22	 .	 -
shall not be promoted.	 So, with certain exceptions, all
probationers are expected to start at the same level on the basis
of their qualifications and advance according to the aptitude they
display on the work they are given. Probation is particularly
*See Chapter IV (Table 4.4).122
important -For those who have been appointed only on the basis of
their records or academic performance alone. There is no guarantee
that they can manage public service work or are suited to service
"norms". The employing departments to which they are allocated
have to certify as to their conduct, diligence and efficiency
within the specific period. The Civil Service Regttlations state
that:
"The official is strictly and continuously supervised
by his department with a view to ascertaining the
proper performance of his duties and the promptness
of his orientation in respect of the requirements of
the post to which he has been appointed, and to re-
vealing his fitness for staying in the Service or the
necessity for terminating his services on grounds of
misconduct or inefficiency by the end of the period of
probation or prior thereto." 23
Nevertheless, how well employing departments place new recruits,
test them on exacting work and otherwise determine suitability is
questionable. However, when an official is confirmed in permanent
service, the period of his probation is counted as a part of his
24
service.
Finally, recruitment is based on the principle of "loyalty"
to the Service at whatever salary the government is able to pay.25
This includes pension scheme, promotion, compensation, remuneration,
allowances and all the aspects of financial rewards.
5.3 SELECTION METHODS
Recruiting agencies in Western developed countries give great
attention to the process of recruitment. 26 On the basis of their
experience developed over many years a healthy programme of selectionL
123
must have the following elements: advertising the vacancies;
evaluation of the qualifications; the rating of training and
experience; written competitive tests of different types and kinds;
the interview - which is the most widely used technique of selection;
and the probationary period, which is considered the best means of
checking the validity and accuracy of the other selection devices.27
In Jordan, advertising is occasionally used, depending mainly
upon the number of vacancies. One-fourth of our sample indicated
that their posts had been advertised at the time of their recruit-
ment. Much more attention was given to the evaluation of
qualifications including academic education, skills and past records
of performance. In essence, the purpose of the evaluation step is
mainly to rate and rank the applicants on the basis of the degree
to which they possess the knowledge, abilities and skills needed
for successful performance in the position to be filled. In the
case of training and experience, data s'hows that no weight was given to
this factor in Jordan as nobody in the sample presented
to the Service in this way.
Competitive examination has two major purposes: to test
competence; and to establish a system of direct recruitment by
educatiOn. Applicants are then sorted into groups, classes and
grades for which they are fit. Thirty per cent of our sample, the
majority are specialists, had an entry examination. However, at
present, the number of applicants to the public service posts is
less than what is needed. There is consequently no sense in1 24
emphasising the competitive examination as the basis of proper
selection. 28 In addition, such methods require a great deal o-F
skilled effort to prepare and the availability of trained staff
in the Civil Service Department does not exist.29
Nevertheless, within the last few years, competitive examina-
tions in Jordan have found their way as a method of selection in
some instances where the vacant posts were fewer than the applicants.
Clerks and book-keepers in some departments have to sit for a
competitive examination before seiection. 30 Some professional and
specialist applicants are required to take an entry test on the
basis of competition. 31 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopts the
competitive examination for the employment of Second and Third
Diplomatic Secretaries. Candidates must have at least a Dachelor's
degree from an approved university and must pass a qualifying
physical examination. 32 The written examination consists of three
33
subjects with a total of one hundred points.	 Those successful
in the written test must then take a viva voce test. The written
and viva-voce rts of the examination are conducted in Arabic and
a live foreign language spoken by the candidate, preferably English
and/or French. Members of an ad hoc committee from the Foreign
Office conduct these examinations personally in panels of four or
five interviewers
In Jordan, the greatest weakness of using any kind of
examination is the lack of a central organisation responsible for
the whole machinery of selection. 35 This arises because
examination is not used regularly and consistently and, therefore,125
no body of expertise has been accumulated on which to conduct them
reliably.
Filling a vacancy in any level takes place either by lateral
movement within the Service, i.e. "trawling"; or by internal
promotion; or by direct entry from outside the Service. Frequently
the Service reduces the opportunity for staff to compete internally
for established posts by eliminating such posts as they become
vacant and allowing additional work to be dispersed among potential
candidates for the job, possibly adding "responsibility allowance"
to their salary. Had the competitive promotion examination been
accepted as a rule, there would have been no difficulty in securing
the best candidate whenever a situation arose. A senior official
comments:
"The importance of the principle of competitive examina-
tion is not only that it sets out to ensure the
selection of the best available individuals for the
Civil Service so much as it eliminates the personal
factor in the choice of civil servants. The competition
means equality of opportunity to all of a certain age
and c-f a certain standard of education of its great virtues
is that it does not leave the unsuccessful candidate
feeling that he has been victimised." 36
Alternatively, the authorities in Jordan, both central and
departmental, rely exclusively on interviews guided by a prior perusal
of the candidates' academic qualifications. Ninety per cent of
the respondents had an entry interview. The interviews concern
mainly the dimensions of personality, character, appearance, behaviour,
individual culture and general knowledge. 37 Ironically, key
officials in the Civil Service Department and other departments
strongly criticised the exclusive use of interviews as	 method of126
selection on the grounds that it was not an infallible method of
selecting the most suitable candidates for the government service.38
The danger lies in the fact that interviews can always be biased
39 and subjective.
However, a number of research studies indicated that a more
highly structured interview is more effective for selection than a
less structured one. Goodle has indicated two reasons why
unstructured interviews may not be reliable:
"Systematic biases and selective perception can affect
interviews in different ways, thus resulting in lack
of agreement between them. Further, if the interview
is unstructured, entirely different topics may be
covered by one interviewer than by another ......" 40
There are, however, other research studies which have shown that
the degree of structure is not a key variable in interviewing,
and only a highly unstructured form of interviewing (non-directive)
has been found effective by many interviewers trained in its use.41
Despite the many criticisms of the interview, Vernon, in his
work with the Civil Service Boards in the U.K., concluded that no
test	 produced results of equivalent validity to those obtained
through interview. It would appear that the interview is more valid
for come situations and occupations than others. The whole matLer
needs to be looked at in context. When examined in isolation most
selection methods contain obvious weaknesses. 2 Further, Bernard
Ungerson, who admits to favouring objective selection, sums up the
situation rather well '... there are some characteristics which can
be assessed only by visual and conversational contact."43127
The question then is, if the criticism concerning the interview
is justified. how can we improve it as a selection device in Jordan?
The solution lies in adequate preparation -For the interview along
with basic guidelines -For the conduct of the interview. It is
important that special attention should be paid to the training of
those who are used for regular interviews of candidates, and that
the criteria for each element in the qualities to be measured are
as closely defined as humanly possible in order to reduce the area
of subjectivity. For that reason also, it is wise to use at least
three persons on each panel of interviewers so that the averaging
out of the results may achieve a reasonably high degree of object-
ivity. For instance, the British Civil Service normally uses
board or panels (3 or 5 people) to interview large batches of
applicants for entry or promotion internally. This is designed to
ensure consistency as between individuals applying for the same
thing at the same time; to ensure that each candidate gets the
benefit of a spread of opinion on different aspects of his abilities;
and to ensure that permanent bias does not creep into selection.44
Overall, in Jordan there has been a lack of any adequate attempt
to keep recruitment methods up to date. There has been no objective
assessment for the country as a whole of the way in which these
arrangements have worked. The criteria by which personnel are
selected by the Central Selection Board are not up-to-date, and
examining and appraising techniques are far from fair and modern.
There has been no systematic attempt at job analysis. Qualifications1 28
-For various jobs have continued to be laid down in general terms
by the Central Selection Board. 45 There is considerable scope for
personal preferences and prejudices in the recruitment process.
Appointing authorities could not always assess the personality of
candidates properly but are apt to pay undue attention to manners,
appearance and the amount of information which candidates appearing
before them possessed. A more thorough inquiry into the interests,
activities and achievements of candidates is not attempted.
In short, the civil service of Jordan does not have any corn-
prehensive programme for selection which would be considered
satisfactory by Western standards. Although provisions about merit
as the basis of choice may be set forth in the Civil Service
Regulations, the individual department concerned is usually free
to apply this criterion as it sees fit.
5.4 SIZE OF RECRUITMENT
Recruitment policy disguises conflicting objectives as between
the central management departments. The Budget Department is
responsible for the management of financial resources, while the
Civil Service Department is responsible for the management of human
resources. This conflict becomes apparent in the scope and nature
of government service recruitment in recent times. Chart 5.2
displays the number of applications and appointments for the period
of 1978-1981. Total applications for 1979 and 1980 are about the
same, whereas in 1981 they increased nearly by 15 per cent over
1978 and 13 per cent over 1979 and 1980. But appointments -For
classified posts had declined in 1979 by 20 per cent over 1978 and
in 1980 by 19.5 per cent over 1979. In 1981 the appointments of1 30
classified officials has decreased by 23 per cent over 1979 and
4.8 per cent over 1980. It is noticeable from the Chart that
while overall applications have sharply increased, the proportion
of classified appointments has progressively decreased. The
main reason is that a lot of applicants are already working in
the private sector or are self-employed either inside or outside
the country. These are applicants who see the government service
as the employment of "last resort" i-F other opportunities collapse
and they remain dissatisfied with their existing situation.46
By contrast, while the proportion of classified jobs has
decreased, unclassified and contractual employment has become
the "norm" of the Service. This is due to the fact that the
government wants to reduce the overall costs of the Service. 47 This
can be achieved both by reduced recruitment and by reduced security
of tenure which unclassified recruitment implies. In addition,
some technical personnel prefer to work with the government on a
contract basis.	 Chart 5.3 and Graph 5.4 represent newly appointed
classified and unclassified personnel.
Chart 5.5 shows proportion of applications from different
educational levels for classified posts 1978-1981. We notice
that the percentage of university graduates who applied -For
a government post increased substantially between 1978_B1.(48)
Most 0-F the graduate applicants had degrees in arts and social
sciences, followed by economics, administration, law and politics.0)
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GRAPH 5.4
Newly Appointed Classified Personnel by Grade and Time. 1979-1981
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CHART 5.5
Proportion of Applications from Different Educational Levels -For
Classified Posts. 1978-1981
70% -
65% j
Year	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981
Source: Civil Service Department, Annual Reports of 1978-1981, Amman
University degree
Teaching Certificate
Secondary School leavers
Less than Secondary School leavers134
A relatively high proportion of mathematics and physical sciences
graduates presented themselves together with vocationally trained
graduates in engineering, medicine and agriculture.49
The number with teaching degrees was highest in 1980 and 1981,
consisting o-F 53 per cent and 45 per cent of the total applications
respectively. A trend which the Civil Service Department indicates
is attributable to the following reasons. The country needs more
teachers. Therefore, more people are being trained for teaching,
coupled with the fact that the trained teachers are not merely the
front-line teaching force, but also the administrators required to
support the large education system. This is especially so in a
decentralised administrative structure. Other factors include:
the government's policy of expanding opportunities in teaching and
polytechnic institutions; the obligation of these institutions'
graduates to work with the government (indenture); and new private
sector opportunities in privately sponsored technical institutions
to produce more skilled manpower. Finally, some school leavers
cannot find an alternative but to join these institutions for
50
various reasons.
The highest number of applications in 1978 and 1979 were the
school leavers holding the Secondary School CerLificate. These
constituted 58 per cent and 50 per cent of the total applications
for 1978 and 1979 respectively. However, the number sharply
decreased afterwards due to several reasons. First, the Ministry
of Education followed a new policy, starting in 1980, at stopping
appointment of secondary school leavers as teaching staff. 51 Second,-35
a large number a-f school leavers are required to join the national
military service. Third, the attitude of the majority of school
leavers is now to go to universities and other higher education
institutions. Finally, the stronger private sector competition
now attracts or absorbs as much as possible of the school leaver
52
catchment group.
The trends illustrated in the above Chart, rather than simple
numbers, are the key to manpower planning, which is a long-term
activity. For instance, it takes perhaps more than five years'
higher education to train a veterinarian; and another 6-8 years to
turn him into a manager of veterinary services at a mid-career
level. Then, after getting experience, some of them attempt to
leave to work for other governments or for regional and inter-
national organisations such as the United Nations, FAD, ILO, etc.
Although Jordan is an agricultural society where the veterinary
services are very important, relatively few senior veterinary
surgeons are available to the service 15 years after entry. 53 On
this basis, the implications for our sample are clear when it is
considered that of 15 veterinary surgeons currently with average
length of service 8 years, we expect that five years from now,
only one-third of this number would remain in government service.
5.5 SIZE OF WASTAGE
The turnover of employees in recent years has caused the
government of Jordan a great deal of alarm. Causes of this pheno
menon are various. They include: competition for manpower among138
neighbouring countries; competition from the private sector; high
cost of living; low pay; absence of an incentive scheme for
productive officials poor physical working conditions; 'red-
tape' and poor administrative practices; extensive overtime work;
unfair promotion system, etc. 54 Wastage is defined as a permanent
loss from the Service for the reasons of retirement, resignations,
death, physical unfitness, loss of office, dismissal, etc.55
Graph 5.6 shows the fluctuation of wastage among public employees.
Chart 5.7 represents wastages against recruitment for
the period o-F 1979-19:81. A close investigation of the data dis-
covered that members of the classified class, mainly Class II,
constitute the vast majority of staff turnover. In 1979, the
classified staff involved in turnover was 1300 officers (83 per
cent) against only 270 unclassified officers (17 per cent of the
total number). In 1980, the number o-F classified officials who
were involved in turnover was 3179 (82 per cent) against 688
unclassified officers (18 per cent of gross turnover). In 1981,
the number of classified officials lost declined to 1840 officers
or 66 per cent, while among unclassified staff it rose to 900 officers
or 34 per cent.
Resignations have occupied the highest percentage of the total
turnover, representing 50 per cent, 47 per cent and 57 per cent for
the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 respectively. Loss of office occupies
second place, representing 26 per cent in 1979 and 34 per cent in
1980. In contrast, this factor remarkably declined to 14 per cent in
1981. Retirement was 15 per cent in 1979 and 14 per cent in 1980, but
the number has increased to 23 per cent in 1981.a)
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GRAPH 6.6
Wastage of Personnel Over Time, 1970-1981
Year	 1970 71	 72 73	 74	 75 76	 77	 76	 79 80	 81
Source: Civil Service Department, Annual Reports o-F 1970-1981,Ammari.0)
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CHART 57
Recruitment and Wastage Over Time, 1979-1981
Year	 1979	 1980	 1981
Source: Civil Service Department, Annual Reports of 1979-1981, Amman.
Recruitment
Wastage139
Turnover among all university degree holders was 31 per cent
in 1979. 25 per cent in 1980 and 29 per cent in 1981. Among all
teaching certificate degree holders turnover consisted of 23 per
cent in 1979, 32 per cent in 1980 and 35 per cent in 1981. The
sudden increase in recruitment of teachers at the earlier date is
reflected in higher wastage rates in the most recent figures. They
now have the opportunity for work inside the country and abroad on
a more extensive scale.
The percentage of secondary school leavers involved in turn-
over was 33 per cent in 1979, representing the highest turnover,
25 per cent in 1980 and nearly 29 per cent in 1981. Turnover
among those who hold less than a secondary school certificate was
9.5 per cent, 24 per cent and 4 per cent in 1979, 1980 and 1981
respectively.
As between the sexes, male turnover presents 71 per cent in
1979. By 1980 the number increased to 73 per cent. But in 1981,
it was 30 per cent for females against 70 per cent for males.
It is understandable that wastage is very high in professional
groups, especially among doctors and engineers. This is due to the
law of supply and demand and to the market value of those groups.
The high wastage trends of this category affected decisions relating
to recruitment policies. The mean incentives given to such personnel
to remain in the Service included: direct entry at Grade 5*.
*See Chart 5.1140
* 55 guaranteed promotion within 3 years; and	 allowances.	 Neverthe-
less, the problem o-F wastage among skilled personnel still exist and
is likely to persist -For a long time to come.
Using 1979 as a base, percentage turnover in 1980 was 144 per
cent, but improved in 1981 to only 41 per cent. However, the 1980
and 1981 results may be a "freak" not a "trend". Looking to the
trend of wastage in the period since 1976 in Graph 5.6, there is
clear evidence of attempts to meet crises which occur in one year
with remedial action to meet the aspiration of the staff in the
hope of avoiding serious wastage in the next year, only to discover
some new causes of dissatisfaction or alternative attraction has
created a new peak in wastage.
Finally, our sample, supported by wider statistical evidence
about wastage, confirms two findings. First, if an officer leaves
he is most likely to do so within the first year or two, and almost
certainly within the first five years, though turnover figures also
vary somewhat according to the economic situation, occupation,
grades, classes, skills and departments. Second, the recruitment
problem, in existing circumstances, is more a matter of retention
than attraction. The lack of experienced staff which this creates
in many areas might only be remedied by lateral recruitment to make
better use of available manpower resources. To discover what
motivates people to join the Service and to get some idea why so many
leave, our sample were asked a series o-F questions on job attraction,
experience and satisfaction.
*Technical and Specialisation Allowances141
5.6 ATTITUDES TO ATTRACTION AND TURNOVER
Reasons -For Joinin g the Government Service
In order to focus attention on primary motivations, officials
in the sample were asked "why did you decide to accept government
service?" They have offered twelve different reasons. Many of them
gave more than one reason. The replies showed some clear and
interesting patterns (see Table 5.8). For the purpose of the
following discussion, we can divide these reasons into "positive"
(Nos. 1, 2. 6) and "negative" (Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12).
Among negative reasons the most frequent was lack of employment
opportunities in other fields. Also, in most cases, these employees
did not possess the necessary educational qualifications to train
for a profession such as medicine or law, nor did they have the
required resources to undertake independent business. They had no
choice but to work as salaried servants of the State. Two reasons
have mostly been given by the younger officials: the obligation to
work with the Service as a consequence of continuing their education
at the expense of the government; and the intention to gain exper-
ience and training of use for work outside the government in the
future.
The most frequently offered positive reasons were the security
of employment, promotion opportunities and pension benefits -
especially by comparison with the private sector. In addition,
public service employment gives certain amounts of prestige to the
incumbent of an officer under government. The nature of this
argument may become understandable if it is kept in mind that theFrequency	 Percentage
150	 50.0
129	 43.0
111	 37.0
90
	
30.0
89
	
29.7
80
	
26.7
75
	
25.0
67
	
22.3
55
	
18.3
50
	
16.6
37
	
12.3
20
	
6.7
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TABLE 5.8
Reasons for Joining Government Service (n	 300)
Reason
1. For prospective pension benefits
2. Good prospect o-F promotion
3. No alternative employer
4. No possibility of suitable employ-
ment in the private sector for my
skills or qualifications
5. qualifications required for other
trade or profession not possessed
6. For prestige and status/or for
power to influence public policy
7. Temperamentally not inclined to
work in the private sector
8. To get experience/training to work
outside the 3overnment $ervice
9. Family tradition of government
service
10. Obligation to work with the
8 overnment (indenture)
11. Less hard work than private sector
enterprise or private practice in
a profession
12. Lack o-F direction
Note: responses are not mutually exclusive.143
government	 system in most developing countries is authoritarian.
Association with it creates an aura of authority on the part of the
public servant, in official as well as in social life. 57 This
feeling was reinforced by the -Fact that only recently opportunities
for filling the most prestigious and profitable jobs in government
have become available.58
Family tradition as a reason for joining the Service cannot be
classified as a negative or a positive reason. It demonstrates an
interesting sociological phenomenon, namely the extent to which a
tendency exists to follow the occupation of one's father. 59 For
instance, a son follows the father's example in accepting salaried
employment with the government but does not necessarily enter the
same profession or vocation. Adopting government service as a
family tradition has another significance which has its roots in the
history of the country. The government at the time of the creation
of the State, attached great importance to the applicant's family
connections with government service while making recruitment. Such
connections were supposed to indicate the loyalty of the candidate
and his family to the government. Government service had, as a
consequence, become a symbol of distinction and prestige, so much
so that some people prided themselves in belonging to a -Family of
So
government servants.
The data indicates that the frequency of negative reasons was
relatively high in the Departmentsof Education and Treasury. The
lack of alternative employer for different reasons on the part of141
the Education Department is the main factor. The same is true of
large unspecialised departments like the Treasury where y
market existed offering careers to non-vocationally trained line
managers. The frequency of negative and positive reasons account
more or less equally for the staff in the Civil Service Department.
The considerations offered by the respondents in the National
Planning Council and Agriculture showed a far higher frequency of
positive reasons. These responses indicate that the higher the
prestige of a department, the higher is the frequency of positive
reasons for joining it. This suggests, also, the greater skills
required for professional work and the incentive created for
officials of these departments to seek to influence public policy.
In order to find out how the respondents compared government
service with service in a private enterprise , a few more questions
were put to them. The first question sought to determine the
opinion of the employees about government service as an occupation.
The question was put in the following form: 'Do you think that
your decision in entering the government service was wise?' The
question was designed as an indicator of a state of mind in which
the official might be imagined to say: 'If I were to be allowed to
make a fresh start, I would choose an occupation other than
government service'. The results are shown in Table 5.9.
TABLE 5.9
Wisdom o-F Entry Decision of the Respondents (n = 300)
Response	 Number	 Percentage
Yes	 I	 126	 I	 42.0
No	 171	 I	 57.0
Non-response	 3	 I	 1.0145
Forty-two per cent of the respondents said "yes", in
contrast to 57 per cent who said "no".	 Three persons offered
no reply since they have only recently been appointed and have
no experience on which to base a decision.	 The responses given
have been influenced by age, classes, grades, seniority, qualifica-
tions, level and degree of responsibility, salary, type of
organisation, training and academic education of the respondents.
For example:
A typical senior official who is working -For the Civil
Service Department in Class 1, Grade 2, aged 47 years, perform-
ing administrative duties, holds a secondary school certificate
and entered the Service at 20 years of age.	 He has now
accumulated 27 years seniority, transferred four times around
departments, had two central training courses and is satisfied
to accept that making the civil service a career of life was a
wise decision.	 By contrast, a mid-career official in Class II,
Grade 7, aged 30 years who holds a university degree has been
working in the Department of Agriculture for seven years. 	 He
was engaged on technical work in the field under the supervision
of a non-technical director, felt less satisfied with his salary
and considered his career "blocked" because no promotion
opportunity existed in his specialism.	 He tried unsuccessfully
to seek transfer because his background specialisation was not
required by other departments. He was,therefore.dissatisfied with
his decision to enter the civil service particularly when he
compared his prospects within the Service with those existing
outside.146
The next question was asked to discover what would be the
preference of the respondents if they were to choose from among
alternative occupations at the present time, allowing for differ-
ences of time in government service (see Table 5.10). The object
of the question was to find out where any government servants were
so dissatisfied with the Service as to be willing to change their
occupations at this stage of their careers.
TABLE 5.10
Preference Among Alternative Occupations (n = 296)
Occupational preference
Government Service
Foreign-owned private concern
Jordanian private concern
Anywhere in the private concern
Number Percentage
	
139	 47.0
	
75	 25.3
	
62	 21.0
20	 I	 6.7
The table shows that government service continues to command
relatively high preference as an attractive choice. A close
analysis of the data indicates that officials of departments prefer
to continue in the government, with the exception of the National
Planning Council Officers, who would prefer to work in the private
sector instead. The reason may relate to the nature of the Planning
Council and its functions. It has a very strong connection with the
private sector.*
* cf. Chapter IV, pp. 92-94.147
As to the choice a-f alternative occupations, professionals (e.g.
engineers)and technical groups showed a relatively greater inclina-
tion for employment in a private concern. This is indicative of
the growing demand for technical personnel by the private sector
in view of the increasing industrialisation in Jordan. Another
reason may be that authority in decision making is not devolved
to them and salaries offered to them by government are well below
their market value.
It was observed that the second choice of occupation was, to
a considerable extent, determined by the educational qualifications
of the respondents. For example, officials with a relatively low
level of education exhibited a greater reluctance to suggest
alternative employment to public service. On the other hand, the
relatively highly educated officials showed greater resourcefulness
in offering alternatives.
Officials in the sample who have been in the Service more than
15 years expressed their desire to continue working in the govern-
ment. Therefore,a recurring consideration for staying in the
Service is that 'it is too late to change now' . Most of the
respondents who gave this response are senior officials who put
in long years of service, have earned many increments in salary
and are expecting either promotion or retirement on pension. It,
therefore,is understandable that they are unwilling to leave the
government for other employment. In addition, some senior people
gave other reasons for staying in the Service such as challenge,
scope, variety, importance of their work, the enjoyment of working148
with good associates and sense of achievement. But inertia and
reluctance to change has played a part in their preferences. However,
it is notable that a significant proportion (18 per cent) of the
senior officials are prepared to leave public service, even at this
stage, for alternative occupations. Data also suggests a strong
relationship between lower income and preference to leave the
Service. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of young
people indicate their desire to leave the government in one way or
another. During the last decade , opportunities have increased for
employment in private industry and commerce. This has created new
openings for the mass of job-seeking, educated, young men. In
many cases, private enterprises pay good salaries, offer better
remuneration, provide greater incentive and freedom in which to
work and recognise the achievements of their employees. Human
relations between the employees and the employer are reputed to be
less impersonal than those in government departments. Foreign
owned private concerns enjoy the reputation of taking special
interest in providing for the conditions of service described above.
A comparison of the responses from different departments shows
that certain categories of personnel are more satisfied with government
service as a career than others. Less than one-third of the
National Planning Council and Agriculture officers are satisfied
with their decision in entering the government (28 per cent and 30
per cent respectively). The reason is that most employees of these
two departments are specialists with professional qualifications.149
The Service is dominated by generalists rather than specialists
with relatively poor salary structure -For the latter in the
government. On the other hand, as many as 61.7 per cent of the
Civil Service Department officers and 50 per cent of Education
officers said that they consider their decision in accepting
government service was wise.
It may be concluded that the officers of the first category
of departments are the least satisfied and those of the latter
category are more satisfied with government service. The
responses among Treasury officials indicate that as many as a
half "opted" against the Service. These findings are supported bY
the occupational preferences offered by the respondents. The
percentage of officers who would prefer to continue in the Service
is 25 per cent of those in the National Planning Council, 31 per
cent in Agriculture, 53 per cent in the Civil Service Departments,
47 per cent in Education and 45 per cent of Treasury officers.
An explanation of this pattern seems to lie in conditions of service
(including level of salary increments, prospects of promotion,
possession of authority, allowances, outside opportunities, status
of specialists, age and length of service, etc.).
Comparing the evaluation of the entry decision and occupational
preferences with the age and class of the respondents, the following
trends were discovered. Older officers and officers belonging
to Class I and unclassified grades showed a greater satisfaction in
regard to their decision in joining the Service. Perhaps the older
officers were satisfied with their decision in entering the Service1 5U
for three main reasons. Their academic qualifications were limited
at time of appointment; the Service carried a certain amount of
distinction; and alternative opportunities for jobs at the time
of entry were few. In other words, their decision made in the past
to accept the public service was "right" under the circumstances.
In the past, private industry had been established in the country on
a very limited scale and the government was almost the only source of
employment.
Class I officers might derive satisfaction from the fact that
in government they had been able to obtain a progressive rise in
the hierarchy including an increased rate of remuneration which
usually accompanies the Class I status. On the other hand, the
reasons for unclassified officers' satisfaction might be that they
possess a low level of educational qualifications combined with
limited opportunities for work outside the government service.
Similarly, as fri the case of occupational preferences, more
older officers and those in categories of Class I and unclassified
grades responded more favourably towards staying in government than
did the relatively younger officers o-F Class II and contractual
grades.
Overall, the data established the following general points.
First, it is not possible to establish a broad generalisation to the
effect that the higher the class of official, the higher is the
satisfaction in government service. Second, the evaluation by
officials of their decisions to enter the government service were151
influenced by their own experiences in the service. On this basis
the frequency of responses shows a downward trend. This may be
interpreted to mean that the popularity of government service is
on the decline. Third, employment opportunities for educated
persons, other than those run by the government, are expanding,
despite the fact that the government service continues to command
a relatively high preference in society. This brings us to the
problem of turnover.
Reasons for Leavin g the Government Service
An administrative system staffed with discontented, fault-
finding officials is not a very pleasant place to work. Nor is it
likely to be an efficient and effective agent for the implementation
of government policies. The measurement and interpretation o-F job
satisfaction is a multi-faceted enterprise. 1 Therefore, it is
interesting to note the circumstances under which government officials
in Jordan would voluntarily leave government service [see Table 5.11).
The factors are not mutually exclusive and any one go\IernrnRnt official
might need to see a combination of advantages offered before being
tempted away from the Service.1 52
TABLE 5.11
Reasons for Leaving the Government Service. (n	 300)
Reason
Better paying job elsewhere
Improved non-wage benefits elsewhere
Poor civil service prospects
Better opportunity to utilize skills
elsewhere
Better opportunities to obtain skill,
training,education, etc.
Frustration and discontent within the
Service
To leave the country
Bad internal structure and processes
To continue academic studies
Frequency Percentage
2.31	 77.0
120	 40.0
114	 38.0
109	 36.3
95
	
31.7
76
	
25 . 3
70
	
23.3
65
	
21.7
60
	
20.0
Note: Responses are not mutually exclusive.
"Money" is by far the most important single factor quoted by
the respondents. This suggests dissatisfaction with the current level
of salaries and with the salary structure as a whole compared with
outside employment. The bulk of the sample, particularly the
technicians and lower grades put significant emphasis on the "pay"
factor. Over one-third of the respondents are dissatisfied with the
prospects in public posts and they,therefore,would leave for a
"better job" (defined as more interesting or satisfying with new
kinds of work). The majority of respondents tend to be young people1 53
in Class II working in particular departments. These departments
in which these feelings were particularly noticeable were the
Treasury and Education. The principal explanation of this appears
to be poor prospects of promotion in these two departments compared
with the other departments studied.*
One-fourth of officials in the sample felt that if they
became too frustrated or discontented with their own work or in
their departments they would leave the Service. However, frustra-
tions and discontent revolve around "organisational issues" -
red-tape, budget process, slow decisions, etc. Unlike the senior
and middle grades officials, lower level officials' criticism is
most likely to be directed at structures and internal processes,
dissatisfaction with programmes and policies of the departments.62
This suggests reluctance to discuss such matters at a higher level.
However, some people assured the reason to be the fact that at a
higher level bureaucrats are a fairly content group of individuals
and well socialised within their own departments.
Some officials felt that if there was a better opportunity
to utilize their skills, training and experience outside government
work, they would leave the Service. One-fifth of the sample who
offered this reason have been more than ten years in the government
service. It is interesting to note that some of the younger officers
would leave the Service just to get out of the country. Twenty per
cent of the respondents, the majority young officials, mention their
desire to leave just to continue their education in order to get
*See Chapter IV (Table 4.6).I 54
academic qualifications.	 All of this indicates a relative decline
in the importance of government as an employer.155
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CHAPTER VI
FINANCIAL REWARD SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Appropriate remuneration is important to the general quality
and quantity, tone and efficiency, integrity and morale of the
civil servant. Inadequate salaries in the government service are
an expense, not an economy. The constant drain of competent and
trained personnel -From the service, and their replacement by
recruits of often inferior ability, is enormously costly and
results in inefficiency. It will be impossible to achieve and
maintain integrity, efficiency and quality in the service if
officers do not receive adequate pay. 1 "Governments encourage
corruption among their officials when salaries are inadequate."2
A service that is ill-paid is almost invariably unproductive and
over-staffed. Pensions, along with other fringe benefits, are
regarded as one of the main attractions of the service. All
categories of employees attach great importance to the scheme of
retirement benefits. This chapter aims to examine the forms of
payment within the existing financial reward system in the government
service of Jordan.
6.1 SALARY STRUCTURE
The first unified grading system and salary structure was
introduced in 1926, which provided for ten classified grades numbered
from one to ten and an unclassified grade, with starting rates and1 60
ceilings being fixed for each grade. 3 This salary structure was
(4)	 (5)	 (6)
revised in 1958	 , 1975	 and 1979	 . The revision contained
improvements in every grade either by increasing the higher rates
or shortening the intervals between increments. However, different
principles governed the system of payments for differently
recruited categories of employees.
Classified officials
The present basic salary scale for classified grades is
listed in Table 6.1.	 t the time of their initial appointment,
officials are assigned to a grade on the basis of the educational
attainment standards specified in the Regulations. 7	Thereafter,
the officials move through the steps of the grade upon completion
of the required periods of time and assuming they render a satis-
factory level of performance. 8 In essence, the present system may
be described as one in which grade and salary are geared primarily
to educational attainment and length of service, with only incidental
consideration of the duties and responsibilities of the positions
occupied.
I-F this salary structure has any merit at all, it is that it is
simple to understand and to operate. It consists merely of one
fundamental scale, divided into two notional classes and sub-divided
into steps or runs of four years each. Thus, for example, an officer
entering the Service in Grade 10, knows that his entering salary will
be JO. 36 per month, that his salary in the second year will be1 62
JO. 37.5 per month, and in his third year Jo. 39 per month, and so
on, and that, i-F he works satisfactorily and does not embarrass the
government, he will rise, grade by grade, to at least JO. 66 per
month at the top of Class II, after some 19 years. I-F, by virtue
o-F having a university degree, his starting salary is JO. 63 per
month in Grade 7, Class II. He knows that he will proceed, grade
by grade, to at least JO. 126 per month at the top of Grade 2 in
Class I. In short, the salary structure shows at a glance what a
new entrant to the Service may expect in emoluments, year by year.
A further advantage is that, in terms of control of the manpower
budget cost in a developing state, the incremental salary system
gives security both to the individual and to those responsible for
finding tax income. In addition, a single salary scale, including
Special Grades and a few sigher posts, avoids a multiplicity of
pay scales.
Nevertheless, whatever the merits of the salary system may be,
they cannot over-shadow its defects. Those defects may be summarised
as follows. First, all classified officials are lumped together in
ten general grades, whatever their specialities and responsibilities
may be. Thus, engineers, doctors, judges, teachers, clerks, typists,
etc. all come together in these grades without any clear internal
relationship between the salaries paid to them and the duties
performed by them.
Second, although there are four incremental steps above the
basic salary in each grade, the system "builds in" security at the163
cost of any expectation of rapid promotion. It would, in theory
at least, take an official who is a non-university graduate some 19
years to rise from entry at Grade 10 to the top of Grade 7, assuming
no accelerated promotion. In financial terms this means that it
would take him 19 years to rise from JO. 36 to JO. 66 per month.
Similarly, a university graduate who enters in the middle 0f Grade 7
could take 27 years to progress to the top of Grade 2. In that
time his earnings would have increased from JO. 63 to a mere
JO. 126 per month. Furthermore, since there is no bar to the
promotion of a non-university graduate from Class II to Class I, an
officjal who enters the Service at the bottom of Grade 10, and who
is unable to gain promotion in shorter periods than the four-year
stage laid down for each grade, would take some 46 years to progress
from JO. 36 to 30. 126 per month, assuming that he does not die or
retire long before the end o-F that period. In short, the length o-F
the fundamental scales put together is such as to make the whole
pay structure somewhat unrealistic and, for that reason, liable to
be abused.
Third, in an effort to circumvent the promotion delay involved
in an extensive increment system, officials exert all possible
pressure to have themselves raised to the next higher grade before
they have exhausted the incremental stages of their existing grades.
Ouring the survey interviews, some senior officials pointed out
that the usual form of pressure is to lobby for promotion. From time
to time, officials concerned see their Ministers, formally and
informally, and press for the upgrading of their posts in the ensuing
budget. Not all officials resort to this method but enough of them164
do so to make it a matter a-F un-Favourable comment by Ministers,
particularly at the time when budget estimates are being prepared.9
Fourth, should an official succeed in having his post upgraded
in the budget for the next fiscal year, he "moves up" with his
post, although his duties and responsibilities remain the same. In
our sample, for instance, a clerk in the Civil Service Department,
Class I, Grade 4, complained because, although he had been promoted
several times, he had been working for twenty-one years in the same
department doing the exact same job. In point of fact, it is not
his post that is upgraded; it is he who is upgraded. This
practice which is repeated when an official seeks to move up again
to a higher grade, seems completely contrary to the principle
that an official should be promoted to a higher grade only if there
10
is a vacancy.
Fifth, since in most cases the upgrading of posts depends more
an personal factors than on anything else, it is not unusual to
find holders of the same type of post occupying different grades in
different departments. For example, the Chief Clerk in the Treasury
is in Grade 5; the Chief Clerk in the National Planning Council is
in Grade 7, although their duties and responsibilities are identical.
Worse than this, the Chief Clerk in Education occupies a lower grade
(Grade 6) than the Chief Clerk in the Land and Survey Department
(Grade 4), although the former's duties and responsibilities are
heavier.	 This situation arises simply because he has less total
service than the latter or because he has not sought accelerated165
promotion. Such a situation, too, is contrary to the normal concept
of granting the same pay to holders of the same category of posts.
Sixth, as a result of fixing short runs of four years in each
grade, the officials who avoid canvassing for their own promotion
and prefer to rise on the basis o-F their own work and conduct, may
find themselves left behind at the top of their grades. while their
colleagues, who do canvass, move up to the higher grades. In so
doing, the posts they hold have to be upgraded with them. Indeed,
if they do not have the goodwill of their superiors and their
Ministers, officials may well stagnate for some time in the same
grade. Such stagnation is bound to have an adverse effect on their
morale, and in the long run this will be detrimental to the national
interest.
Seventh, there is no apparent attempt to conform to the pay
principle of matching the salary and grade of the official with
age, experience and responsibilities. The data shows that a lot
of older officials with long experience in the Service, occupying
lower grades, drawing less salary, are being supervised by young,
newly appointed officials. For example, an official in the
Treasury, in Class II at the top of Grade 7, aged 40 years, entered
the Service at age twenty, holding a Secondary School Certificate. He 174'S
worked in his current post for 17 years. He is being supervised by
a graduate aged 26 years, newly entered in Class I at the bottom of
Grade 6, drawing a salary of JD. 68 per month. With only a few
months of experience, the latter is already acting as a head of166
division. The former expressed his attitudes, through an interview,
by pointing out that he feels disappointed and his morale has been
affected.
Finally, the short runs in each grade and the small incremental
stages of JO. 1.5 per month, in Class II are undoubtedly instrumental
in inducing a fear of career stagnation. Even in Class I the
incremental stages between Grade B and Grade 3 are only 3D. 2 per
month; and between Grade 2 and Grade 1, are 3D. 3 per month. This
in turn has led to certain officials "breaking through" the grades.
According to the Regulations, an official must not be promoted before
the expiry of at least two years from the date on which he began
to hold his existing position. 11 During the last few years, this
particuLar Regulation has been construed with such flexibility as
to enable those officials with sufficient drive and determination to
secure their promotions to the next higher grades after spending
only two years in their own grades. As a result, a period of only
two years in a grade is now looked upon as a "normal" period of tenure
before promotion to a higher grade can be requested.
If this practice is accepted as a normal method of advancement
in Jordan, non-university graduates might take only eight years to
rise from the basic Grade ID to the top of Grade 7 and ten years
from the bottom of Grade B to the top of Grade 2, while a university
graduate in Social Science would take only 12 years to rise from his
entry point in the Service to the top of Grade 2. If the incremental
stages were more realistic in terms of the rising cost of living, a167
system of salary overlap permitted between grades and the steps in
each grade longer, then there would not be so much pressure on the
part of officials to secure accelerated or premature advancement.12
Unclassified officials
In addition to 49,000 classified personnel , there are 19,000
unclassified employees.* As in the case of recruitment, their
salaries are determined by the appropriate Minister upon recommenda-
tion of the Permanent Secretary or Head of the Department concerned.
However, if the salary is more than JO. 60 per month, the approval
of the Prime Minister is required.13
In general, the objective has been to set these salaries at
the same levels as for comparable positions in the classified service.
For employees with Secondary education or less, this is specifically
regulated by the following conditions on salaries at time of
appointment: (a) Graduates of secondary schools, not to exceed a basic
salary of JO. 39 per month. (b) Graduates of intermediate schools,
not to exceed a basic salary of JO. 38 per month. (c) Graduates of
elementary schools, not to exceed a basic salary of JO. 37 per month.14
As might be expected under the present decentralisation of
authority to set salaries, there is a wide variety of rates established
for unclassified positions with the same job titles. Obviously
generic terms used to describe individuals carrying the same type of
responsibilities cannot demonstrate difference in levels of responsi-
bilities. This can be done only in the form of salary differentials.
* See chapter III (Chart 3.8 J.168
For example, the latest Posts' Establishment Regulations show
salaries for positions with the title of "clerk" ranging from 3D. 68
to 30. 65 per month; of "mechanic" from 3D. 50 to 30. 106 per month;
of "draughtsman" from JD. 50 to 3D. 99 per month and so on. 15	It
can cover a significant violation of the principle of equal pay for
equivalent work. 16	It also has its effect on allowances and
retirement benefits which will be discussed later. As shown in
Chart 3.8, salaries for unclassified class range from a low of 3D. 37
to a high o-F 30. 168 per month.
Contract officials
There are approximately 2,300 positions of this category in
the government service*, the occupants o-F which are paid from project
and trust funds under individual employment contracts. 17 Under the
present Civil Service Regulations, the salary rates for these positions
are determined by the appropriate Minister upon recommendation of
the Permanent Secretary or Head of the Department concerned if the
salary is less than 30. 100 per month. However, if the salary is
more than 3D. 100 per month, the approval of the Prime Minister is
required. 18
The same internal differentials in salary rates for positions
carrying the same titles exist as in the unclassified service. For
example, among Land Surveyors salaries range from 30. 49 to JO. 97 per
month. Similarly, among Agricultural Advisers salaries range from
30. 66 to 3D. 100 per month, and so on. 19 Clearly,internal systems of
salary differentials have developed departmentally within job groups
*See Chapter III (Chart 3.9).169
related to specific departments. As seen in Chart 3.9, rates for
contract officials range from a low of JO. 37 to a high of JO. 650
per month.
Overall there can be no doubt that, because of these
complications the existing salary structure has contributed, to an
appreciable extent, to the general weakness of the administrative
machinery of the government. It has certainly given rise in the
past to such questionable practices as the exercise of patronage on
the part of Ministers and top officials in matters of promotions,
canvassing for promotion by the officials anxious to avoid stagnation
in their short grades, advancement through personal influence
instead of merit and the misapplication of the Civil Service Regula-
tions and the Annual Budget in such a way that posts often follow
the incumbents up to higher grades. The sooner, therefore, the
present system is replaced by one based on a service-wide system of
integrated grading with published and understood criteria relating
salary to level of responsibility, the sooner the malpractice
20	 . described above will be stopped.	 This view is shared by others
responsible for the management of government service.21
6.2 PRINCIPLES OF PAY
The government has not enunciated any criteria for the determination
of the pay structure and pay scales of the various classes of employees.
But they have accepted the following principles. First, the "public
service" in Jordan, as in many other countries, is based on the concept
of obligation and privilege of working for the State. 22 The government
job is by itself the reward for the official's service and not an170
acquired right by virtue c-F owing or occupying the post. There-Fore
an official must perform the duties required of the post he occupies
and devote all official working hours to the performance of productive
work. An official may be called upon to work more than the specified
working hours if the public interest so requires.23
Second, the payment system must ensure attraction of qualified
24
persons to serve the State efficiently and honestly. 	 The government
cannot expect employees to perform their duties with maximum efficiency
i-F, in -Fixing their salaries and other terms of service, it gives them
cause -For dissatisfaction. It is therefore essential that the salary
scales and other conditions of service should be devised so that the
Service as a whole is able to carry out its duties efficiently in
an atmosphere c-F security. On the other hand, the government,
according to the Regulations, should pay enough to cause employees
to remain honest. 25 In the context of Middle Eastern culture, this
principle assumes the importance which "loyalty" holds in the govern-
ment service codes of Western nations.  I-F salaries are adequate,
staff tend to remain honest. 26 But i-F their emoluments fall short
of their needs, they are generally unable to withstand temptation.27
Third, the employment c-F the best candidates on salaries which
the government is able to pay. 28 This means that the government pays
what is necessary to obtain the qualified recruits, to retain them
as well as shield them from temptation and keep them efficient and
honest for the terms of their service. Unlike the private sector.
where profitability is so important and the major factor in determining
the level of payment, in the case of the State the major factor is171
availability of public -Financial resources. How much the State can
a-F-Ford to pay varies from year to year.29
Nevertheless, the Government of Jordan has responded slowly
to changing circumstances. As mentioned earlier, the salary structure
was revised only once over the 32 years 1926-1958. The next
revision took place after another 17 years in 1975. The latest
revision was in 1979. Not only was this response too late, but
also too limited. It does not even compensate what an official
30
would have lost in purchasing power. 	 As the vast majority of
the employees are affected by this relative salary decline, the
evidence indicating that some of them want to leave the Service
is understandable. Consider, for example, the case of an engineer
working for the Ministry of Education who used to work for multi-
national company abroad with high salary and comfortable conditions
o-F life. Because he had a sense of "national service", he entered
the public service. He was appointed to Grade 5 in Class I, acting
as technical deputy head of a division. He found things difficult
and was particularly "shocked" by the level of his basic salary (30.80
per month). -In consequence, he wants to leave the Service as soon
as possible. A lot of engineers in other departments think like
him.
Some advocates of the government payment policy, however, argue
that officials should not claim increases in their salaries because
when a person accepts employment in the public office he contracts
for the receipt of a specified salary. 	 He should, therefore,
expect to adjust his cost of living according to the rise or fall in172
the	 purchasing power. It is arguable. however, whether any
body o-f workers, either in public or private sector, would -Find this
argument acceptable.
It is obvious that the question of establishing principles
which should govern pay in the government service of Jordan have
never been specifically examined. This is not surprising since, in
the general absence of considerations u-F profit and loss, it is not
easy to determine the principles on which public service pay ehould
be based. In spite of this fact, one must still ask what should be
the primary principle of pay for the Public Service of Jordan. Critics
emphasise a number o-F factors as a foundation for salary structure.
These include standard of living, cost of living, market value,
internal relativities, educational qualifications, comparability and
reputation u-F the service.31
On the subject of ensuring a reasonable standard of living and
a good pension at retirement, it could be argued that, in the last
resort, no member of the corrvTunity can reasonably claim from his
government more than that he might receive income in the pursuit of
a gainful occupation. This would, of course, be an extreme doctrine
which few would endorse. The alternative view is that standards ofiving
vary between social classes	 and the State has an obligation to
reduce rather than create greater disparities of wealth. It would
obviously be wrong to determine a man's salary in the light of the
social class to which he belongs. Instead a person should be rewarded
according to the work he does. I-F government work is important, then
public servant should be well rewarded. Obviously such considerations173
make obligation inappropriate as a basic principle of pay.
Increases in the cost of living also cannot be regarded as
the only guiding principle of pay. This is not meant to imply that
the cost of living should cease to be an important factor or that
the government is absolved from relating salaries to price levels.
On the contrary, as a good employer, the government should take
necessary steps to ensure that it is kept fully informed of movement
in the real wages of its servants. But the rising cost of living
should not be treated as a firm principle for the fixation of pay
since, if basic salaries were raised from time to time on the basis
of a cost of living index, they would be pegged at too high a level
to be reduced should the cost of living take a downturn at any time
in the future. In practice it is difficult, if not impossible, to
bring down basic salaries and wages. It must, however, be admitted
that the economy of a developing country presents certain peculiar
features, one of which is a tendency for the cost of living to go
up steadily. For instance, the average rate of increase of the
cost of living in Jordan for the years 1975-1980 is 14.7 per cent.
(See Table 6.2).
TABLE 6.2
Cost oF Living Index for 1975-1980
Year	 Index	 Annual percent-
age changes
1975	 100	 -
1976	 111.5	 11.5
1977	 127.7	 14.5
1978	 136.6	 7.0
1979	 156.0	 14.2
1980	 173.3	 11.1
Source: The Central Orink of Jordan, Anntjil Report of 1981, Amman, 1q87.174
Therefore, an employee should maintain an increase in his
salary by rate of '14.7 per cent per annum in order to keep a
parallel between inflation and his real income. There is a wide
gap between the rate of inflation and level of salary. While the
rate of inflation is 14.7 per cent, the government has increased
salaries by I per cent, the public autonomous corporations by 2.5
per cent, whereas the private sector has increased by an average
of 5 per cent per annum. 32	The cost of living, having risen, is
unlikely to come down. There is therefore a case for reviewing
the pay structure of the civil service regularly to ensure that it
is realistic in terms of the cost of living.
It is often urged in Jordan that the "market value" of certain
professional and technical skills should be treated as a firm
principle of pay. 33 In response to this kind of demand, government
of Jordan offered allowances of two kinds: technical allowance and
specialisation allowance. In addition, certain technical and
professional staff have been offered higher entry grades as shown
by Chart 5.1. For instance, a civil engineer who holds a B.Sc. and
has recently been appointed to Grade 5, Class I, will have a basic
salary JO. 78 per month and a technical allowance equal to his basic
salary. In contrast, a newly recruited official who holds a B.A.
degree in Social Science was appointed to Grade 7. Class II, with
basic salary JO. 53 per month without any technical or specialisation
allowances.175
However, the "market value" principle should not be accepted in
its entirety. While universities and training institutions are in a
position to supply enough people with special qualifications where
they are most needed in the government and outside, the marginal
value which may be attached at any time to the members of certain
professions, such as medicine and engineering, will be substantially
reduced. In the interests of the tax-payer, it would be there-Fore
wrong to perpetuate in Jordan what is at present an advantage accruing
only temporarily to the members of professions.
There are also so-called 'relativities'. The term is used
here to denote pay relationships based on the duties and responsibilities
of public service posts. But there are two kinds of relativity -
one is "vertical" i.e. between grades in the same hierarchy; the
other is "horizontal" i.e. between grades of comparable standing or
of about the same level of responsibilities in different hierarchies.
The consequences of a vertical relativity can be seen in the following
way. The salaries of the top official in a ministry (Permanent
Secretary) is fixed in higher grades ranging from JD. 180 to JO. 240
per month. That 0-F Assistant Secretary, his deputy, might range -From
JO. 150 to JO. 168 per month in Grade IA. That of the next official
in the chain of command might extend from JO. 114 per month at the
bottom of Grade 2 to JO. 144 per month at the top o-F Grade 1B. 34	The
difference in salary structure represents roughly the difference
between their duties and responsibilities.
As an example of horizontal relativities in the present pay
structure, consider the staffing situation of senior level which arise
in large departments with a range of complex and differentiated176
-Functions. An illustration -From our survey is the Treasury, which is
in reality not a single department but six departments, namely,
Finance, Budget, Income Tax, Customs, Land and Survey, and Geiiei'aJ
Materials (see Chart 6.3).
For reasons of historical accident, the principal o-F-Ficial in
the Ministry of Finance carries the title of Permanent Secretary. He
is therefore entitled to a higher grade salary. However, the other
-Five Departments are run by officials of equal 7S±c* , but they
carry the title of Head of Department. Although their salaries
are fixed in the higher grades, they are slightly less than that of
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. Both of these
categories (i.e. Permanent Secretary and Heads of Departments) are
the highest officials in their respective administrative agencies.
Their duties in many cases substantially are the same. But because
the Permanent Secretary is thought to carry somewhat higher
responsibility, a slightly higher salary or responsibility allowance
has been attached to his post. The demonstration of what occurs in
the Treasury at senior level, also accounts for the wide disparities
between payments to officials in Grade j5 and those in Grade 2. It
is to this level that most heads of smaller departments are appointed.
This is due to the assumption that their duties and responsibilities
are not as great as those of the heads of major departments paid at
higher grade rates. A horizontal pay relationship between these three
grades of top officials of comparable standing has thus been
established on the basis of a difference between the duties and
responsibilities of their posts.(Ut
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There can be no doubt that the principle of relativities is
logical since it establishes a sensible relationship based on the
duties and responsibilities of posts. It is also objective since
it takes no account o-F such personal -Factors as -Favouritism and
r')epot1JI72 . In addition, it is easy to understand. In all the
circumstances, there would appear to be no reason why the concept
of "pay by degree of responsibility" should not be treated as a
primary principle of pay for the public service of Jordan.*35
In the previous chapter we explained the close relationship
between educational qualifications and career potential. To some
people, particularly those who have had the benefit of higher
education, this should be treated as a primary principle c-F pay.
It has, however, been pointed out earlier that when civil service
grades are created, the determination of salaries and salary scales
is usually influenced principally by relativities based on -Functional
relationships. It is there-Fore impossible to encompass the view that
academic qualifications should be treated as a -First principle of
pay. 5ut it would be only fair to acknowledge that the fixation of
pay is also influenced to some extent by educational qualifications.
That is why, in Jordan as in most civil service structures, the lowest
pay scales are attached to those grades which carry little or no
responsibility and which are open to candidates with lowest educational
qualifications. Higher pay scales are attached to those posts which
carry more responsibility and call -For higher educational qualifications,
and the highest to those posts which involve the greatest responsibility
and require the highest educational, professional or scientific
qualifications, as the case might
*cf. The discussion in Chapter III of the means by which a unified grading
system might be established.179
Once admitted to any particular grade of the Service, an
official might usefully be judged by his performance alone and in
consequence be paid for the work he does and the responsibility he
shoulders. Advancement to a higher post will then depend on the
quality of his work and not solely on his educational attainments.
Another factor to be considered is "comparability".37
Enthusiasts claim that in Jordan the primary principle of pay
for the government service should be fair comparison with current
remuneration of outside firms employing staff on broadly comparable
work, taking account of differences in other conditions of service.38
The principle is, however, not feasible because the scope for
comparison between posts in the public sector and posts outside,
particularly in commerce and industry, is too wide. 39	It is
also difficult to compare salaries in the public and private
sectors. One reason might be that there is not sufficient similarity
of work, and another that each sector is using different valuations
in determining the salary of various jobs. Nevertheless, Table 6.4
shows an average rate of' salaries in both sectors for some
selected posts.
It is obvious that there is a wide difference between
salaries inside and outside the government. The most important
factor in this is the incremental policy of both sectors. For
instance, the basic salary at entry of a university graduate inU)
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the public sector is JD. 63 and will increase by JO. 9 per month
after completion of -Five years service. In the private sector, by
contrast, a graduate with the same qualifications starts at Jo. 88
per month at entry salary and he will receive increases of JO. 63
per month during the same five years period. Other factors, however,
affect the level of salary in both sectors such as experience, skills
and the nature of the work, etc.
Another example of difference in remuneration occurs between
levels of management. The top management officials (defined as
Permanent Secretaries and equivalent Heads of departments a-F
government) receive an average salary of JO. 366 per month; whereas
the director-general of autonomous corporations receives JO. 625
per month. By contrast, the average salary of a director-general
in private enterprises is JO. 1098 per month. The minimum salary
of a director-general in the private sector is JO. 650 per month,
which is higher than the maximum salary earned by a Permanent
Secretary or a head of department in the government. In 1970,
the average salary of top managers in the private sector was 30. 161
per month, and had increased to JO. 1098 per month in 1980, (i.e.
by BOO per cent). This -Far exceeds the increase in the average
salaries paid to Permanent Secretaries and heads of departments
over the same period.40
Accordingly, unlike Western countries such as Britain and
France, which have to compete with the private sector on an equal
basis, Jordan cannot pay the market rate as a principle of182
remuneration. 41 Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance that
the government of Jordan tries to do everything possible, within its
-Financial capacity, to attract the best quality of recruits,
particularly in those fields where they are most needed. If, for
example, the government enjoyed the general reputation of being a
"good employer", the best young men of the country, on leaving school
or the university, might choose a career in the civil service
despite lower financial rewards.
What is meant by the term "good employer"? The best definition
is perhaps to be found in the following extract from the Report of
the British Royal Commission on the Civil Service:
"The 'good employer' is not necessarily the one who offers
the highest rate of pay. He seeks rather to provide
stability and continuity of employment and consults with
representatives of his employees upon changes that affect
both their remuneration and their conditions of work. He
provides adequate facilities for training and advancement
and carries on a range of practices which today constitute
good management, whether they be formalised in joint
consultation along civil service lines or not. Such
employers are likely to be amongst the more progressive
in all aspects of management policy. Their rates of
remuneration will compare well with those of the generality
of' employers, will move readily and not atypically upward
when the trend is in that direction, and will be rather
more stable than most when the trend is downward."	 42
The above principles can be best described as internal and
external relativities. DaLa shows their impact varies upon officials
in the sample. An example of internal relativities can be seen from
the circumstance of an official working for the Civil Service Department.
He is of a head of division in Class II, Grade 7. aged 39 years without
university qualification. He commands salary and allowance less than183
some of his subordinates despite his greater responsibilities.
He therefore suffers from the effects of internal relativities.
A second, but quite different problem involving external relativ-
ities can be demonstrated by the case of an official of the
Department of Agriculture. He is a specialist with an engineering
background in Class I, Grade 4, aged 45 years, occupying the post
of Field Manager, and has a relatively large dependent family
consisting of 8 persons. His salary is 3D. 90 per month and is
the only source of family income. The level of prices and the
cost of living are increasing with no real increase in the official's
salary. Although objective factors suggest that he should leave
the government and "realise" his market value elsewhere, subjective
factors persuade him to stay in the Service because of his length
of service. Finally , his family commitment reduces his desire for
mobility.
In Jordan the principles of pay outlined above have been
applied in the following manner. Towards the end of each calendar
year, each department prepares its budget estimates for the forth-
coming calendar year. These estimates make provision for the
continuance of existing posts with their grades, for the upgrading
of some posts and for the creation and grading o-F new posts. Each
deportment sends its estimates to the Budget Department for considera-
tion and discussions are held between the appropriate departmental
officials. But when these meetings take place, little or no attention
is paid to the advice of the Civil Service Department, and the Budget
Department determines for itself how many staff each department
should have in the next fiscal year and what their grading should be.184
It is there-Fore obvious how important the role of the Budget
Department is in deciding how posts should be evaluated. For
this purpose it does not employ any specialist staff for job
analysis and evaluation. They are content to make an evaluation
of both programmes and staff on the basis of discussions with
the officials of departments concerned related to the needs of
controlling manpower costs.
As a 'system', these arrangements are obviously defective.
They do not involve any serious examination and assessment of
pay relationships in each administrative unit of the government or
in units carrying out similar or analogous functions. There is,
however, in the existing processes one redeeming feature which
could provide a sound basis for developing what is now a sketchy
and unsatisfactory procedure into a more coherent and effective
evaluation system. This is the existing legal provision of the
Civil Service Regulations that the Civil Service Department is
responsible for participating in the examination of the job content
of posts within departments, with a view to determining the number
of staff required and their grading according to duties and
responsibilities. In addition it advises the Budget Department on
the creation of new posts. 43 At the present, the information
provided in this way is not effectively used.
The encouraging -Feature here is that the Civil Service
Department is actually examining the duties and responsibilities
attached to posts in departments ,although it concerns itself more
with control of numbers than with the grading of posts. If the185
activities of the OSO in this direction could be expanded, so
that major attention is given to the evaluation of duties and
responsibilities and the appropriate grading of posts, the end
result might be an effective method of applying the principles of
pay already enunciated. In the meantime the system has developed
certain distinct features.
6.3 FEATURES OF PAY STRUCTURE
The most salient features of the pay structure in the
government service of Jordan are) First, there is a great disparity
in salaries. This is not based on any extensive family budget
inquiry, nor does it appear to reflect any substantial improvement
from the past. 44 The government made no effort to discover
principles by which the maximum salary and its proportion to the
minimum salary might be determined. For example, a Permanent
Secretary commands a monthly salary JO. 400 without dependents'
allowance (i.e. family allowance). By contrast, a junior official
working in the same department, has a salary fixed at Jo. 37 per
month. The system of recruitment, described in the previous
chapter, permitted them to enter the Service at the same date and
accumulate an equal length of service. Dependents' allowance
provide some assistance to the junior official. But the disparity
in the basic salary indicates the problem which arises in the
organisation where too little thought is given to the social and
economic consequences of salary structures. The present disparity186
between the highest and lowest level of pay together with the number
of disincentives seem unlikely to advance the cause of building an
effective government service such as those which exist in countries
like 5ritain and the United States. 45 In order to give a more
balanced pay structure, the gap should be narrowed.
Second, time-scale of promotion, involving promotion barriers
between grades, is too long. Age and -Family responsibilities are
not considered. The government determined the compulsory age of
retirement at 60 years with size a-F pension determined by length of
pensionable service -	 The length in
posts and promotion must depend, to a large extent, on both the
age of retirement and maximum length of service.
Third, there is a considerable rigidity in salary structure.
An increase of pay-scales is frequently accompanied by an increase
in level of prices, / reducing the real income. The effect of
these circumstances adversely affectsthe morale  4:. efficiency of
employees. In addition, with present salary levels it is not
possible to attract recruits of the right calibre to the Civil
Service. The introduction of greater elasticity in the salary
structure is badly needed.
Fourth, pay-scales do not encompass an "overlap system"
reflecting responsibilities but are classified as "fixed scale with
automatic progression". The individual progresses automatically up
a salary ladder on the basis of service, so that annual increases
are pre-determined up to the maximum level. This system is
criticised because it does not give enough incentive to effort and
to the improvement of performance. Effort might only be rewarded187
by promotion in the longer term, if at all. By contrast, an
overlap structure is able to take care of senior staff who cannot
be promoted, but for whom some additional payment reflecting
responsibilities has to be arranged. 46 This is also a way of
indicating that a post may rotate between officials of different
ranks, provided the lower ranking officer has sufficient seniority
in his own grade.
Fifth, there is no one salary structure but rather a variety
of different salary arrangements which apply to various categories
of employees. For example, there is one plan for special and
higher posts, another for classified officials, another for unclassi-
fied officials, another for contractual employees and still another
for daily wage employees. 47 It would, therefore, be far simpler
and more equitable to have a single basic pay structure that covers
all employees irrespective of their status in the Service or other
terms and conditions of their employment. A pay structure fulfiling
the three requirements ofnormal performance length of service;
and exceptional service would provide a far more effective tool of
personnel management than the existing arrangements.46
The government has not been altogether blind to the need for
improvement of emoluments. Seine departments and personnel succeeded
in getting some special allowances. 49 A critic may, however, feel
that this piecemeal approach tends to generate jealousy among those
who remain left out of any improvements. He may also find that lack
of internal relativities are made worse by this approach. It is not
desirable that sectional pulls and pressures rather than a publicly-
declared and integrated policy should guide the changes in the salary188
structure. There-Fore, an inquiry commission with comprehensive
terms of reference could be set up to inquire into the pay
structure of th8 public service as a whole. As well as the
central government service, the inquiry should take into account
the pay-scale of the other public employees in autonomous corpora-
tions so as to establish some sort of co-ordination. 50 The
immediate objective would be not only rationalisation but also
co-ordination of the salary structure of all public servants.
Better co-ordination has many advantages: (a)Limproves the
employees' morale; Ib) it facilitates mobility of personnel
between one public employment and the other; and (c) it can help
in the proper distribution of capable persons among various employ-
ments instead of their being concentrated in those in which salary
is much higher. 51 A further advantage might be to co-ordinate the
efforts of the Civil Service Department, Budget Department, and
National Planning Council as they relate to planning, finance and
control of service manpower.
6.4 ALLOWANCES
The policy of the government in Jordan is not to accept the
principle that the remuneration of employees should be changed from
time to time with variations in the purchasing power of money. But
where the cost of living rises or the market rates for certain kinds
of manpower increases, some system of bonus becomes necessary to
preserve the neutrality of the Service. To meet situations like
this, the government has adopted a system of allowances. The most
important of these are: family high cost of living allowances189
technical allowance;and specialisation allowance.
The Family High Cost of Living Allowance
This is paid as follows: 3D. 7 per month for the wife of the
52
official and 3D. 2 per month for each of the first -Four children.
The allowance for each child is stopped as soon as the child has
reached 18 years of age. 53 The effect of this allowance on "take-
home" pay can be demonstrated by the following illustration. An
officer who is married and has four children, receives his basic
pay plus a -Family allowance, amounting to 3D. 15 per month. This
allowance reduces as each child reaches the age of 18 years till it
ceases when the fourth child attains that age. In the sample,
60 per cent of employees from all categories receive this kind of
allowance.
The sole merit of the family allowance appears to be that it
is an acknowledgement on the part of the government that its
employees need to be safeguarded against the rising cost of living.
This allowance, however, is objected to on several grounds. Firstly,
it has the effect of narrowing differentials in the Service, indeed
of suppressing them in certain cases. For instance, an unmarried
Director, Grade 2, in the Ministry of Education has a smaller
salary than his Assistant, Grade 3, who is married and has four
children. Such a narrowing of differentials doubtless occurs
throughout the various grades of the Service and it certainly clashes
with the basic pay principle that officials who have greater
responsibility should receive higher emoluments. Secondly, this
allowance begins to shrink and finally to disappear at a time when it is1 90
most	 needed. It could be argued that an official's basic
salary should have increased sufficiently by the time his children
have begun to reach the age of 18 to enable him to carry on without
the family allowance. On the other hand, it is more likely that his
higher salary will be barely sufficient to cope with the needs of
a growing family, and the loss of even one part of the family
allowance will be keenly felt. Thirdly, family allowance is quite
static and is not geared to any cost of living index.
The question accordingly arises whether this concession should
be consolidated into the salary structure, or whether it should be
replaced by a cost of living allowance payable to all officials,
married or single. There are serious objections to the first course.
(a) If basic salaries were to be increased through consolidation, the
Exchequer would be saddled with a much higher bill for pensions than
at present, and this would prove an intolerable strain to the govern-
ment while it is trying to carry out a phased economic development
programmes. Ib) If this allowance were merged with basic salaries,
the narrowing of differentials would become a built in feature of the
pay structure unless the allowance were also made applicable to
unmarried officials, in which case the pension implications would be
even greater. (c) From the budgetary and accounts aspects, much
time and labour would have to be spent on the revision of officials'
salaries as and when their children reach the age of eighteen. In
these circumstances, it would seem that this course should be avoided.
As regards the alternative course, there can be no doubt that a
straight cost of living allowance, payable to all officials is a fairer
system than the present practice. It must be borne in mind that the
rising cost of living, including house rent and the daily necessities of191
life a-F-Fects a single official no less than a married one. Also,
single officials often have family responsibilities, in that they
have to support aged parents and young brothers and sisters. The
data shows that 80 single officials were included in the sample.
Forty per cent of them support at least one other person, 17.5 per
cent have the responsibility for between 3 and 4 people, 3.7 per
cent support between 6 and 7 dependents and 5 per cent may have as
many as 10 dependents. However, Table 6.5 shows the number of
persons economically dependent upon officials in the sample.
TABLE 6.5
Number of Persons Economically Dependent upon the Respondents (n = 300)
Dependents
	
Number I Percentage
None	 48
	
16.0
1-2 persons	
56
	
18.7
3-5
	
68
	
22.7
6-7
	
70
	
23.3
8-10
	
43
	
14.3
-11-15
	
15
	
5.0
There-Fore, it would appear, on the whole, that the present
system of family allowance paid only to married officials is the
only affordable system that is practical for the government of
Jordan.	 It is also well understood and it provides a measure
of relief.192
Technical Allowance and Specialisation Allowance
These allowances are paid only to particular types a-F officials,
i.e. doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, pharmacists, engineers.
judges, agricultural engineers, nurses and midwives. 54 For technical
allowance, there are two criteria: academic qualifications; and
field of study. For specialisation allowance the criteria are
academic qualifications; and length of service. 55 However, these
allowances vary in amount. Technical allowance vary from 40 per
cent to 100 per cent of the basic salary of the official concerned.
For instance, doctors and engineers receive 100 per cent of the
basic salary; dentists, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, judges
and agricultural engineers receive 70 per cent. Nurses receive
50 per cent, midwives receive 50 per cent and judges under training
receive 40 per	 Specialisation allowance is paid on a
-Flat rate basis ranging from JO. 30 to JO. 180 per month. 57 It
is notable that a "specialist s' is eligible to claim both of them
simultaneously. 58 The consequence, for example, is that in the
case of pharmacists, technical allowance is paid at 70 per cent
per month of the basic salary, in addition to which a specialisation
allowance of JO. 30 up to JO. 120 per month is payable to licensed
pharmacists of all grades.59
The grant of these allowances is subject to the condition
that professionals must close their private clinics and devote their
time to the performance of their official duties only. What the
government seeks to do by these means is to abolish private practice
on the part of professional people and to award them allowances as
compensation for the loss of private income.193
The payment of these types of allowances to certain specialist
officials has advantages as well as disadvantages. On the one hand,
it can be defended on the grounds that it is meant to compensate
those who choose to serve the State instead of practising their
profession outside where they command far higher monetary rewards.
On the other hand, it is found objectionable on the following
grounds. First, a "special privileged class" has been created
within the Service. For instance, only 25 per cent in our sample
have access to these allowances. Second, other categories of
officials, who feel that they too have a certain market value,feel
not adequately rewarded. They are convinced that their duties
and responsibilities are of no less importance to the State, and
they become frustrated when their claims of a similar allowance
are not accepted.
On the whole, the disadvantages of this system outweigh the
advantages and it is considered that, in normal circumstances, the
best course would be to merge the whole, or a part of these
allowances with basic salaries. But in view of the economic
situation, Jordan might not be able to follow this course. Firstly,
if a whole or part of these allowances were consolidated into basic
salaries for specialists concerned, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to bring down the salaries of these officials in line
with changing market value in different professional groups. There
is also, at present, a sizeable group of young Jordanians studying
at medical and engineering institutions inside and outside the
country who have expectations of certain standards of living. 60 When1 4
they complete their study the market value now attaching to these
professions might be considerably reduced. Therefore, a relatively
stable basic salary with flexible allowance permits government to
keep pace with supply and demand of specialised manpower. Secondly,
the pension charges would be substantially increased by such
consolidation. At present the pensions of such officials are
calculated on basic emoluments, technical and specialisation
allowances not being taken into account for that purpose. Accordingly,
it is suggested that tchnical and pecialisation aLllowances
/
attached to certain posts should continue, at least for the time
being but that, as and when more young graduates with the requisite
qualifications are available to fill these posts, these allowances
61
might be phased out.
6.5 RETIREMENT BENEFITS
In Jordan the retirement benefits to which the employees under
the central government are entitled, are of two kinds: 	 pension
and provident fund. Classified officials are pensionable, whereas
departmental recruited personnel in unclassified posts are non-
pensionable but are eligible for the provident funds. Contractual
grades are either pensionable or non-pensionable, according to
62
their contracts.
There is the so-called "ordinary pension" which is exclusively
paid to retired people in the classified grades and to the pensionable195
contractual grades. It is paid under two sets of rules: (a) to an
officer who is required by rules to retire at age of 60 years or
after, completing 40 years of qualifying service;and (b) to an
officer who is permitted under rules to retire after completing 30
years of qualifying service. 63 Each of the two cases consists of
a monthly pension subject to a maximum limit according to a specific
formula. 64 The scale of benefit varies according to the salary and
length of service. The pension is contributory at a rate of 7 per
cent o-F the basic salary, paid by the officials.65
On the other hand, "provident fund" is a system of lump-sum
payments for unclassified and the non-pensionable contractual
personnel. It is based on a combined employer-employee contribution,
at the rate of 10 per cent to 5 per cent (i.e. total of 15 per
cent). 66 This amount is payable to those retiring after completion
of at least 25 years of government service or retiring prematurely
on account o-F permanent physical or mental incapacity.67
There is also "disability pension" which is paid for all
classes of employees on the following grounds. First, to the
official who is injured in performing his duty, and to the family
of an officer who is killed or dies of injuries received in the
execution of his duty. 68 Second, to the official who is permanently
incapacitated for public service and for the particular service to
which he belongs. 69 There is also provision for a benefit to be paid
to the official who is discharged owing to the abolition of his post
provided that it is not possible for the government to offer him
other suitable alternative employment.70196
6.6 FEATURES OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Age of retirement
Under the existing rules in Jordan an officer may be permitted
to retire after completing 30 years of qualifying service, and must
retire at the age of sixty, though extension is possible up to the
age o-F sixty five. This practice is neither in the interest of the
State, nor in that of the individual and should be amended as soon
as possible. At the age of sixty most people are in good physical
and mental health and their accumulated experience makes them
valuable assets of the nation. The loss of such experienced and
well-trained personnel when they are at the height of their useful-
ness is a serious matter from the point of view of effectiveness
and efficiency and imposes a heavy burden on the finances of the
State.
However, the government has not recommended any change in the
existing practice. This is attributable to the following reasons.
First, in view of the existence of unemployment among educated
groups, the raising of the age limit, it is feared, would cause
some disappointment to young persons seeking jobs. Second, the
promotion prospects of those working within the Service are likely
to be blocked to a certain extent by this move. According to the
government the raising of the age limit will be contrary to public
interest. Once the age limit is raised even inefficient employees
will be allowed to stay on, as the very old of these employees will197
appeal to the officer who, on compassionate grounds, would hesitate
71
to throw them out.
After the completion o-F the present Plan for Soclo-Economic
*
Development, the problem of unemployment among educated groups would
have disappeared to a large extent. This would remove the first
objection. As far as the second is concerned, we have to bear in
mind the fact that the blocking of promotion prospects would be
only temporary and that ultimately employees would stand to gain
by the raising o-F the age of retirement. Jordan needs men o-F
experience to run her administration in this age of planned
development, and there is a shortage o-F senior, trained and
experienced officers. There-Fore, the age of retirement may be
raised especially for technical personnel.	 On the other hand,
the government should retire any officer who is considered
physically or mentally unfit even before he attains the age of
sixty. Further, the officer who does not want to continue in
service beyond the age of sixty should not be compelled to do so.
This policy would enable the experience of personnel to be used
more adequately than today.
Retirement Benefits Rules
As in the case o-F salary and allowances, the rules of
retirement benefits are not uniform for all employees. It is
a grievance of some employees [i.e. non-pensionable) that
the rules applicable to them are not fair and just. This
discrimination is a legacy from the past when only classified
*
The Five Year Plan for Social and Economic Development, 1981-1985.198
officials used to receive attention at the hands of government.
Successive governments confined their attention to classified
staff. The central management agencies, unfortunately, also did
not remove this grievance on part of some departmental staff.
Discrimination of this kind should have no place in the Jordanian
administration.
Pension and Inefficient Officials
An official who is removed from office on account c-F
inefficiency is not entitled to retirement benefits in Jordan,
although in special cases benefits may be granted for compassionate
reasons, for instance, on the grounds of ill-health. This makes
the supervisors reluctant to recommend the dismissal of their
subordinates on the grounds of inefficiency. In awarding
benefits, however, in such cases the government will be guided
by the circumstances of each case and the amount will be higher
or lower according to the circumstances. In the interest of
efficiency, this rule could be made the general public service
rule. This will enable the government to retire unfit persons
at all levels without loss of pension r"ights. This rule, however,
needs to be applied discreetly but firmly. The government service
today is looked upon as a life-time career. Any significant
violation of this idea may destroy the non-political status of the
Service and may weaken an official's devotion to work. On the
other hand, a proper, just and judicious use of this power is likely
to promote efficiency and effectiveness in administration.199
Pension and Temporary Service
Under the existing rules service rendered in a temporary
post, with certain exceptions, does not count towards pension.
It might be easy to justify the principle underlying the
regulations in the case of appointments which are purely o-F a
temporary character and have been created for a short period
for specific purposes. But it is difficult to justify it where
the department is maintained on a temporary footing from year
to year. For example, one third of the employees in the
72
Department of Customs has been recruited on temporary basis.
The system under which officials are continued on a temporary
establishment from year to year without qualifying for pension
is definitely unsatisfactory. It creates a sense of insecurity
about the future in the minds of the officials concerned. They
-Feel that they have no stake in their service and are constantly
looking for other avenues of part time earnings. If they are
accorded pension rights, they would be more inclined to see their
best interests served by giving all their attention to their
official duties.
It is, therefore, suggested that all employees carried on
temporary establishments may be allowed to count their entire
temporary service for the purpose of pension.
Retirement Benefit Cost
Numerous reports on the pension scheme have referred to
the large deficits, which in the fiscal year o-F 1981 amounted to200
JD. 23.7 million (Civil and Military) and which are certain to
grow in the future. (See Chart 6.6). This results -From two
factors: () the possibility of retiring at relatively young
ages after relatively short period o-F service, and (b) relatively
high pension amounts, particularly for those with relatively
short service. 73 These two factors not only produce high costs,
but also are undesirable from a personal standpoint, because of
the significant incentives that are given to employees in mid-
career to leave the Service and draw a sizeable pension, while
at the same time obtaining other employment. Such mid-career
employees are often at the very peak of their usefulness to the
Service. It seems likely that there will be some sort of general
pay readjustment, reflected in pension payments, with primary
emphasis upon increased salaries. This would make remaining in
service more attractive for those who have had valuable experience
and technical skills. I-F this were done, there would be a
significant effect on the pension scheme, not only directly, but
also indirectly in that there would be less pressure -For early
retirement.
Internal and External Mobilit
The rules of pension in Jordan greatly restrict the sort of
movement which many people wish to see. While the rules allow
for transferring pension rights in moves between employment in
public sector, this does not extend to moves between the public
and private sectors of employment.74 A person who enters the0
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CHART 6.8
Government Expenditure (Million JO] on Employees' Salaries, Allowances
and Retirement Benefits, 1976-1981
1081
Year	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981
Sources: Treasury, Annual Financial Reports of Pension and Social
Security of 1978-1981, Amman.
Budget Department, Budget Law For the Fiscal Years 1976-19&1,Amman.
Salary
Allowance
Pension (Civil & Military]202
public service from the private sector cannot transfer his pension
rights into the government pension scheme and thus continue to
build up a continuous pension entitlement, though he may be able
to preserve his rights in his old scheme. A government official
who leaves to go to a private employment loses all his pension
rights. Clearly this is a serious impediment to movement both
into and out of the Service. The Service should, therefore,
wherever practicable, make transfer arrangements with private
employers to facilitate late entry. In order to provide incentive,
all government employees who have served for an appropriate
qualifying period should be able to transfer, or preserve their
rights on voluntarily leaving the Service.
Retirement Benefits and Length of Service
There is a great inequity in the rules in that short-service
employees who voluntarily separate from the Service (except for
women) or who are involuntarily separated without cause before
having five years of service receive no lump-sum refund of the
75
contribution that they have made.	 This practice is unfair,
because employee contributions are really the property of the
76
individual concerned. Therefore, at least this amount should be
returned to him upon separation from service.203
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CHAPTER VII
PROMOTION AND ADVANCEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Promotion is "part of the greater problem of placement within
the service, the problem of so allocating the available personnel
that the most efficient result is obtained through the maximum use
of existing abilities."	 If this can be achieved, it will be
advantageous because it gives the employee an incentive. The
question of promotion in the bureaucracy is a complicated, difficult
and sensitive one. The bureaucracy offers a life-time vocation
and opportunities for growth, development and advancement to "capable"
men. The main purpose of a fair and effective system of promotion
is to render this possible. Such a system thus has to achieve three
important goals: to select the "best" men for the higher positions;
to satisfy those to whom it is applied that it is fair and just; and
to have a creative influence on the whole staff structure. 2 The
success with which this intricate issue of promotion is handled is
a very important factor which vitally affects the efficiency and
morale of the service.
This chapter aims to investigate the Jordanian system of
promotion: its policy, procedures, principles and promotional
opportunities. The reporting system and performance appraisal will
also be examined. The attitudes of respondents and their images
of promotional principles and how to get ahead in the Service are
also explored.208
7.1 PROMOTION POLICY
Central iromotion
In Jordan, promotions to the highest administrative posts -
Permanent Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Director-General or equiva-
lent rank - are made by the Cabinet on the recommendations of the
Ministers concerned, provided that such action is confirmed by Royal
Decree. 3 Like the appointment of this group, there is a political
consideration in the promotion process. The scrutiny of the Cabinet
in this kind of activity therefore exists. The key positions in the
administration should be manned by persons who enjoy the confidence
of Ministers collectively.4
Promotions of classified officials are made by the Civil
Service Department through the Central Selection Board. But in the
case of Class I officials the Cabinet should approve the decision
on promotion taken by the Selection Board, while in the case of
Class II officials the Minister concerned should confirm it. 5 In
practice, the assessment reports of the officers within the zone
of promotion are sent to the CSO with a memorandum containing the
recommendations of the department concerned, and the Selection Board
decides which of the candidates are most suitable for the promotion.6
Thus, classified officials promotions are in reality made by
departments and confirmed by central decision taken by the Civil
Service Department.
Departmental Promotion
Promotions of unclassified and contractual officials are made209
on a departmental basis only. The Civil Service Department is not
associated with the promotions of this category of employees but
may be consulted in certain cases. 7 However, the procedure differs
from one department to another. Some departments use promotion
committees or ad hoc selection boards. These committees have
become more usual in recent years and are normally presided over by
the head of the department or an officer nominated by him and two
other officers familiar with the work of the candidates. The
committees rely mainly on the personnel records of the candidates
(as recorded in the assessment reports). Interviews are seldom
used. 8 In other departments, promotions are made on the recommenda-
tion of a higher officer who goes through the assessment reports of
the candidates. 9 The possibilities of disparities arising between
departments in promotion opportunities can be imagined.
Advancement in most large organisations is usually measured by
three major methods - annual increments in the scale a-F pay (J.e.
time-scale	 efficiency bars at certain points in the time-scale;
and promotion bars either at certain stages of the time-scale or
between one class of the service and another. 1 ° In Jordan, methods
of advancement and promotion of classified personnel have been
regulated through increments and promotion bars. There are no
efficiency bars as such. Increments are granted at the sole dis-
cretion of the Head of Department if he is satisfied with the
performance of the official concerned. Increments are often granted
as a matter of course, while the promotion bars at the top of each
grade do not operate on the basis of known and consistent criteria
of effectiveness and promotion from grade to grade is seldom made
on the basis of merit.11210
Promotions in some cases do not take place promptly. This delay
is on account of two main reasons. The Establishment Divisions are
understaffed and do not prepare the lists of candidates in advance of
12
vacancies likely to occur in a period o-F time, say a year. Some
attention is being paid to the removal of this defect and things are
likely to improve. 13 The reference of each case to the Civil Service
Department in the case of classified employees also involves delay
since the CSD has not been strengthened numerically to keep pace
with the growth of their work.	 However, there is some evidence
recently about improvement in the disposal of cases of promotion by
the Civil Service Department.14
The normal principle of advancement is that an official must
prove by his performance and conduct as an official that he is fit
to be promoted.	 Strict observance of this principle means that
the constant efficiency of the Service as a whole is ensured, a
matter which is wholly in the public interest. Nevertheless, there
are complaints of occasional favouritism and nepotism.	 These
complaints grow as one goes down the hierarchy. Annual reports
of the Civil Service Department made serious allegations against
the departmental promotion committees. The procedure followed by
these committees is not fully conducive to -Fairness. The departmental
officers also come with a certain degree of prejudice for or against
certain candidates.	 In such circumstances, since these cases are
not subject to the scrutiny of the CSD, it is difficult for the
latter to give an independent verdict as far as the promotion o-F
departmental employees is concerned. 17 This is a serious allegation211
and is not by any means helpful in ensuring promotion on the basis
of merit. The eradication of such practices cannot a-P-Ford any delay.
The Civil Service Department can, however, act as a guardian
against glaring favouritism and political nepotism involving pro-
motion of classified employees. But it should not be forgotten
that since the CSD has still to rely upon assessment reports primarily,
its role therefore is limited by the nature of these reprts. In
a similar situation, Hayes, a British observer, points out:
"The (British Civil Service) Commission is in a difficult
position over promotions. Since there is neither time
nor staff to interview likely candidates, decisions have
to be made on their records and confidential reports. It
is notorious in all countries that confidential reports,
however sincerely made, vary widely in value. The
Commission's duty is not so much to select the best
officer for promotion as to protect civil servants against
injustice". 18
Transposed to the situation in Jordan, the following measures
might remove the defects. Careful selection of the members of
promotion committees should be carefully selected. If the committee
consists of independent officers, none of whom is subordinate to
the other, it is less likely that its decisions will be unduly
influenced by the opinion or the likes or dislikes of the head o-F
department or his representative who has to be there.	 A repres-
entative of the Civil Service Department should be associated with
the departmental promotion committees in their deliberations. It
is also essential to ensure that no names of persons who have a
reasonable claim to be considered are withheld -Prom the committees.
A complete list of all the eligible candidates should be made in
advance.212
The materials placed before the committees must be full,
adequate and reliable. The representatives or members of these
committees should come to the meetings with an open mind and place
all the facts before the committees. In addition, the right to
appeal needs to be granted -For all categories of employees and a
candidate who feels himself aggrieved by the promotion decision be
enabled to place his case either before a special board to be
created -For this purpose, or before the next meeting of the Central
Selection Board in the CSD and departmental promotion committees.
'Limited competition' as a method of promotion might also be
organised on a trial in Jordan. This involves written examinations
supplemented by interviews. 19 Two advantages could be obtained by
using this method. First, it has the supreme merit of making the
selection thoroughly impartial and objective. "It ensures the
deserving civil servant of equality both of opportunity and in the
standard of selection throughout the service." 20 Second, it provides
opportunities for promotion to the young officers of ability whose
length of service is so short that assessment reports cannot reveal
their true worth. The use of interviews can give a more comprehensive
idea of the personality and a better picture of the relative fitness
of candidates for promotion than does reliance on mere records.21
Finally, the politicians should exercise self-restraint and not try
to press the claims of those officials in whom they feel interested
for reasons of nepotism and favouritism.*
*f	 Chapter VI, pp. 163-164.213
These measures are likely to minimise the chances of miscarriage
of justice on the one hand, and of mistrust on the other.	 Morale
and efficiency of the Service as a whole could thereby be improved.
7.2 PRINCIPLES OF PROMOTION
A major source of stress and tension within bureaucratic
organisation can be the criteria of promotion. In Jordan, the
Regulations stipulate a set of criteria, namely: competence, i.e.
ability to do the job; academic and non-academic qualifications;
and seniority. 22 While these criteria may appear to be rational
and not subject to disagreement, the formal Regulations are some-
what different from the way they are applied. For instance, although
the Regulations relegate seniority to a criterion of a minor
importance, in practice it is the most important criterion. It
tends to be the basis of promotion up to the post of Assistant
Director-General. 23 However, it is a controversial issue in the
government service of Jordan.
Promotion by seniority is advocated on the following grounds.24
First, seniority indicates the length of service which, resulting in
the accumulation of	 experience, is an important factor in
equipping the official for posts of higher skill or competence and
determines, to some extent, the usefulness of an officer to the State.
It is, thus, one of the factors that determines merit itself. Second,
the operation of promotion on this basis is objective and intelligible.
It is a safe method likely to cause least resentment and there is also
less risk of favouritism under it than might be the case under some
national principle of merit. Third, most employees seem to like it214
because they can understand it and also because it does not produce
any embarrassment for elderly employees who might have to work under
those who were once their juniors. 8y avoiding the need to make
any distinction between one person and another based on "merit
criterion", it removes the embarrassment of promoting a junior officer
over the head of an older one. Finally, the promotion of the officer
supposedly possessing superior "ability" and "efficiency" is
generally mistrusted by the majority of officials as an excuse for
nepotism and patronage.
Nevertheless, the basis of promotion by seniority in Jordan
has come in for criticism from time to time. The Prime Minister,
for instance, remarks: "Consideration of fitness for promotion must
have precedence over the claims of seniority." 25 The Civil Service
Department, also, is of the opinion that merit or ability must be
the primary consideration in governing promotions to higher posts
in the government service. The CSD further points out that in all
cases the relative merits of the candidates will require careful
consideration. "While seniority will be an important factor, it
cannot be the sole or the most important criterion." 25 The
criticism is mainly based upon the fact that seniority provides no
motivation for improving performance, nor does it ensure that
positions requiring initiative and innovation are held by persons
having these qualities. Ambition is stifled. Moreover, seniority
has encouraged a lot of public servants to think of promotion as a
right, irrespective of the needs of the Service and the necessary
qualifications. 27 This creates disincentives.
A theoretical advantage of seniority is that all members of a21 5
particular grade are equally -Fit -For promotion and vacancies arise
in a reasonable continuous flow. But critics argue that, in practice,
28 the occurrence o-F such ideal conditions is extremely improbable.
All members of the grade in one department or across the Service are
not equally fit -For promotion. The real situation which has existed
makes it difficult to believe that personnel management has developed
solely upon the use of seniority in public sector promotion. The
totality of the bureaucracy in Jordan consists of a multitude of
sub-organisations, located in various parts of the hierarchy and
engaged in many different tasks. Given so large a number of units,
it would be difficult to maintain a uniform personnel system based
strictly upon seniority. Indeed, even within a specified group such
as middle management, there is a good deal of variation from one
department to another. Illustrative cases demonstrate this point.
Two officials entered the Service at the same time and they have
almost identical qualifications and length of service one having
been working for the Treasury and the other for the Civil Service
Department. Although both of them are middle-rank managers, the
former is in Grade 5 acting as Assistant Head of Division, whereas
the latter is in Grade 4 acting as Head of Division. This demonstrates
the extreme improbability that every bureaucrat with certain
characteristics is advancing at the same speed.
In addition, promotion on the basis of seniority is rather
slow and infrequent. The higher the management level, the smaller
the number of available posts. Large numbers of men necessarily
fail to win promotion to position of Assistant Director-General or
above. Thus seniority may create a sense of frustration which is
likely to compel the best officer to turn elsewhere for opportunities.216
Recently the Civil Service Department pleaded for more attention to
be given to merit as the basis of promotion than had been the case
in the past. According to the CSD, while the principle of seniority
could not be ignored completely, the possibility of the more
extensive use o-F the principle of merit, judged by a performance
appraisal system, should be explored so that, in each field, a
person who has the requisite ability can feel assured that if he
does outstanding work, the Service provides adequately -For promotion
to higher levels of responsibility.29
Despite the vigorous advocacy of merit as the criterion -For
promotion, seniority is still the determining factor in selecting
employees for promotion to a higher grade or post. 30 Advocates
claim that the rule of seniority may be followed for many situations,
especially those oF a routine character in respect of which long
familiarity with office work itself is an adequate training. 31 But
even in this category of posts, occasional examples of exceptional
and accelerated promotion of deserving persons would be an inducement
to greater endeavour, provided care was taken to guard against all
suspicion of nepotism and favouritism. With respect to promotions
to higher responsibilities, merit or fitness -For the post should be
the sole criterion. There is a growing realisation within the
bureaucracy of Jordan that seniority, though useful in certain ways,
provides no motivation -For improving performance. 32 Improvement, in
turn, is necessary to achieve effectiveness. Accordingly a more
comprehensive re-orientation of promotional principles is needed -For
the various categories of employees. The -Formula laid down by the
Tomlin Commission, though written in a different context, seems to be
a valuable guide in the process of re-orientation in Jordan.	 The217
Commission points out that, for filling higher posts, "merit
should be the only consideration"; for the middle level posts,
"merit should be the determining factor", for the lower posts
seniority should ordinarily carry weight but it should also be
provided "that exceptional merit is rewarded by accelerated
,33
promotion.
7.3 IMAGES OF PROMOTION PRINCIPLES AMONG RESPONDENTS
Individuals in the organisation may prefer that certain
criteria and methods be used, but the formal regulations may pre-
scribe a very different pattern. Also people may perceive that
criteria of promotion are implemented quite differently from the
way the regulations prescribe. In other words, bureaucrats can
perceive that promotions are awarded on a very different set of
criteria from either those they prefer or those that statutory
regulations prescribe.
So, one series of questions in the survey dealt with promotion
principles. The respondents were asked to rank six criteria of
promotion in order of personal preference. The criteria referred
to are listed below in Table 7.1. After recording their preferred
ranking, the further question was asked: 'The way promotions are
made is often different from the way that one considers ideal.
Would you examine the six criteria again. This time rank them the
way you think the Service makes promotions.'
A comparison of the preferred and the perceived ranks provided
information on how closely the actual promotional behaviour matched£ ID
the ideal promotional behaviour. The first three criteria refer
to the formal requirements set forth in the Regulations. Results
indicate that officials prefer a promotion order with competence
(i.e. ability to do the job) ranked first and -Favouritism (i.e.
personal relations with superiors) ranked last. Seniority ranked
second; education, training and personality traits are ranked third,
fourth and fifth respectively. How officials in the sample perceive
promotions to be made by the Service is strikingly different from
what they would prefer. Seniority ranked first and personality
traits last. Competence is ranked second; education, being well-
known to superiors and training are ranked third, fourth and fifth
respectively. The data shows that the respondents were nearly
consistent as a group in their preferred ranking of the promotion
criteria and much less consistent in evaluating how they perceived
the criteria were applied in practice.
TABLE 7.1
Ranking of perceived and preferred promotional criteria (n = 300)
percentage of respondents
Criteria	 Perceived	 Preferred
Seniority	 70.3	 4g.3
Competence	 44.7	 84.3
Education	 29.0	 41.7
Training	 3.3	 33.0
Personal relations	 25.0	 4.0
Personality traits	 2.8	 25.0219
Rank, class and type of the organisation make a difference to
the way in which an official thinks about promotion in the Service.
The data shows that 65 per cent of senior officials, 78 per cent of
middle level and 68 per cent of lower level ranked seniority as the
factor of prime significance in promotion. This suggests that
seniority is widely used in the bureaucracy of Jordan for making
promotion. However, 52 per cent of senior officials and 47 per
cent of the middle level managers ranked competence as second rank
whereas 44 per cent of junior level ranked the factor o-F'personal
relations with superiors'as the second influential factor in their
promotion. This reflects the importance of social pressure on the
bottom of the ladder bearing in mind that the majority o-F junior level
staff are departmental grades.
By contrast, all levels of management (87 per cent of senior,
85 per cent of middle and 81 per cent of junior) prefer competence
to be the determining factor for promotion. Seniority occupies
second rank at 37 per cent of senior managers, 64 per cent of middle
and 47 per cent of the lower ranks. It is noticed that the middle-
ranking officials rate seniority higher in both perceiving and
preferring than do the higher and lower-ranking officials. This
suggests that the middle-rank feel dependent on seniority and they
are advanced by the concept o-F "being promoted on the basis of
experience." This also suggests the limited scope for lateral entry
to the middle_rank.*
All classes share a clear perception of seniority as a determining
*chapter IV, pp. 89-92.220
criterion in their advancement. Over sixty-five (65.8 per cent)
of Class I officers, 77.6 per cent o-F Class II, 62.9 per cent of
unclassified and 62 per cent of contractual officers took this view.
However, there was a large difference in perception about the
next most important criterion.	 Fifty per cent of Class I
officers and 34.5 per cent of Class II officers perceived "competence"
as the second major criterion;	 whereas 80 per cent of unclassified
officers and 55 per cent of contractual officers perceived 'personal
relations with superiors' as the second major criterion for making
promotion.	 Only 12.8 per cent of Class I officers and 22.4
per cent of Class II officers perceived that personal influence is
used in the promotion process.	 This shows the difference in
experience of promotion procedures.
When preference was tested, 87 per cent of Class I, 81 per cent
of Class II and 90 per cent of contractual officials preferred
"competence" to be the prime criterion for promotion; 71.4 per cent
of unclassified class officials preferred both competence and
seniority to be used on an equal basis for promotion. Nearly half of
Class I officers (51 per cent) prefer seniority to be second rank, while
46.5 per cent of Class II and 40 per cent of contractual class officers
prefer education to be the second rank of criterion. One-third of
Class I officers and 39.7 per cent of Class II officers advocated
that training courses should be taken into account in determining
promotion, whereas 28.6 per cent and 20 per cent of unclassified and
contractual officers respectively inclined towards this trend.221
As between departments studied, seniority ranked first in all
of them except the National Planning Council where "competence" is
regarded as the first criterion for promotion. Eighty per cent of
the Civil Service Department, 85 per cent of the Treasury, 85 per
cent of the Education and 66.7 per cent of Agriculture officers
perceived seniority the most significant factor among all promotion
criteria. When considering perceived criteria for promotion among
the officers of the National Planning Council, 75 per cent perceived
competence as the determining principle. At the same time, 55 per
cent of the officers mentioned seniority as an influential factor.
In the Civil Service Department and Agriculture, competence was the
next most important criterion at rate  a-F 31.7 per cent and 38.3 per
cent respectively. In the Department of Education.the criterion
which was second in importance was the education factor at the
rate of 45 per cent.
The importance of favouritism also differs in significance among
different departments. In the CSD, 25 per cent of the officers
thought it to be an important factor  in promotion; whereas in the
Treasury, 28.3 per cent considered it significant. In the Department
of Education the factor was V'ZJas important by 31.7 per cent,
and in Agriculture by 33.3 per cent. The National Planning Council,
however, gives a very limited role to the factor of personal influence.
Only five officers considered this factor worth mentioning. It is
interesting to note that the National Planning Council is the only
department in the sample perceived by its officials to take due
consideration of experience; training courses; potential; outstanding
accomplishment; physical characteristics and personality traits. The
latter include discretion, initiative, ability to negotiate and
diplomatic behaviour. Because the National Planning Council is closely223
The people who have a lesser qualification than a university
degree gave equal significance to seniority and personal relations
with their superiors as factor for promotion. Since this group have
no university qualification, they preferred promotion to be based
on competence and seniority without regard to favouritism. Even
the university degree holders perceived seniority as the determining
factor. Only postgraduate degree holders perceived that competence
is the most influential factor in their promotion. However, under-
graduates and postgraduates stated that the Service should give
greater weight to academic qualifications and training than at
present in the promotion process.
The people who have been in the Service more than ten years
are more likely to perceive seniority as the first promotion criterion
than people who recently entered. The former even preferred seniority
to be considered the most decisive factor along with competence and
experience. The people who have been less than ten years in the
Service prefer the widest possible range of factors to be taken into
account; education, training, outstanding accomplishments, potential
and personality, along with competence, to be seriously considered
in deciding the bureaucrats' promotion.
On the whole, our sample confirms two major findings. First
most government servants are dissatisfied with the promotion criteria
arrangement used in the Service. Although many variables were
involved in promotions, clearly the most significant factor was
seniority. A large number of officials have moved into a certain
level of the administrative structure on the basis of seniority. They
now find themselves with a rather limited professional career ahead
k224
of them. The challenge to the Service is firstly how these vitally-
needed people can be further advanced and their ability retained.
Secondly, though it is true that seniority was the dominant factor
in promotion, it was noted that seniority rules were not observed
rigidly and no two people progress at the same rate of promotion.
The data from this survey on job satisfaction indicates that the
younger official certainly thinks about leaving the public service.
If his career opportunity in government service appears to him to be
limited, he may seek other employment. Alternatively he may become
very discontented with his present job. This demonstrates the need
to have in the system objective predictability about how people
advance. Certain questions in the Survey were designed to test
respondents' beliefs about the predictability of promotion. 34 This
raises the question of who gets to the top.
7.4 HOW TO ADVANCE IN THE BUREAUCRACY: VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS
In our sample, Managers and supervisors were asked for
their views on how to advance and succeed in the government service.
The responses (see Table 7.2) are not mutually exclusive.
Over two-thirds of the senior officials indicated that in
order to advance in the Service one needs to have some kind of
educational qualification.*	 This can be demonstrated from the
data by analysing the careers of two officials who entered the
Service at the same time working in the Treasury. One of them is
'cf. Chapter V (Chart 5.1)Number Percentage
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TABLE 7.2
How to advance and succeed in the bureaucracy
In = 200)
Advice
Get a University qualification
Work hard
Keep good internal public relations, socialise
Get broad experience, generalise
Know your job, know the service, learn about
your department
Pick the right department or good work-subject
area *
Seek transfers
Apply for available promotions, seek interest-
ing jobs
Obey orders, show respect to superiors
Show initiative, speak out
Get known to your supervisors
Specialise, become an expert
Be neat in appearance, be punctual
60	 30.0
55	 27.5
48	 24.0
Note: responses are rot mutually exclusive.
* This general description covers (a) being in a prominent policy
area or powerful department; and (bi job incentive and job
satisfaction.
a University graduate who joined the Service at entry Grade 7,while
the other is a high school leaver who joined the Service at the basic
Grade 10. At present, with 20 years of seniority, the former is in
Grade IA, acting as Assistant to the DirectorGeneral, while the
latter is still in Grade 5. However, there were many senior officials226
interviewed during the field-work survey who expressed scepticism
about the usefulness of securing qualifications such as university
degrees for purposes of promotion.
Nearly 57 per cent of the respondents mentioned 'hard work'
or 'applying oneself to the job' as ways of advancing and succeeding
in the Service. Seventy-five managers stressed that it was important
to be 'friendly, co-operative, to keep good public relations, or be
sociable.	 One senior official comments: 'One should understand
thoroughly the psychology of the organisation and its internal
atmosphere. ' Others felt that this was not always possible, though
it did make for an easier working environment.
In several closely-related categories, 27.5 per cent of the
respondents mentioned the importance of selecting the 'right'
department to work in, or alternatively, a good subject area for
work. Forty six managers (23 per cent) indicated that a person
should consistently inquire about available promotions. Another 24
per cent recommended that one should seek transfers to the 'important
departments' or being a "fire -Fighter". 35 Some departments are
importance politically and administratively. Here the turnover is
high at the top because of the political cadre which moves as the
Minister moves. This affects the rate of promotion. Also, this
kind of department recognises the value of discretion, innovation
and initiative on the part of the officials in the promotion process.
To illustrate the point, consider the experience of an official with
university qualification who worked 15 years for the Ministry of
Education in the field. In that time, he had only been upgraded to
Grade B as a school-teacher. Later, he transferred to the National
Planning Council. Within 8 years he was promoted to Grade 4,227
occupying the position of a head of division. He gave as his advice,
'do not serve in the field, pick a centralised department and be
close to the centre o-F power.
Regarding advice about whether to be a generalist or specialist
in order to succeed in the Service, 32.5 per cent recommend that an
official should seek broad, general experience and only 10 per cent
advised that an official should specialise and become an expert in
a particular field. One senior manager said: "generalist and special-
ist streams are two totally different careers. However, experience
shows that the latter have a gloomy future in the Service.hP*
Few senior officials advised that an official must know the
bureaucracy in general. He should know how his department functions
from top to bottom. On the other hand, 30 per cent of the senior
bureaucrats advised that to get ahead, an official should not only
know his job and learn about his department but should also know
the public service more generally. In fact this is an old organisa-
tional problem about which much has been written.36
Some of the less-frequently mentioned items are interesting for
the intensity of conviction and forcefulness with which the respondents
express them. Nearly 19 per cent mentioned items relating to dealing
with superiors: "Let the boss see you are taking an interest. Learn
the likes and dislikes of your superiors and be polite to them."
In one important category, 18.5 per cent of the managers regarded
'initiative, drive or speak out' as a way to advance. Even those
* cf. Chapter IV (Chart 4.13)228
senior officials who did mention initiative as important, qualified
their endorsement of this advice. One illustrated the caution
with an official must exercise initiative and speaking out:
'if you are going to question something, do so through the
available normal channels. Be prepared to use a modicum
of initiative without being too obvious about it.'
Items relating to personal appearance and habits were mentioned
by 5.0 per cent of the managers. One senior official's advice was
'pay attention to the traditions and old-established values -
punctuality, neatness of dress, respect for superiors.' 	 Only three
senior people mentioned having good relations with people or groups
outside the Service or their own department as being of use in
succeeding in the public bureaucracy.
While almost all the managers and supervisors answered the
question asked, several were openly critical or cynical about a
career in the government service. Comments such as the following
were made: 'If you are imaginative, sensitive and artistic - forget
the government service.'
7.5 PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES
People complained that there were not adequate promotion
opportunities for them, because of the government's policy of direct
recruitment based upon educational attainment, as pointed out in
Chapter V. The Civil Service Department recommended that the claims
of those already in employment should be recognised in an increasing
measure by affording to the deserving amongst them greater opportunities229
-For promotion. The CSD was of the view that such a change was
necessary not only for promoting well-educated persons already working
in lower rungs of the government service but also for keeping up
the attraction of lower posts. 37 This is a problem which faces all
nations when their government service expands. It is also a well
known feature of "career blockage".38
In the late 1970s, the Civil Service Department pressed for the
39 increase of promotion opportunities throughout the Service. 	 Two
arguments were advanced in support of this demand. First, the
existing practice was not only resulting in a waste of valuable
experience among employees but was also producing considerable
frustration among them. Second, entrusting extensive powers to
direct recruits both comparatively young and totally inexperienced
was neither good for administrative efficiency nor for inspiring
confidence and respect among the subordinates.40
What is the position today? A superficial observer might
feel pleased by the fact that the number of promotion opportunities
from lower to higher posts has gone up on account of the increasing
need for senior managers. But a careful study could show that while
it has benefitted a few officials at the top of certain grades, these
tend to be officials in the Higher and Special Grades. It has not
meant greater incentive for staff as a whole. This is because the
increase in number of posts at lower level has been much greater
than those at the higher level. Graph 7.3 represents promotions
of classified officials. The number of promotions for the years
1979, 1980 and 1981 was 7129, 8586, and 8330 officials respectively.41
The growth of promotion was 20 per cent between 1979 and 1980.230
GRAPH 7.3
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Whereas the growth of promotion was 17 per cent between 1979 and
1981. However, the proportion of promotions decreased by 3 per
cent between 1980 and 1981.
Because of its size and variety, the Ministry of Education
has always promoted -Far more people than other departments. In 1979,
promotion in the Ministry of Education was 77.8 per cent of the
total. Other departments in which large numbers of promotions
occurred were the Ministry of Communication, 3.5 per cent; Oepartment
of CustomsI 2 per cent; Ministry of Agriculture, 1.6 per centand
the Treasury 1.5 per cent. In 1980, of all promotions made, 74 per
cent were in the Ministry of Educations 6 per cent in the Ministry
of Healthi 2 per cent in the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1981, the
proportion had changed as follows: in the Ministry of Education,
77.5 per cent Ministry of Health, 5.2 per cent	 Ministry of
Agriculture, 1.7 per cent, Ministry of Communication (including
Telecommunication Corporation) 1.5 per cent of the total government
promotions.
Graph 7.4 shows the difference in promotion opportunities as
between central grades. In 1979 the highest proportion was in
Grade 6 consisting of 24 per cent of the total promotions, followed
by Grade 8 (22.5 per cent) and Grade 5 (20 per cent). By contrast,
in 1980 the highest proportion was Grade 8 consisting of 32 per
cent, followed by Grade 9 (17 per cent) and Grade 6 (14.5 per cent).
Whereas in 1981, the highest proportion was in Grade 8 (27 per cent).
This is due to the government's decision (referred to in Chapter V)
to improve the status o-F the Teaching Certificate holders, especially
in the Ministry of Education, by promoting them from Grade 9 to232
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Grade 5. The next highest proportion was in Grade B consisting of
22 per cent of the total promotions.
Clearly promotion opportunities have been affected bY many
variables; the nature of the department and its staff, the rate of
departmental growth, the implications for staffing, turnover, job
satisfaction, manpower planning and grading structures, etc.
However, despite some limited attempts at improving promotion
opportunities, two factors continue to dominate the problem of
promotion in Jordan. First, there is the hangover from the past
that promoted officers are not assumed to possess the requisite
qualities and hence higher posts should be manned mostly by those
directly recruited to do so. This avoids too much dilution of
quality. 42	The advocates of this viewpoint do not seem to realise
that early promotions on the basis of merit and the linking up of
promotion with in-service training ought to prevent this fear of
dilution of quality. Second, the number of higher grade posts is
dictated too much by financial considerations and  140 20 ?Z7144
by administrative needs and incentives. This unreasonably limits
the avenues for promotion, thereby depressing the morale of the
employees. In addition to this, the survey data suggests that one
of the chief causes of low morale in the lower ranks of the Service
is the slowness of promotion.
In the future, promotion opportunities may tend to decrease
with the increasing drive for economy which is the declared policy
of the government today. This would merely reinforce low morale
among staff. Moreover, the Budget Department proposes to step up
direct recruitment to some extent in order to bring fresh blood into
the Service. 43 This again would reduce opportunities for existing234
officials seeking grade-to-grade promotion and add to short contract
employment. Accordingly, rethinking of the problem of promotion
opportunities is needed in Jordan. Both considerations of incentives
and fresh energy need proper balancing in the context of the present
requirements. While financial considerations should not be ignored
altogether, they should not be over-emphasised in the interest of
efficiency. Unlike some Western countries, where the pressure
exerted by staff associations tends to counterbalance any "tight-
44
fisted policy of the Treasury, in Jordan no such pressure exists.
The responsibility for pursuing an enlightened promotion policy
therefore rests upon the shoulders of the government.
7.6 REPORTING SYSTEM
In Jordan, the relative merits of candidates for promotion
are assessed mainly from the records of work as contained in the
assessment reports. But it is strange to observe that in Jordan,
where public service careers are such important avenues of employ-
ment, reporting systems have never been seriously studied. A
reporting system was introduced, for the purpose of promotion,
within the government service in 1957.	 Since its introduction,
the assessment report has been confined to the classified grades
46
only.	 Categories of departmental gradus have no such central
service-wide arrangements for assessment reports. However, some
departments, on individual basis, have an assessment report designed
to suit their departmental employees.47
The assessment of central grades is carried out by the
immediate supervisor. 48 Since generally he will have day-to-day contact
with the official concerned, he should be well equipped to evaluate and235
counsel. The assessment report form contains detailed headings
concerning the character, conduct, efficiency, capabilities, outlook
and temperament of the individual employees. 49 The supervisor is
requested to express an opinion about a given ability or type of
behaviour of his subordinate. Each ability is rated as: Excellent,
50
Very Good, Good, Medium, and Weak.	 The Standard assessment
report -Form for central grades is contained at Appendix (1). Table
7.5 represents assâssment rates -From ten departments.
TABLE 7.5
Assessment Rates for Employees From Ten Departments, 1981
In = 1000)
Rate	 Number	 Percentage
Excellent	 150	 15.0
Very Good	 680	 68.0
Good	 149	 14.9
Medium	 18	 1.8
Weak	 3	 0.3
Source: Civil Service Department, Annual Assessment Reports,Amman, 1982.
People complained, however, that reports are not always written
accurately and comprehensively. Ratings are less specific and less
objective than they ought to be. They merely record superficial
impressions. The choice of headings is frequently quite unsystematic
when not wildly fanciful. For example, supervisors are asked whether
subordinates think independently. They are not given any measure of236
how "independent thinking" is to be defined. They are also not helped
by the -Fact that they do not know the purpose -For which reports will
be used. The points to which the attention of rating officers are
called are not necessarily those that would best reveal the competence
of an official. The aim of the report appeared to be to rate staff
members according to their morale and intellectual facilities rather
than to their performance.	 What such reports reflect most
accurately are the varying personalities of the reporting officers.
The Civil Service Department has instructed departments to pay
"proper attention" to this problem and take appropriate steps to
effect improvement.51
Another major weakness of the reporting system in Jordan is
that it does not contain any indication of the views of the person
reported on, or of his interests and aspirations. Nor does it
contain any provision for regularly letting an employee know how
he stands in the promotion race. 52 Therefore, one of the most
controversial issues is whether or not the assessment report should
be openly discussed with the employee concerned. In our sample the
respondents were asked to express their views on showing the
assessment report. Responses are represented in Table 7.6.
TABLE 7.6
Respondents views on showing the Assessment Report (n = 257)
Response	 Number	 Percentage
Highly desirable	 68	 26.5
Probably a good idea	 88	 33.5
Neutral - no opinion	 13	 5.0
Probably a bad idea	 55	 21.4
Quite wrong	 35	 13.6237
As shown in Table 7.6, some people in the sample (35 per cent)
are against discussion of the assessment reports with the subordinates.
Their argument is generally based on the allegation that reports,
which it is known are to be discussed, are likely to be less reliable.
By contrast, advocates o-F discussion of the reports (60 per cent)
argue that without -Feedback of results, the assessment report can have
little development value. The employee can hardly be expected to
improve if he is not aware in what way his performance is inadequate.
In addition, the consequences of an honest and open exchange of
information and ideas must be compared with the possible negative
consequences of the assessment report being shrouded in secrecy
and suspicion. 53 On this basis, the process of reviewing the person's
work would be more valuable if it were a two-way process, with the
person able to give his own comments to the supervisor and make his
own criticism or constructive suggestions about performance review.
The main formal purpose of the assessment report in Jordan is
to provide evidence of fitness for promotion. 55	Respondents in the
sample were asked to explain their attitudes towards the value of the
reporting system in the Service. The responses (see Table 7.7) are
not mutually exclusive.238
TABLE 7.7
The Value of the Reporting System: Respondents Attitudes
(Measured as preference)	 (n = 257)
Value
	
Frequency	 I Percentage
Motivate staff
	
122
	
47.5
Ensure appropriate staff deployment
	
95
	
37.0
Prepare for promotion	
90
	
35.0
Indicate for training needs	
83
	
32.3
Control staff
	
70
	
27.0
Note: Responses are not mutually exclusive.
The data indicates differences between departments studied and
levels of management regarding the purpose of the assessment report.
Staff of the Civil Service Department regarded the prime purpose of
such a report as ensuring appropriate staff deployment. Those in
the National Planning Council and Education considered the principle
value as being to'motivate sta-F-F'in the organisation. In contrast,
Treasury staff were equally divided between those who regarded staff-
reporting as a technique to 'monitor staff and those who saw it as
a means of assessing the 'suitability of officials' for promotion.
Agriculture, being a technical department, which also employs a large
cadre of non-specialists, has staff which reFlected both points of
view. On balance they regarded the primary purpose to be an
'indication for training needs	 Senior officials in all departments,
except the Planning Council, regarded the purpose as being the 'control
of staff'. This reflects the attitudes of top managers in a bureaucracy.56239
Other levels of staff indicated that the first purpose should be
'motivating the staff'. Thus our sample o-F managers and staff at
different levels in different departments demonstrate that the
first need is to get acceptance of the purpose o-F a reporting
system to which everyone can agree.
Accordingly, two more questions were advanced: one to managerial,
the other to non-managerial staff. Managers were asked: 'Does the
reporting system used in the Service give an indication as to the
ability and competence of the subordinate and consequently provide
an indication of training needs and suitability for promotion?'
Responses are shown in Table 7.8.
TABLE 7.6
Does the Reporting System Indicate Competence, Training
Needs and Suitability for promotion
(n = 100)
Response	 Number	 Percentage
Yes	 40	 40.0
Neutral	 5	 5.0
No	 52	 52.0
Non-Response	 3	 3.0
The question put to non-managerial staff was: 'In your view, does
the reporting system create motivation in the Service?' Responses are
represented in Table 7.9.24 11]
TABLE 7.9
Does the Reporting System Create Motivation in the Service?
(Perception of the Respondents)	 In = 157)
Response	 Number	 Percentage
Yes	 50	 31.5
Neutral	 7	 4.5
No	 95	 50.5
Non-response	 5	 3.2
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 suggest two points: first, the manner
in which assessment reports are completed do not realise any
defined objective. and second, the assessment report as an
appraisal system does not play the role of either a motivator of
staff or a measurement of fitness for promotion.
In improving the reporting system in Jordan, two things need
to be borne in mind. In the first place, the forms of assessment
reports should be so designed as not only to provide columns for
judging the skill or competence of a person but also for assessing
his personality and fitness for promotion. It must follow a pattern
deliberately set to elicit the essential information regarding the
worth, ability and character of the candidate. Moreover, there
should be carefully-worded pointers in each column to guide the
officer who is to write the report. Secondly, the reporting officer
should try to be accurate and objective to the maximum possible
extent. He should observe his subordinates work more closely and
should not let prejudice influence him unnecessarily. Further241
limitation on prejudices can also be provided if the report is
countersigned by a more senior officer. Menzies remarks:
"Whatever system is adopted, the reports should (a) be
similar in form, (b) be based as far as possible on a
common standard of judgement to enable valid compari-
sons to be made, Cc) be accepted as fair and reliable
by the staff, and Cd) give the fullest possible account
of present performance and suitability for promotion." 57
We should not, however, think that complete objectivity is easy
to attain. The prejudice of reporting officers tend to colour the
writing of assessment reports at times. A British ax-civil servant
remarks in this connection:
"Some tend to be over-critical, others regard all their
geese as swans. A senior may take a strong dislike to
a member of his staff or he may be unreasonably prej-
udiced in his -Favour. Reporting officers may go to
great lengths to boost the claims o-F their candidates,
or they may be quite indifferent." 58
Considerable efforts could be made to make the reporting system
as realistic as is possible. This issue of particular relevance in
assessing departmental grades at establishing a service-wide system
of reporting system. The report can be improved by modification of
the form to take account of performance at different levels of
responsibility. However, this idea creates immediate opposition. Our
sample were asked whether they think that each class or level o-F
management should have a coparate assessment report. Nearly 34 per
cent of the respondents rejected the idea,whereas 61.4 per cent
supported it. The qualities that are important in the different
levels and classes obviously vary and it remains desirable that
separate assessments are used for the different categories of personnel.242
A prototype assessment -Form for all staff might be based on
the following principles. A brief statement should be given of the
duties on which the officer has been employed during the year
under review. Each form should contain an over-all grading o-F
duties actually performed in the present grade and an assessment
of fitness for promotion to the next grade on a specific point
scale, in addition to rating on the traditional basis. Each point
of the scale should be clearly and -Fully defined. It would be more
useful to use a fully descriptive form for executive officers arid up
wards, and a simpler semi-descriptive one for clerical officers
downwards. The headings should be related as far as possible to
performance instead of qualities. Observed performance is likely
to be more objective than measurement of the qualities underlying
observed performance. Out, however carefully designed the form of
the report may be, the critics point out that the system is too
rough to permit precise and reliable comparison between the candidates
of more or less equal merit.59
The pictures presented by the reports may not be precise enough
for fine shades of distinction. Nevertheless, the reporting system
has, as Professor Finer points out, three advantages. First, there
is the regularity of report.
"This means that there must be recurrent attention to the
relative merits of subordinates. The deliberateness at
stated intervals conduces to conscious attempts to dis-
tinction and though there is in all countries a tendency
for the certifying officer to tar all with the same brush,
so that the total marks tend to prove that all are equally
meritorious - distinctions are made." 60
Second, again is the "heightening of responsibility (on the part of
the supervisor) brought about by the possibility of a representation243
against a flagrantly unjust promotion."	 Third, the staff feels
that the system reduces the possibility of favouritism, jobbery
and nepotism, and that they are having a "square deal"9 2 These
are important gains and well worth the time and energy expanded
upon the operation of the system."63
Overall perhaps it may not be possible to obtain complete
objectivity in making promotions. When all measures and precautions
to ensure objectivity are taken, it is yet likely to elude the
assessors because assessment of merit remains essentially a matter
of subjective judgement, not capable of being fully determined by
objective criteria. However, the system of carefully designed
reports, adequate publicity to all the vacancies to be filled by
promotion, the judicious use of promotion committees, the right of
appeal by those adversely affected, the limited competitive examina-
tion and interview might provide a more satisfactory basis to
assess"merit"as the criterion for promotion in Jordan.244
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CHAPTER VIII
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Training is a crucial matter for all types of personnel in the
government service ofiordan. 1 The increase in the variety, number
and complexity of functions that have to be performed in developing
Jordan has resulted in an imbalance between the needs to be met
and the adequacy of personnel to carry them out. This imbalance
constitutes a major obstacle to national development. To meet
even a part of its growing responsibilities, Jordan must develop
the administrative capacity to implement its programmes of economic
and social progress. 2 To an ever-increasing degree, economic and
social development depends upon an effective and well-trained govern-
ment	 service. Training, therefore, deserves a high priority on
the agenda of development.
This chapter investigates the most crucial issues in training
and development of government servants in Jordan. The need for
training; its objectives; training policy; central and departmental
training, and how this division can be bridged. Methods and
techniques used in training are examined and their deficiencies
probed. Training abroad and its content is also considered. The
chapter also examines the attitudes of the employees towards the
various aspects of training.
8.1 NEED FOR TRAINING
Administration has become a highly specialised and complex task
calling for a high degree of specialised knowledge. It is symptomatic249
of the growing complexity of the task that very few administrative
decisions today can be taken without consulting or calling for the
co-operation of many interests. This is owing to the increasingly
complex nature of administrative duties. An official needs to
keep abreast of technological and scientific progress. 3 The standards
required for success have become higher than formerly and the
consequences of failure are proportionately greater. To avoid
failure on such a scale, efficient	 administration is essential.4
The training of officials is a vital step in the development of an
efficient government administration.5
The higher ranking officials in Jordan shoulder the heaviest
burden and on them rest greatest responsibilities. On their
performance depends much of the success of administrative measures
and from their ranks are chosen persons for positions of highest
responsibility in the government. It is clearly in the interest of
the nation that the fullest possible attention should be paid to
the training of senior managers who are in positions of considerable
administrative and managerial responsibility. 6 The Assheton
Committee, discussing the need of the British Civil Service pointed
out:
"While administration can be represented as being primarily
o matter of commonsense, ... the achievement of balanced
judgement which is the real meaning of commonsense in this
connection can be hastened and facilitated by a well-thought-
out training scheme." 7
A new recruit to the government service of Jordan needs a
greater practical knowledge of administration and a better grasp
of the implication of what he is doing than the education system250
provides. This can be provided by a purposeful scheme of training.
An individual recruit, if left to himself, will no doubt acquire
a conception of the public service administration - with its need
for bringing into harmony the ideal and practice; the legally
permissible and the politically possible against which all his
future decisions are consciously or unconsciously tested. But this
is a slow and time-consuming process, because wide experience needs
years to acquire, and he has no framework of ideas into which to
fit early impressions. Such a framework can be supplied by a well
conceived course of instruction at the beginning of his career. A
meaningful course o-F training would give the new recruit the idea
that:
"administration means something more than taking a number of
unrelated decisions on disconnected files; that what he is
doing to contribute to the formation or operation of a
policy; that such process are going on in many departments
beside his own; that solutions, some good, some not so good,
have been found for the difficulties they raise, that there
are generally a number of alternative methods of operating
a policy besides the one his Department has chosen; and that
his mind should be constantly on the alert to criticise or
to justify." 8
Training should,there-Fore,be o-F great value to the vast body
of officials in Jordan. A great part of the daily work in government
offices is done by the middle and lower grades. Fully trained and
efficient middle and lower ranks alive to their duties and respons-
ibilities are as necessary -For the successful execution of the tasks
of the administration as are the higher ranks. I-F they are to be
encouraged to give of their best, and the best of them is to be
developed, they are to be trained for their tasks as well. 9 Emphasising
the need of training, the Assheton Committee pointed out that the251
"disadvantages, more especially on the long-term view,
inherent in the policy of leaving the recruit to learn
his job by trial and error are -Formidable. They include
not only delay in his becoming a -Fully effective member
of the department, but also a risk of dissipating the
enthusiasm with which he enters on his first job." 10
8.2 OBJECTIVES OF TRAINING
The main purpose of training in the government service of
Jordan, as lay down by the Civil Service Regulations, is to increase
the efficiency of the officials, influence their attitudes, improve
their standard of service, prepare them for shouldering bigger
responsibilities and raising of their cultural and occupational
standing.	 Through training programmes, the officer is led to
understand ways and methods in which he can speed up his work,
eliminate waste, employ manpower and resources.12
Our sample were asked to indicate the objectives of the training
they had undertaken during their career service. The question was
put to them in the following form: 'People undertake training
either voluntarily or as a requirement. Indicate your purpose in
taking training.
Chart 8.1 represents the responses, which are not mutually
exclusive. The objective of training of different individuals and
of different level of staff vary according to their circumstances.
In higher ranks , 42 out of 70 officials indicated that the purpose
of training was to assume more senior duties and wider responsibilitiess.
In middle ranks the majority, 37 out of 61 officials thought training
courses were to prepare for other duties (e.g. computer programming),
and 27 out of 33 officials in lower ranks considered that training253
was to learn the existing job. Thus the higher ranks feel greater
need for wider and thorough training than those in the middle ranks
and the latter more than those in lower ones.
Objectives will also vary according to the classes of employees.
In Class I, 62 out of 75 officials and in contractual Class 6 out of
8 officials who had received training stated that the purpose was to
prepare for other duties and higher posts. In contrast, the
majority of Class II, 44 out of 53 officials and unclassified class..
22 out of 28 officials mentioned that their primary purpose was to
learn and to keep the existing job. This is attributed to the fact
that members of these two classes have less experience in their
jobs than the former, who represent the most senior members of the
Service. This indicates that the immediate objective of training
for this group is to equip them for the assumption o-F the regular
duties of their positions, to help them to develop the best in them,
and to fit them gradually for the assumption of increasing
responsibilities of higher and varying character.
The purpose of training at the individual level has been
affected by the characteristics of departmental organisation. For
instance, Departments of Agriculture and Education, being specialist
in character and requiring field administration arrangements, have
a different attitude towards training from other departments studied.
Twenty out of 32 Agricultural officers and 24 out of 35 Education
Officers indicated that their primary personal objectives in
training was seeking more knowledge and new in-Formation.
The purpose of training will also vary according to the nature
of occupation. Where the work is o-F a general character, a broad254
type of training will be necessary. If the work is of a technical
character, substantial vocational training is called for. Never-
theless, an element of general management training in this case
also might not be over-emphasised.13
In the light of the above, the following suggestions can be
advanced. First, officials should be able to do the work for
which they are first assigned quickly, accurately and intelligently.
For this they must know the techniques required for the job. Their
standard of performance is likely to be better if they have a clear
and lively appreciation o-F their positions in the scheme or the
environment o-F the government. Everyone should understand clearly
the nature and purpose of his work and its relation to the wider
purpose of the government. Such a knowledge can give meaning and
significance to their work.
Second, the purpose of the respondents for undertaking training,
as reflected by Chart 8.1, serves to show that the training of
employees has assumed a wider meaning nowadays. It includes not
only vocational training designed to make the official fit to
perform his current duty, but also instruction on a broader basis
to develop his capacity for higher work and greater responsibilities.
Third, training depends upon the general political conditions
in a country. It varies according to the form of prevailing political
system (e.g. authoritarian or consultative, ihtcrventionist or
14	 .
laissez-faire).	 Training will depend on the nature and variety of
the socio-economic plans for the development of the country. It will,
therefore, be useful for the officials to have a knowledge of255
political, social, cultural and psychological background of the
community they are called upon to serve.
Fourth, training needs to be related to grade-to-grade promotion.
At present, the vast majority of the respondents, as seen by Chart
8.1, do not think that criteria for promotion are related to the
objectives of training.* For this reason, there is fear on the part
of officials that by being absent for training they miss their turn
for promotion. 15 Hence, the importance of attaching training to the
career development arrangements.
Finally, training should not be restricted merely to instructions
in administrative techniques (e.g. job analysis, programme budgeting,
financial reporting system, etc.), but should include development
o-F management skills (e.g. personnel management). The training
scheme could be utilized to develop "esprit de corps" iii the Service
as a whole.
8.3 TRAINING POLICY
Initial Training
Civil Service Regulations (1966) state that the government shall
(e )take steps	 to assist the appropriate departments in developing
their training programmes; (h) concern itself with the orientation
period set out for new officials; (c) develop a special programme to
guide and train the new officials. The programme must include the
acquaintance of o-F-Ficials with the objectives and duties of the
department concerned, its organisation, their duties and responsibilities,
16
and the system of supervision.	 The agency which has been created to
*cf. Chapter VII (Table 7.i258
fulfil these functions is the Civil Service Department. However,
little progress has been made in meeting these objectives since 1966.
But in 1982, the CSD began organising for the first time an initial
training course to be held regularly twice a month for one day.
This short course is attended by all new recruits in the Government
Service. 17 The syllabus includes: government organisation, admin-
istrative divisions in Jordan, dealing with the public, disciplinary
18
procedures, and Civil Service Regulations. 	 The latter is important
because there has been a tendency over many years for departments
to operate these Regulations to suit themselves.*
In some departments, for instance the Ministry of Communications,
the new recruit is required to spend a short spell of time, two to
four weeks, at the Postal Training Centre, working for the subordinate
employees. 19	There were 123 and 144 trainees at the Centre for the
years 1980 and 1981 respectively. 20 The Income Tax Department
organises initial training courses for new recruits, lasting two
21
months.
By comparison, present arrangements are still very small-scale.
In the U.S.A. it is the Universities, particularly Law Schools and
Faculties of Business and Public Administration, which prOvide initial
training to persons seeking a career in the public service. In
France, the Ecole National d'Administration (ENA) runs a very
elaborate course of initial training. In fact, ENA pursues both lines
of induction training - (a) new recruit induction. (b) continuous
induction for people already in the service moving jobs up the ladder
*See Chapters V and VII.257
to higher posts which require a broader training - most of them
having already had an earlier induction training in their own
specialism in one of the other French "Ecoles" for public service
22
training.
To discover what was the experience of initial training among
officials, those in the sample were asked to state whether they
joined an initial training course when they were appointed. Seventy
one officials 123.7 per cent) stated they had. The majority, however,
are specialists in the Departments of Agriculture and Education.
Their experience seems to reflect a more general trend for specialists
to receive such training. To illustrate the induction training for
specialists, consider the experience of an official belonging to the
Department of Agriculture, holding a technical post without previous
experience before joining the Service.
He will be in Class I, Grade 8; typically aged 38 and usually
managing a staff of 14 in a field station placement. He is a
secondary school certificate holder with 17 years length of service
in his department. At the time of joining the Service he had the
opportunity to choose to work in either Agriculture or the Treasury.
He preferred Agriculture because this Department is more concerned
with post-entry training, particularly initial training. His view
of the value of initial training was based upon the following
expectations. First, his view about how to improve capacity for
higher and more responsible tasks in the administration. Second,
the crucial need to learn how to deal with the public as a district
manager. Such a post also implies the ability to give the right
supervision to district officers, and how to conduct their job258
appraisals. Third, since he is not a university graduate, training
is considered as a means of finishing his education.
Nevertheless, although initial training has been developed
to a limited scale, it remains weak and intermittent. It would be
to the advantage of both the individual and the department to pay
full attention to this type of training as a starting point for an
official career.
In-Service Training
Training a-F government officials should be a continuous process,
not something that is done once to new employees. 23 In every well-
run establishment it is continuous. 24 The initial training needs
to be followed by in-service training both of formal and informal
types. Formal type implies that the official gets away from his
routine work for a while and spends the time undergoing specialised
training or a particular specialised course of further education.
Informal training implies that facilities are afforded to an official
while engaged on his job, to improve knowledge and to develop his
capacities. 25 By far the greatest proportion  a-F both formal and
informal training (initial and continuous) takes place on an in-
service basis.
In-service training is by far the most important type or training
for government officials. 28 It normally starts after the employee
has had a period of service to familiarise himself with the job. 27 This
type of training, however, has started attracting some notice only in
recent years. Nigro points out:259
"Even in the advanced countries, relatively little attention
was given to training until recently. Even now it is still
generally considered one o-F the lesser developed areas in
public personnel administration, one in which much remains
to be done." 28
The pre-independence government service in Jordan had hardly
known any -Form of in-service training. Training by experience,
rather than any organised in-service training, was the normal
practice. The new recruit was put on the job to learn how to do it
over time. After independence, in-service training was adopted at
two levels: central and departmental. 29 The former is the
responsibility of the civil Service Department and the Institute of
Public Administration (IPA). The CSD is responsible -For training
policy in the Service as a whole and -For determining the resources
30
to be allocated -For this purpose.	 The CSD interprets its mandate
in staffing to include all measures required to meet the needs of
the Service for qualified personnel. 31 The IRA conducts courses
which are common to all departments and government agencies and
assists them in developing training programmes of their own. 32 In
contrast, departmental training programmes are conducted and
administered by the line departments.33
Departmental Training
In practice, training activities in Jordan are largely decentralised.
Most training activities are conducted by individual departments and
their training institutions. In the sample, nearly 55 per cent had
taken training, of whom over 90 per cent had taken training in depart-
ments.	 Regulations lay down that Central Training Agencies, i.e.
CSD and IPA, will assist and co-operate with departments for meeting
their training needs. 34 Departmental training in Jordan takes two260
main -Forms, i.e. on-the-job training; and training institutes within
the departments.
On the Job Training
Government Service in Jordan widely exercises "training by
doing", which is the traditional British approach to post-entry
training. This method has even been used by the Civil Service
Department for its own staff. 35 It takes place in the work situa-
tion. It is justified on the grounds that the best training -For an
official is -For him to be immersed in the day-to-day work of his
department. He deals with current business as it comes to the
office and learns step by step under the watchful guidance of his
superiors, the "appropriate" method -For dealing with problems. In
the course of time,the official builds up a profound and compre-
hensive knowledge of his own field. 36 It is an informal but a
continuing activity which is largely the responsibility of the
supervisors at different echelons. The middle echelon employees
have to be instructed and their attention drawn to the usefulness
of this easy-going training.37
Training Institutes
Frequently departments run their own training institutions for
in-service training. These include the Ministries of Education, Health,
Tourism, Labour, Social Development, Communications, Information,
Transport, and Agriculture; the Telecommunications Corporation,
Central Bank, Statistics Department, Royal Scientific Society, Youth
and Sports Organisation, Co-operative Organisation, Geographic Centre
and others. 38 Each institute has its own curriculum, syllabus, duration,261
requirements, staff and administration, etc. For instance, the
Ministry of Education established the Certification Institute for
In-Service Teacher Education in 1970. Unqualified teachers are
released from their jobs for a period of 16 weeks, during which time
they receive instruction in education and methodology. 39 The Jordan
Statistical Training Centre, affiliated to the Department of
Statistics, was established in 1964 and the study is for two years.
The curriculum is designed to meet specified needs or objectives.
It covers statistical methods, mathematics, applied statistics,
public administration, sociology, demography, census and survey
methods, principles of economics, national income, packages, etc.40
The Ministry of Social Development established the Institute of
Social Work in 1966. Instructions covers academic disciplines and
social environments. The curriculum includes social health,
economic development, Jordanian society, Psychology, rural and urban
sociology, family and child-care, community, individual welfare, etc.41
Institutional training is primarily provided for all lower and
middle grades. It is designed with generalists rather than specialists.
It seeks, therefore, to provide a broad knowledge about the work,
department and environment. The lecture method is widely used in
this type of training. However, the scale of this training varies
among departments studied. While it is heavily used in the Departments
of Education and Treasury, other departments are less enthusiastic
towards this kind of training, especially Agriculture. Table 8.2 shows
an example of the training institutes within departments.262
TABLE 8.2
Example of Training through Departmental Institutes.
Variable
	 Civil Service	 Education	 Treasury
Department
Level a-F management
Pa si tion
Duty/Function
Class
Grade
Age
Age at entrance
Seniority
Education
Specialisation
Non-Government experience
Supervision
Work location
Number of departmental
training institute
courses
Top
Director
Management
I
3
43
23
21
B.A.
Law
None
6 people
Centre
1
Middle	 Lower
Deputy of	 General Staff
Headmaster
Teaching	 Accountant
I	 Unclassified
B	 None
39	 24
26	 20
13	 4
Teaching	 Secondary
Certificate	 Certificate
Social Science None
3	 None
12 people	 None
Province	 Centre
5	 12
Our sample were asked whether they had taken a training course
in departmental training institutes. Hal-F of the respondents had,
and this group were asked to comment critically upon the departmental
training institutes. Table 8.3 shows the responses which are not
mutually exclusive.263
TABLE 8.3
Respondents Evaluation of Departmental Training Courses (n = 150)
Criticism
	
Frequency Percentage
90
	
60.0
87
	
58.0
83
	
54.7
80
	
53.3
73
	
48.7
72
	
48.0
66
	
44.0
62
	
41.3
55
	
36.7
48
	
32.0
Too theoretical
Too short
Inadequate selection of participants
Not provided by qualified instructors
Not career related (i.e. promotion or needs)
Inadequate -Facilities (libraries, equipment)
Insufficient financial support
Not relevant to the job
Poorly managed courses (bad organisation)
No emphasis on ethics, personality, behaviour etc.
Note: Responses are not mutually exclusive.
It should be understood that some departments require more than
one institute to serve their needs. These responses are there-Fore
representative of experience in ID different institutes. The
evidence suggests that respondents consider training courses too
theoretical, too short, based upon inadequate selection of trainees,
not provided by sufficiently well trained or qualified staff and
not sufficiently related to the requirements of promotion. Other
points made included the lack of facilities and -Financial support,
irrelevant syllabus, disorganised and unqualified administrative
staff. They also commented that courses showed lack of concern
with attitudes towards dealing with the public.264
In the light of the responses, one would highlight the following.
First, training institutes in Jordan rely mainly on the lecture method.
This is perhaps a less effective method than others such as seminars,
case-studies, role-playing and conferences. In France, for instance,
the ENA has adopted a method of training which has proved very effect-
ive not only in the intellectual training of public servants, but also
in making them understand administrative problems realistically. During
second year of the training programme , the trainee not merely attends
class-room lectures but spends his time mostly in seminars and
conferences where discussion goes on in a critical way. 42 In Jordan
also,more attention could be paid to seminars, group discussion and
residential conferences for imparting knowledge and for stimulating
independent thinking.
Second, if the period of training were to be extended for all
training programmes, it might then be able to pay more attention to
the teaching process. Teaching staff need not be confined to public
servants. Each institute could have a few highly qualified teachers
who can establish respect for the training among trainees. There
are also among government servants some officials who can make an
important contribution based upon their own education and experience.
The quality of instruction should be of the highest standard.
Additional training beyond the competence or resources of the
departments could be undertaken by universities. When necessary,
senior managers from both the public and private sectors can also
be asked for contributions. This is likely to be an antidote to
possible inbreeding of bureaucratic norms. Stahl sums up the process
by which this development of the training function might be achieved:255
"One of the -First considerations in working out a group
training programme is the selection and training of
those who are to assume the responsibility -For training
others. It may be taken for granted that many a
practitioner with a broad understanding of his field
lacks the knack of taking on the role of an educator,
but, given this knack, he should be stimulated and
aided to organise the material to be presented so
that it may be offered in a systematic and comprehensive
manner." 43
Third, the benefits of training, however well conceived and
well organised, may not be realised unless due attention is paid to
the physical surroundings in which people are trained. Library
facilities should also be adequate. Finally, at present, the
emphasis is on vocational training at the expense of learning how
to deal with the public. Emphasis has to be given, therefore, to
the cultivation of moral standards, ethics, personal conduct,
administrative behaviour and personality, etc. A brief course on
mass communications, public relations and human relations is
essential. The Assheton Committee pointed out:
"Nothing could be more disastrous than that the civil
service and the public should think of themselves as
in two separate camps. The inculition of the right
attitudes towards the public and towards business
should therefore be one o-F the principal aims of civil
service training. The civil servant must never -Forget
that he is the servant, and should not lose the human
touch. " 44
The achievement of these objectives is complicated by another
feature of training arrangements. Training theory and Jordanian
practice at the present time both strongly -Favour the decentralisation
to departments of a large part of the responsibility -For meeting
their own needs. 45 However, there are many challenges in the process.
It is first necessary to create interest in such activities and to266
obtain the support of the top executives. This is not an easy task
because departmental training has only recently been developed and
remains limited. There-Fore.an evaluation of its benefits to the
Service had not yet been attempted. Having convinced the top
executives, each departmental institute has to make a careful study
of the training needs of employees at different levels of the
department and must try to cope with the departmental problems
which each of these studies reveals. Which employees have to be
trained first? What are the most beneficial techniques of training?
Where do the trainers come from? Identifying who needs training,
and what kind of training is the most difficult and important
stage of the process. Management at departmental level is best
placed to do this, with back-up help from central training agencies.
Unfortunately, there is an obvious lack of contact between the two
sides. Admittedly, it is essential for the Civil Service Department
and the Institute of Public Administration to assess and know
departmental needs so that they can cater fully for these needs. It
is also equally essential for the departments to demonstrate these
needs and to have them fully catered for. It is only through such
two-way communication that central and departmental training can
fully achieve their objectives.
*
Central Training
The Civil Service Department
As indicated earlier, the Civil Service Department retains
overall responsibility for training in areas of administration where
commonalty of training needs are considered to exist. The CSD
* The duration of this type of training does not exceed four months
continuously.267
provides the opportunities for the administrative and technical training
of officials, at all levels, and takes such steps as may be necessary for
raising standards of probity in the Service. 46 It is responsible for
developing training programmes for officials during service as well as
encouraging and co-ordinating such programes, and participating in the
selection of officials for study or training both inside or outside the
country. 47 The CSD also maintains liaison with departmental training
institutes within the country and comparable institutes abroad.
The Civil Service Department has a major responsibility in respect
of national training. In reality, however, its "training" role is
limited to receiving offers for training courses from abroad and circula-
ting these offers to the departments according to the nature of the offer
and the specialisa-tion o-F the departments. In return, departments
nominate their candidates for these courses and send the lists to the
Civil Service Department. 45 The latter has a nominal authority to
select the final list of nominees. 49 Three main criteria are used in
selection: the grade of the nominee; his specialisation; and the number
of training courses already attended.5°
After completion of the course, each participant is required to
submit a report to his department concerning the prograrmie and a copy of
the report will be sent to the Civil Service Department. The report includes
the title of the programme, its location, number of participants, the
syllabus, duration, methods of training, importance of the programme,
recommendations,	 Accordingly, the CSD evaluates the usefulness
o-F these programmes as regards the needs o-F the Service as well as the
individual interest. The official receives a certificate indicating268
successful completion of the course. The CSD receives a copy of
this certificate which is placed in the personal file of the official.
Table 8.4 represents an example of the central training.
TABLE 8.4
Example of Central Training
Variable-
Level of management
Position
Duty/Function
Class
Grade
Age
Age at entrance
Seniority
Education
Specialisation
'Jon-government experience
3upervision
Jork location
Jumber of Central
:raining Courses
National
Planning Council
Top
Director
Manpower Planni
Contractual
None
50
28
15
f1.A.
Economics
7
9
Centre
6
Treasury I Educatio
Middle
	
Lower
Head of
	
General
Division
	
Staff
Auditing
	
Computer
I
	
II
6
	
9
36
	
25
24
	
18
12
	
7
B.A.	 Secondary
Certifite
Accountancy None
None	 None
5	 3
Province	 Centre
1	 14
Central programmes cover a wide range of topics and subjects of
common interest to officials such as manpower planning, supervisory
techniques, office management, public relations, quantitative and26
behavioural dimensions o-F the decision-making process, as well as
more specific techniques geared to the needs of particular groups,
for example, documentation and in-Formation systems in administration.
For trainers - case studies iii training, training design and research
problems; and -For personnel managers - recruitment and promotion
procedures, etc.52
The programmes concern all levels of staff, i.e. managerial
training, supervisory training, and clerical training. However,
these programmes exclusively deal with generalists rather than
specialists. For instance, a top official holding the position of
the Director of Human Resources in the National Planning Council
participated six times in such courses, whereas it is hard to find
a specialist in the Ministry of Agriculture holding a technical post
who found it helpful to attend such courses during his career service.
In an attempt to classify the problems facing the Civil Service
Department in pursuing its responsibilities as a central agency for
training, we draw attention to the following shortcomings. First,
"training" as perceived by the CSO means simply accepting an outside
offer for training by an outside institute and communicating this
offer to the departments who are asked to nominate their candidates.
After that, the CSD supervises the -Formal procedures associated with
the training process, i.e. filling an application and signing a
contract with the trainees, etc. 53 In this arrangement, the CSD
is handicapped by two obstacles	 (o) it has nothing to do with
the nominations made by the departments or whether they need this
54	 .	 .	 . type of programme -For their work.	 (4)	 it is even con-Fined in
arranging external opportunities by the need to ensure the co-operation
of the National Planning Council and the Arab Organisation for270
the Administrative Science. 55 This is due to the fact that most
training courses are initially arranged and financed for the CSD
by these two organisations. 56 This raises the unusual role played
b the National Planning Council in the training function.
The National Planning Council is the link between Jordan and
training agencies abroad. It is there-Fore obvious that most
training courses offered by outside training institutions are
arranged by the NPC. Unfortunately, co-operation and co-ordination
between the NPC and CSD J very limited. 57 Although the Planning
Law emphasises the necessity of co-operation between the NPC and
the CSD. 58 in reality the former entirely ignores the activities of
the latter in training and development. 59 Many attempts have been
made for mutual co-operation but there is no sign of success.6°
In addition, the NPC even conducts its own studies and executes.'
its own annual training programme for all departments without parti-
81
cipation on the part of the CSD.	 As a result, the effectiveness of
the CSD in training is severely affected.
This raises a second interesting point: how did the Civil
Service Department lose control over training? Co-operation and
co-ordination between the CSD and IPA as central training agencies
been rather limited. The latter designs its own training
programmes, decides the -Future plans of training inside the country
for government officials in the absence of the former. 62 In the
same way there is a lack of co-ordination between the Civil Service
Department and departmental training institutes whether in central
government, nationalised industries, local government or the private
63 sector.271
ee 'ne successive generations of management refuse to allocate
a training budget adequate for the development of a significant
degree of training related to career needs beyond induction and on-
the-job training. At present, training is confined by what the
Civil Service Department is offered by the National Planning Council
through its contacts abroad. 64 Further, there is neither a central
training committee nor civil service training regulations to force
attention upon these issues. In the absence of staff associations
of the Western kind, there is no organisethpressure -For such issues
to be examined. 65 However, the CSD has proposed training regulations
to the Council of Ministers. So far, there have been no results.66
Finally, ihe Civil Service Department has not a sufficient
number of qualified training officers o-F its own. The Training
Division within the CSD consists of only three training officials
holding a university degree in Public Administration with between
6-8 years of seniority among them. 67 The work of the Division is
intensive to the point of overload.
In the light of the above, it is obvious that the role of the
Civil Service Department in training is handicapped by internal and
external circumstances. 68 Therefore, it exercises a limited influence
in the manpower development process as a whole. To the extent that
CSD does influence manpower development, it does so through the
IPA.
Institute of Public Administration (I.P.A.)
Civil Service Regulations (1966) state that the Civil Service
Department shall concern itself with the establishment of a central272
training agency. Accordingly, the IPA was established by Law No. 2
of 1968 as "a legal personality with administrative and financial
1,69 independence.
Obj ectives
70
The IPA has the following objectives specified by its laws:
First, to help the government in improving and developing the
organisation and administration of the public service so that public
policy and programmes can be carried out as effectively and as
economically as possible. The Institute has to focus attention and
training activity on the understanding and application of principles,
practices and techniques of administration. Secondly, there is
special attention to the tools of management and the development of
managers which are concerned with planning, staffing. co-ordinating
and evaluating programmes. The Institute also assists any public
agency or private industry requesting its help with specific
organisational problems. Thirdly, it provides practical and academic
training to raise the standard of managers and to prepare officials
-For more responsible tasks with the hope c-F stimulating efficiency
and economy. All of this is to be achieved by means of in-service
training. The methods which are used in its programmes include
lectures, discussions, fieldwork, conferences, workshops, projects
on on-going programmes.
Finally, the Institute produces manuals for in-service training
and other documents on administrative operations. It also conducts
studies and issues publications on administrative problems in Jordan;
promotes the exchange of information on significant development in
administration inside and outside the country; maintains a library o-F273
technical in-Formation, up to date literature on public administration
and departmental reports. To achieve these objectives there are three
areas of activity within the Institute: training, research and
consultancy.
Training Programmes of the Institute
Top Management Training Courses
In Jordan, one of the distinguishing -Features of the Institute's
training programme was the administrative Leaders' Conference (1968)
which brought together senior officials, heads of departments,
university teachers, United Nations experts, permanent secretaries
and members of other training and research institutions in the
country. The major objective of the Conference was to determine
the training needs of higher civil servants. Managers met in one
place to exchange views, compare experience, discuss administrative
problems and various aspects of development administration in Jordan.71
The result of this initial Conference was the decision to create
permanent programmes of seminars and conferences with more specific
and limited objectives related to on-going needs at their meeting.
A wide range of subjects was tackled by the Conference. For
instance, administrative environment in Jordan, analysis of the
administrative problems, application of modern administration in
Jordan, etc. 72 The Conference recommended that "training must be
comprehensive and should cover pre-entry and in-service training
in various agencies in the forms of seminars, conferences, courses
and fellowships." 73 An illustration of the courses which followed
the original Conference were several seminars held for senior officials
at the IPA aimed at management appraisal based upon the problems274
facing top departmental managers. Heavy emphasis was placed on the
importance of managers and their role in improving employees'
performance. 74 These seminars covered the following subjects:
administrative ecology in Jordan, administrative process and its
function, the management of training, management by objectives, and
information systems. Attention also was given to administrative
behaviour, decision-making. self-development, etc.75
One of the weaknesses of these seminars and courses is that
participants from the non-government sectors are excluded. Their
participation would serve two purposes. First, experience suggests
that conferences which include a balanced proportion of members
from outside the government, representing different interests and
disciplines may be able to contribute to the development of public
servants participants and to help them rise above their special
interests. Second, it enables senior government servants to
recognise and appreciate the problems of the private sector and to
understand more fully the contribution which can be made by the
public service to the private sector.75
Another limitation is that top-level officials find it very
difficult to submit themselves to any training programme, not only
because they have not got enough time to spare for training, but
because training "threatens" their sense of security. As a result,
many of them question the value of training. Some senior officials
believe that administrative effectiveness cannot be achieved in
government through education and training.* Their argument is that
cf. Chapter IV, pp.	 85-88.275
administration is an art which is learned, rather than a science which
77 is taught.	 The situation is further aggravated by the fact that
most of the trainers are junior to the managers sent for training,
in both age and rank.
Training of senior officials in Jordan seems to be neither
regular nor problem-oriented in content. Improved training for top-
level officials is therefore an urgent requirement. Training
arrangements for such personnel should be designed with the following
objectives in mind. First, there should be an attention to broaden
the horizon of managers by affording them more time to review and
reflect policy problems. This involves an appreciation of the
techniques employed in improving managerial performance. Secondly.
providing managers with a fuller appreciation of the role of middle
management and with the development of a "planning mentality." Thirdly,
appreciation of the need for a continuous programme of staff develop-
ment. Finally, efforts should be made to assist them in recognising
78 the merit of external public relations and internal communications.
Iliddiellanagement Training Courses
Most training schemes of the IPA are concerned with middle grades
and clerical training levels. It is not simply a question of training
the 'administrative class', but also training the 'executive class'
if the administrative machines are to function effectively. However,
middle management training needs are extremely diverse.
Alive to this situation, the IPA runs a regular training course
for middle ranks covering a wide range of subjects. For instance, a276
five-week full time course on 'Middle Management Programme' was
organised for executive officials in central and local governments
and public corporations. The purpose was to broaden the participants'
understanding o-F the fundamentals of modern administration and the
related sciences, behavioural skills, motivation, etc. Topics
included administrative processes, national planning in Jordan,
supervision and leadership, human relations, forms a-F administrative
organisation in Jordan, communications, etc. Staff who attend such
courses are required to be heads of division and to have completed
high school education. 79 Another course was 'Administrative Super-
vision programme' where 32 heads of divisions participated in the
course aimed at examining modern methods of managing people which
have shown to produce improved performance on the job. The programme
included principles of public administration, leadership and supervision,
constitutional and forms of administrative organisation in Jordan,
staffing and training, performance appraisal, economic and social
development in Jordan, etc.8°
Middle management training programmes give the participants a
wide background in public administration and prepare them for greater
responsibilities and future development. Nevertheless, the programmes
are theoretical as opposed to practical. A close integration between
courses and the office work still remains to be devised by the IPA;
and a better appreciation of the use of skills and knowledge required
needs to be demonstrated subsequently by those who attend.
Lower Management Training Courses
The IPA runs courses for clerical staff and chief clerks, which
last from two to five weeks. For instance, the'Supervision of Office
Management Units Programme' aimed at developing a group o-F supervisors277
in the different aspects of office management. Another programme
was 'Filing and Records Management' aimed at introducing the
participants to the principles which apply to records management
functions. 81 In these courses, instruction generally is given on
functions and role of the office, control of clerical works,
responsibilities of supervisor, staff management, planning and
organisation of office management, civil service and its role,
records and filing processes, classification and indexing, records
storing, job methods and work documentation, motivation, etc. The
participants are drawn from central government, public corporations,
local government and private sector. The approach of the courses
is practical and is conducted through lectures, group discussions
and written reports.
The IPA also conducts a number of short term specialised courses
for middle and junior officials. Participants are graduates and/or
non-graduates with long experience in the specific area. The
duration of the courses range from two to eight weeks. These courses
covered Town and Regional Planning, Supply Management, Managerial
Accounting, Cost Accounting, Taxation Procedures, Customs Procedures,
Training of Trainers, Personnel Management and Public Relations, etc.82
These specialised courses have three basic merits. First, they
provide an opportunity for those working in the same field in
different departments for the exchange of opinions, problems and
solutions. Secondly. they enable a two-way exchange of ideas between
seminar leaders and participants on the principles and new developments
in the field. Thirdly, they point to the advantages and shortcomings
of the various systems in operation in Jordan based on first-hand
information and the feasibility of applying techniques used in more
developed countries.83278
In an attempt to assess the training courses of the IPA. the
following observations are worth making. First, in general, the
courses cover a fairly wide ground. But the duration of the courses
cover a period of two-months only as a maximum. and are too short to
do justice to the syllabus. The programmes become too crowded. The
two-month period appears to be too brief to cover any one particular
subject widely and effectively. Some breathing space needs to be
given to the participants to absorb the new ideas, principles and
techniques they may come across; otherwise the training may lose
its usefulness. The alternative approach to training - intensive
investigation into a few topics - might prove more useful in
developing the ability to solve problems. Second, by addressing
itself from the start mainly to the middle and lower level staffs
of a status-conscious bureaucracy, the Institute came to be
associated in the eyes of senior managers with low-level employees
(see Chart 8.5). This had seriously constrained its ability to
attract senior officials to its programmes and to have a positive
influence on the top level echelons of the administration. In a
situation where the 'conversion' of senior managers was a pre-
requisite for affecting change, this resistance has proved a
considerable handicap. It is adversely affected the Institute's
programmes. The Institute has,therefcre, embarked upon its training
programmes without a clear strategy or the ability to obtain
information and support in developing a picture of job content and
training needs across the Service.84
Research and Consultanc
The IPA has a Research Department (staffed by seven officials)
responsible for conducting research and studies aimed chiefly at280
administrative reform and engaged in consultative services when
required. 85 It is also responsible for the editing, printing and
circulation of the Institute's publications.
Research activities of the Institute include: theoretical
research; developing case-studies, exercises and games that enhance
the training process; and conducting contract research projects
for government departments and private enterprises. This serves
as a tool for decision makers in public and private sectors. The
latest in a series of research projects of this kind were:
developing a government organisational manuafl and conducting a
comparative and analytical study of wages and pension systems
between public agencies and private firms for use in determining
new conditions of service.86
There are, however, some factors which limit the Institute's
research programme. Perhaps the most important factor is that the
government have not realised the value of research and many top
public officials view it with suspicion. Many senior officials
believe that to expose their operational problems to public scrutiny
will reflect badly on their performance. 87 The second important
problem is that in most cases the suggestions made far administrative
improvement are not put into effect. Thirdly, there are the
problems of well-trained researchers and funds. Experience has shown
that staff with academic qualifications make better research officers.83
Only graduates with an aptitude for research should be recruited for
this work. It may be necessary to supplement their training on the
job by specific training in research methods and techniques at an
overseas institutions.281
Like most counterparts, central government research agencies
especially in the new nations, the IPA has a problem of communicating
its research findings with the relevant departments. The International
Conference held at the University of IFE (Nigeria) 1974, convened
to discuss these problems, and recommended possible solutions.89
These are: communicating available information while the research is
in progress; closely relating the subject o-F research to the people
who will use it; and issuing research findings in non-academic
90
reports.
The IFE Institute of Administration stimulates managers to
read its research findings through: () making managers assessors of
such findings written by academics, (b) setting up research advisory
committees to take charge of research projects, and (c) organising
seminars to discuss research findings. 91 The Conference report
points out that the dangers of using managers as assessors is that:
"Officials might in these cases reject the findings, (on
the other hand) the academics, wishing to please the
managers, might try to present reports which are accept-
able (in consequence the findings) are not directed at
solving the administrative problems facing the country
or reforming existing institutions and correcting current
practices." 92
Consultancy, on the other hand, is done on the basis of demands
received from public and private firms. The IPA is usually consulted
in matters such as reorganisation of specific government services,
proposed departmental training programmes, etc. In fact, the advice
of the Institute on various administrative problems facing government
departments and public corporations is much requested. By 1982, the
Institute had accomplished nine consultancies for both public and282
private sectors and four consultancies are under consideration -For
the public agencies concerning performance appraisal and procedures
93
simplifications.
The benefits resulting from a consultancy programme are several.
As the government becomes more complex, procedures become out-dated
and ill-adapted to current needs. A development programme includes
new methods and techniques of operation and old ones have to be
adapted. Consultancy becomes a necessary adjunct of training, in
order to avoid the imbalance between theoretical instruction and
departmental practice. Moreover, not only is consultancy useful
as a means by which the Institute keeps in touch with, and has access
to what is happening in government administration, but it may
contribute to its prestige and general standing.
Problems and Prospects
The IPA has been placed as an autonomous body within the
regular governmental structure, so that in spite of its nominal
independence it is in reality affiliated to the Civil Service
Department. The Head of the CSD is the Chairman of the Governing
Board o-F the Institute. 94 The effect of this has been that the
Institute could not effectively carry out its mission of administrative
reform and change. The Institute could best serve its purpose as
an autonomous body within the Prime Minister's Office. The post of
Director of the IPA should be equated in status at least with that of
a Permanent Secretary of a Ministry.
The IPA also has an internal organisational problem. There are
thirty professional staff, most of whom hold a university degree.283
They have been taught public administration, management and business
studies, psychology and sociology, political science, operations
research, accountancy. office management, linguistics. etc. 95 In
addition, some of them have attended training courses inside and
abroad. But a high proportion of the staff are young, lack experience
and have only recently joined the Institute. In fact, 16 officers
(96) have joined the Institute since 1979.	 This high degree of
inexperience reduces the credibility of training courses of the
Institute in general. It also leaves ample scope for high turnover
or re-deployment as we have seen in the recruitment chapter.
Therefore, the Institute depends mainly on external lectures to
complete its training programmes.
Un-Fortunately, the IPA also does not get the necessary financial
and administrative autonomy which its activities require. Salaries,
career and promotion prospects still do not compare at all with
similar organisations inside the country, e.g. the universities. As
97 a result, almost all senior staff have left for better jobs.	 The
impact of this brain drain without comparable replacement is serious.
In an attempt to remedy a similar situation in another developing
nation, one expert remarked:
"Persons eligible and qualified to serve innovative insti-
tutions like (the) IPA should not be classed with others
in the less inventive or developmental-oriented classifi-
cations, on the basis of pay and mobility. The enterprise
needed, their policy analysis potential, their behavioural
perspectives, their social science skills, which will, if
they are well selected, merit more from the government at
this time than their colleagues who may be much older,
possibly with many more years of experience, but whose
impact is of less dramatic character. The personnel of
this institution should not be in the normal chain of
transfer, promotion, classification and pay. Without
this recognition, the brain drain will continue and be-
come more critical."	 98284
The solution to the problem may be to ensure the availability of a
sufficient number of well trained staff crucial for the development
of the Institute. Therefore to attract competent men to join it,
salary scales and career prospects should be adequate and just.
At present the lecture method is the predominant method of
instruction in the IPA. This is not the only or possibly the best
method of training decision-makers and managers. Experience suggests
participation in training programmes yields better results. 99 A
balanced instructional programme which would include a combination
of teaching methods is clearly better than exclusive dependence on
one. Since the departmental training institutes are also subject
to this criticism, as shown by Table 8.3. they might benefit from
this suggestion.
A related problem is that the departments do not assign officers
in sufficient numbers to fill the Institute's quotas for available
courses. 10° For this situation,the excessive generosity of the
government is largely to blame in assigning officers with full pay
and total maintenance for training abroad. Many officials feel that
i-F they accept training at local institutions they will imperil
their opportunities for more prestigious training abroad.
The IPA still faces difficulty in defining the actual training
needs of the public service. This is due to several factors. First.
the absence of manpower training inventory to indicate the future
needs of officials. Second, the lack of a position classification
system to spell out what tasks constitute the jobs in the departments,
and the type a-F skills, knowledge and attitudes job holders must have
to perform certain tasks.* Third, lack of performance evaluation
See: discussion in chapter III, pp. 63-78.285
instruments to determine the areas in which officials need specific
training*. Fourth, lack of adequate and competent personnel officers
to define the training needs o-F government departments.101
Nevertheless, the IPA remains useful in disseminating know-
ledge about administration in Jordan and documenting the operation
of the government. This helps to widen the horizons of officials
with the objective of clarifying their thinking.
On the whole, central training is supposed to form an important
part of the training effort provided by the Civil Service Department
through the medium of the Institute of Public Administration. However,
in practice, the CSD is not a training agency; it is primarily a
manpower control department and its efforts mainly relate to general
manpower control, costs and staffing, grading issues, promotion. etc.
So far as its training activities are concerned, they are the
responsibility o-F the IPA. Unfortunately, however, except for a
series of supervisory and clerical training courses conducted by
the IPA, little has been done on a systematic basis to implement
this responsibility.
Vocational Training Abroad **
The most highly trained personnel in the Service are those who
require professional or vocational qualifications. Although great
e-Fforts are being made to develop educational institutions for this
purpose in Jordan, existing institutions cannot yet satisfy the
*See: discussion in Chapter VII, pp. 234-243
** The duration of this type of training exceeds four months continuously.286
demand. Hence, a number a-F officials are being sent abroad for such
training as well as -For more general forms of university education.102
For instance, in 1981, training abroad covered a wide range of
specialisation such as Engineering (17 per cent), Physical science
(11 per cent), Economic and Commerce (8 per cent), Public Administra-
tion (7.8 per cent) and Medicine (9 per cent). 103 The officials are
sent to many different countries. 104 Table 8.6 represents an example
of vocational training abroad. Chart 8.7 shows the number of
participants in vocational training abroad.
TABLE 8.6
Example of Vocational Training Abroad.
Variable
Level of Management
position
Duty/Function
Class
Grade
Age
Age at entrance
Seniority
Education
Specialisation
Non-government experience
Supervision
Work location
Number of training courses
taken abroad
Agriculture Civil Service National
Department	 Planning
_____________ ______________ Council
Top	 Middle	 Lower
Director	 Head of Div-	 General
isbn	 Staff
Veterinarian Training	 Technician
I	 I	 Unclassifie
1A	 3	 None
50	 38	 26
28	 23	 20
20	 15	 6
B.A.	 B.A.	 Teaching
Certificate
Veteriner-	 Public I\dmin- Engineering
ary Medicine istration
I	 None	 None
8	 5	 2
Province	 Centre	 Centre
7	 2	 1Lfl
Co
0
rl
C)
.r-
(0
0
4-
0
0)
-o
E
2:
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CHART 8.7
Number 0f Participants in Vocational Training Abroad. 1971-1981.
Year	 1971	 72	 73	 74	 75	 76	 77	 78	 79	 60	 81
Sources: National Planning Council, Training Abroad for 1971-1981. Amman.
Civil Service Department, Annual Reports of 1971-1981, Amman.288
Except for the Ministry of Education's officials, the agency
responsible for vocational training abroad is the Scholarship Committee
which is located in the Civil Service Department. It has the follow-
ing functions. First, the estimation of the country's needs for
trained manpower. Second, to ensure that the country utilises its
internal facilities for training and also the external facilities
offered by friendly countries and institutions. Third, the consider-
ation of the departments proposals connected with courses and the
necessary funds to finance them. Finally, to consider the demands
of non-government sectors for training abroad.105
Training abroad could be viewed as supplementary to the
training being offered at home, and its function is to fill in the
166
gaps in the training offered locally.	 This type a-F training
should be confined to specialised courses which are not available
within the country. Even then, Adedeji says: "every effort must
be made to provide such specialised training locally as soon as
possible for maximum effectiveness." 107 At the same time, the
administration of training abroad needs to be reconsidered in all
aspects, especially for the purpose of speeding up the handling of
correspondence, the arranging of individual programmes of study,
and the shortening of the lapse of time from the receipt a-F
applications to the beginning of training.
8.4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS TRAINING.
Officials in the sample were asked; 'Should there be any
institutional training at all (whether departmental, central or abroad)
to supplement on-the-job training?' Sharp division of opinions emerge.Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62.3 per cent) thought that
there should, while one-third (33.0 per cent) were against the idea.
The opponents in the sample think that such training may result
in the indoctrination of employees as well as inbreeding. The
political regime in power may use the training institutes for
propagating its political ideology and programmes. The political
neutrality of an official may thus be threatened. Another argument
advanced against institutional training is that it entails un-
necessary "waste" of time and money. If an individual has already
spent a number o-F years in school and a university, he does not
need any more schooling. This argument is also advanced by Bridges
who points out that learning by doing the job, under the supervision
of the right type of supervisors	 , is an invaluable way of
training public servants. He adds; "... many of the best oarsmen
learnt a good deal from the mere fact of rowing in a good crew
behind a really good oarsman, for good style and good rhythm proved
as catching as measles 108
The advocates, on the other hand, think that institutional
training is necessary for broadening the outlook of the official,
and for deepening his knowledge of the social significance of State
activities in general and of his own job in particular. Such a
knowledge will stand him in good stead in functioning effectively
in a dynamic and democratic society. This would foster a certain
measure of democratic responsiveness in a public service. In
addition 1 institutional training could provide an official with a
systematic introduction to his job before he actually begins practical
training. This would be useful in two ways. First, it would help290
him to learn his job quicker than he is likely to do through an
exclusive dependence upon apprenticeship. Second, systematic
introduction to his job and machinery of administration could
also help officials to understand the significance of overall
co-ordination in a period of expanding government activities.
This understanding would help co-ordination among public servants.
Accordingly, one would say that the institutional training in
Jordan not only continues, but needs to be extended to cover more
categories of higher and middle level staffs. This would make for
more competence and higher professional standards.
The next question was: 'Whether training should be given in
departments or contracted out to universities and other higher
academic institutions.' The advocates of training at departments
were 47.3 per cent, whereas 43.7 per cent preferred training at
universities, etc.
Those who were particularly opposed to department training
point out certain shortcomings. First, departmental training insti-
tutes tend to produce inbreeding. There is no living contact between
the trainees and the outside world. They begin to live in an ivory
tower and take a narrow view of things, since they are cut off from
the currents of thought and impulses of action prevailing in the
country. it is also arguable that if they were to receive instruction
in a university, they would breathe in a stimulating and intellectually
invigorating atmosphere. Secondly. the teachers whose activities are
confined to the teaching of government officials in a staff college
would tend to become narrow in their interest and vision. Such
instructors would not, therefore, have the capacity to inspire officials291
with high ideals of bureaucracy or help them to understand the
real significance of State activity in the service of man.
Professor Laski makes a comparable point in dealing with the
British argument about the value oF preliminary instruction in a
university in preference to a staff college: "What gives its salt
to university life is the width of the horizons it has to scan, the
variety in the outlook of its teachers, the need in its students to
test the values born of contact with different experience, or a
different discipline." 109	The standards in a staff college cannot
be continually "renewed by being tested in the light o-F external
criteria." 110	The authorities of departmental institutes tend to
suffer from self-complacency and may not be readily persuaded to
introduce changes in the courses of study or methods of instruction.
A university, on the other hand, is a living organism in which ideas
keep on moving and standards keep on renewing. Finally, no depart-
mental institute in Jordan is likely to have adequate Library
facilities and other useful equipment which a university can afford.
Training is, therefore, likely to be more liberalising in a university
than in a departmental training institute.
The advocates of training through departmental institutions
hold the view that firstly, training of officials in a university
cannot be very useful, because in a university the emphasis is more
upon theory than upon applied knowledge. On account of this reason,
officials are not likely to learn much which would be of use to
them in their service careers. Valuable time would thus be wasted
and unnecessary delay and expense would be incurred before young292
recruits are put on the job itself and become effective servants.
Secondly, a realistic study of	 administration and an effective
insight into administrative techniques require that the Instructors
should be senior bureaucrats	 , not "mere" scholars. The services
of the senior officers can be utilised adequately if there are
departmental training institutes as universities do not normally
appoint them. Further, in Jordan, universities are not so well
developed and well equipped as in advanced countries, and the
departmental institutions exist precisely because the university
product is not quite satisfactory. A university may be able to
arrange courses in	 administration or in other specified
subjects. but "their remoteness from the actual processes of civil
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service administration would narrowly limit their usefulness.
There appears to be some element of truth in both viewpoints.
But an additional factor a-F crucial importance is put by Adu who
points out that:
"departmental training is really a form a-F post-entry
training and is needed where the public education
system does not provide the types of training required,
or where the training necessary is peculiar to the
needs of a particular department." 112
Under these circumstances it is more convenient and efficient to
have the training courses under departmental control. In spite of
all the above arguments, one would conclude that the best course is
to devise arrangements which would avoid the dangers of inbreeding
as well as deterioration of training standards and which would,
at the same time, ensure that instruction and training are carried
on in a realistic and effective way.113293
Overall, -	 our survey provides the -Following findings. Central
training hardly exists and has no clear objectives. As a result, it
has failed to contribute to the career development of personnel. This
simply reflects the fact that there is a lack of manpower career
development strategy for the Service as a whole. Accordingly,
departmental training, geared only to departmental needs, is operated
on a large scale. However, this practice ignores the -Fact that
there are categories of need which departmental training does not
meet - comon training needs which can only be provided centrally;
and specialised vocational training for which training overseas may
be necessary. An illustration of the consequence of lack of central
planning can be seen by reference to three cases drawn from the
sample:
An official in the Treasury had one central training course,
whereas an official of similar grade in the Department of Education
had five departmental training courses within the Department. There
is yet a third pattern of training illustrated by a veterinary
officer in the Department of Agriculture who had been sent to pursue
seven specialised training courses abroad during his service career,
(see Tables 8.2, 8.4 and 8.6).294
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
In spite of the varied system of recruitment, different levels
of responsibility and type of jobs, government officials in Jordan
displayed a remarkable homogeneity and demonstrated a consistent
pattern of career experience. For instance, most joined the Service
at an early age and grew up in it. A majority possessed a higher
education qualification. There was little mobility between departments
or between government and outside employment. However, there are
some dis-similarities between the departments studied. For instance,
the Civil Service Department officials have greatest mobility between
departments. As the central personnel agency, the CSD contains staff
whose skills are in training and personnel development. Such staff
can move to any department. This is not so in departments such as
Agriculture. Similarly, data indicates a degree of movement into
and out of the National Planning Council quite unlike the rest of the
departments surveyed, because the NPC acts as an interface between
the public and private sectors.
As a general rule in all departments, the Survey indicates that
there was a strong relationship between tasks performed by those who
transferred into and out of the Service. This indication should give
the government encouragement to develop further exchanges of personnel
with the various types of employers outside the bureaucracy, with the
aim of improving career development of serving employees.1
Unlike career patterns, work experience of officials showed a3LJ2
wide diversity, reflecting the complexity of government	 administration.
Supervision was practised with different capability and is affected by
levels of management, type of departments and personnel (whether general-
ist or specialist). Departments also vary in their dealing with the
public. Some departments are very concerned with the average citizen's
needs and, consequently, their officials felt themselves to be an elite
in the Society. 2 Contacts between politicians and bureaucrats within
departments are much affected by functions of the department concerned
and the "style" of management of its political head. However,
administration is the joint responsibility of bureaucrats and
politicians. While most of the former are busy with planning, executing and
controlling, some officials are in constant contact with the Minister.
Because of the way business is done in the Middle East, a far wider
range of people are in direct contact with Ministers than is the case
in Western Societies. Even so, most government servants are devoted
to implementation of policy and all have an important role in the final
formulation of policy. Playfair, a senior British Civil Servant,
describes the Jordanian situation accurately when he comments on the
situation in the U.K.
"The formulation of policy is a joint effort - the result
of constant discussion.	 The good civil servant sub-
ordinates himself totally to the Minister's decisions but
speaks out frankly when advice and criticism is helpful
and necessary; the good Minister listens with care to all
advice and criticism which he gets and then makes up his
own mind." 3
The policy role of public servants in Jordan today has particular
importance because the government, in spite of its limited finance,
has undertaken	 ambitious planning programmes. The success of
development programmes depends, to a great extent on the responsibility303
of the public servants. Their tasks include planning, executing and
controlling the entire economic and social activities. The welfare
of the people depends, to a great extent, on their imagination,
sympathy and efficiency.
Nevertheless, the government has still failed to grasp the full
significance of the recruitment function. Recruitment is treated in
isolation, there is a lack of information about service careers, lack
of initiative, low salaries and slow career progress. The government
would be able to attract better quality applicants by assuring them
of a career service where progress was not dependent on political and social
-Factors,but on merit.	 The most important action at present is to
increase attractiveness, maximise retention and minimise turnover.
Each department should be required to specify manpower needs in
relation to its programmes. A promotion system could be planned by the
co-ordiriated efforts of the various departments and the central
management departments aimed at achieving "fairness" in promotion.
Recruitment depends exclusively on educational attainment. The
university remains the main well-spring o-F recruitment. However,
there is hardly any co-operation or co-ordination between the university
authorities and departments in forecasting manpower needs. As the
number of graduates increases, there is an imminent danger of considerable
waste of manpower unless planning between these authorities takes place.
On the other hand, the improvement of recruitment methods and techniques
can only achieve limited results and will not go far in enabling the
government to build up a first rate staff at all levels. A radical re-
form o-F the educational system will improve the quality and calibre of
the candidates who seek to compete for government service. The task
is urgent, immediate and fundamental.The question which deserves attention is whether the "preference
for relevance" principle should be pursued in recruitment. This
principle involves greater attention to the field of study as well
as to level of attainment. Consequently, subjects o-F academic quali-
fication would not continue to be ignored in selection. Robson remarks:
"It is right to recruit the highest graduates from the universities for
the Civil Service, irrespective of the subjects they have studied."4
In Jordan, this exactly describes the existing practice. Administration
in Jordan, at present and in the future, stands to gain i-F persons
with diverse academic backgrounds can find their way to it.
Despite the great growth of the public service, there has been no
single office responsible for the appointment of personnel. This
function has been shared between the CSD and individual departments.
This policy has often resulted in considerable confusion and weakened
the role of the central personnel agency. It is necessary to strengthen
the latter, and in an attempt to achieve this objective, the following
suggestions are made.
First, the CSD could have a new office called the"Director of
Examinations"associated with the Ministry of Education. It might be
his responsibility to assist the departments to devise more effective
selection methods and criteria. He should exercise general supervision
over the conduct of the recruitment procedures by the departments.
Second, the CSO might constitute a "Working Part)/' consisting of two
or three officials and one chief with the function of visiting the
various agencies in order to make an on the spot investigation of
existing practices and to explain the exact implications of the regulations
and other statutory requirements. This ensures minimum delay by "argument305
through correspondence" and makes matters easy. Third, departments
should be required to inform the CSD immediately of any departmental
appointment made; and at the end of six months it should  review the
position and report again as to whether the post is likely to continue
beyond a year. In this case,the necessary requisition for recruitment
is to be sent to the CSD without delay. This procedure would remove
suspicion o-F "nepotism" and "favouritism."
There has been no uniform method of recruitment. Competitive
examination is only exceptionally used in selection. The great
weakness of using any kind of examination is the lack of a central
organisation responsible for the whole machinery of selection. In
the introduction of a modern career service, it might be the aim to
bring posts under a system of entrance by examination. It is necessary
for the administration of the examinations to be in the hands of the
CSO which can ensure uniform standards of recruitment.
At present, as the Survey shows, the interview method is widely
used for selection. However, there is considerable scope for personal
preferences and prejudices. Appointing authorities could not always
assess the personality of candidates properly without testing them.
They are apt to pay undue attention to manners, appearance and to the
attributes claimed by candidates.	 A more thorough
inquiry into the interests, activities and achievements of candidates
is not attempted. It is suggested, therefore, that there could in
addition to interview be group discussion and role-playing. Another
thing which needs careful consideration is whether there should be a
preliminary interview. The practice of pre-Board Interview has been
adopted in some developed countries. 5 The success of this new practicedepends upon three factors. An adequate number of experienced officers
trained to interview; a careful job analysis; and careful screening
through preliminary interview to ensure that the number of interviewees
at the final selection should not be too large. 6 In Jordan, arrangements
could be made for introducing this system without difficulty.
Psychological and intelligence tests have not been introduced in
Jordan. It is worth thinking of establishing a"Psychological Testing
Section"in the CSD performing the following functions. First, preparing
job analysis fundamental to the construction of scientific tests of
job capability and other personality characteristics. Second, conducting
preliminary research studies for designing selection tests and devices.
Third, the construction a-F aptitude tests and evaluation devices for
various selection programmes. Fourth, administering tests to the
candidates and reporting test evidence to the Selection Board, analysis
and interpretation of the candidates 1 performance with a view to
conducting research into some of the problems vexing those concerned
with the task of development, assessment and utilization of human
resources. Finally, carrying out follow-up research for the purpose
of validating and refining selection tests and procedures.
The turnover a-F personnel, especially among young people, is
serious and is likely to continue to be so. The Survey indicates
that the recruitment problem, in existing circumstances, is more a
matter of retention than attraction. The first essential step is.
therefore, to find out why people leave the Service.
The evidence indicates the following Service shortcomings. First,
some o-F those who consider they have better outside opportunities are307
thinking of the long-term prospect.	 They compare the average expecta-
tion in the government	 with how they might -Fare outside. Because
the structure of the Service is hierarchical, beyond a certain grade
upwards there are few positions, though these are separated by attractive
salary differentials. Second, a number of those who leave have
discovered that they are not temperamentally suited to a service career.
They dislike working in a formal atmosphere or they just cannot tolerate
service norms. Third, a -Fair proportion of new entrants "drift" into
the public service -For no particular reason. Because the work has not
stimulated them or nobody has taken a personal interest in them or they
disliked their departments and believed that all departments were the
same, they drift out again. Finally, sheer frustration drives others
out of the Service. They think the standards of performance are too
low; payment is also too low; they receive insufficient co-operation
from supervisors, colleagues or subordinates; they find their
equipment and work environment deficient for effective work performance.
There is no job rotation and little chance of obtaining a transfer.
All these circumstances may be interpreted to mean that the popularity
of government service is on the decline.
One of the most important factors which determines the attractiveness
of employment and retention of staff is remuneration. However, data
shows serious defects in the structures of the financial reward system.
These include: a great disparity in salaries; time-scale of promotion
which is too long; a considerable rigidity of the structure; pay-scales
which do not reward an overlap of responsibility between grades. There
is no one salary structure but rather a variety of different salary
arrangements which apply to different categories of employees. These
are not clearly based on any recognised principles. Because of itsuu
defects, the existing salary structure has contributed, to an appreciable
extent, to the general weakness of the government machinery on one hand,
and affected adversely the career progression of its servants on the
other.
In designing a pay structure for the Service in Jordan, the aim
should be to maintain an honest, efficient and contented public service.
The primary principle of pay should be that of"relativities"or pay
relationships based on the"duties and responsibilities"of posts. The
pay structure should also be so designed so as to reflect through the
higher rewards,time and money spent by individuals in equipping them-
selves for tasks involving the highest responsibilities. Educational
qualifications should therefore be treated as a supporting principle
of pay. It is not enough that salaries should enable employees to
meet only the basic need of life. They should be such as to ensure
a moderate standard of living for employees compatible with their
status, and a reasonable measure of security not only against retire-
ment and old age but also against serious emergencies.
After such factors as security of tenure, leaves, promotion
prospects, retirement benefits, etc. have been taken into account,
salaries should be such as to cause officials to feel that their terms
of service are on the whole fair, bearing in mind those of their
countrymen of similar age and educational attainments who perform
comparable duties in business enterprises, industrial organisations and
autonomous corporations. Further, the government as a good employer
should not be reluctant to adopt effective measures for lessening the
impact of rising prices on the purses of its employees, either by
increasing salaries, or by raising cost of living allowances or by
effective price control.309
The salary structure should be so devised as to attract the best
recructs to those spheres of nation-building activity where there are
serious shortages of skilled and experienced staff. For example,
professional and technical personnel are badly needed in the Service,
therefore it would clearly be contrary to the national interest for
the government not to offer them more than non-technical personnel.
On the other hand, these professional staff who sacrifice their own
interests by choosing to serve their country as public servants cannot
expect to receive from the government as much in emoluments as they
can command outside the Service. But they should be able to feel
that, in the final analysis, their choice has not been unwise.
Pay principles can be applied effectively if the existing system
o-F evaluating government posts in Jordan is encouraged and developed.
It can be developed by the creation of a specific "Pay Unit" in the
Civil Service Department.	 The Pay Unit will make a comparative
study of jobs inside and outside the service from the point of view
of pay and other conditions on one hand, and to evaluate posts to
their duties and responsibilities on the other. The Budget Department
should normally accept the advice of the Civil Service Department as
to the numbers and grades of posts shown in the budget estimates of
departments. When the former is unable to accept the advice of the
I,
latter, the matter should be referred to a Special Standing Committee
which will settle the point in dispute.
Salaries need to be reviewed regularly, both overall and on an
individual basis. The basic reason for this is one of the characteristics
of this century: inflation which has spread through the world. Therefore,310
general reviews take place in response to inflationary pressures of
changes in market rates. The unfortunate fact is that the Government of
Jordan has been obliged to make a general salary review three times only
since the creation of the State in 1926. However, any substantial changes
of the salary structure may be made unilaterally or through negotiation
with the staff representatives. In Jordan this process happens
unilaterally. The only body authorised to increase salaries is the
Cabinet. 7 Thus,the employees should be given some choice as to the
form of part c-F their compensation. On the other hand, individual
salary reviews normally take place annually. Although automatic
increments are paid, the system reserves the right to withhold an
increment in the case of poor performance or in a disciplinary action.8
This kind of review is the major operation in Jordan, and often forms part
of the appraisal process. In this case , it will be necessary to maintain
detailed individual records in order to assess the employee's progress
with regard to pay. It is desirable to satisfy each employee about
the equity of his salary according to his progress and aspirations.
The following criteria might be applied to achieve this in
Jordan. First, systematic and regular performance review as a pre-
requisite; such reviews to be based upon indicators of performance
as far as possible. Second, the review should identify level of
performance rewarded appropriately. Third, salary administrators
should be of sufficiently senior level to avoid abuse of the system
through increases which are outside of the norms laid down.
Alongside remuneration, promotion constitutes the cornerstone of
the conditions of service. Like recruitment and salary, there is an311
absence of a central policy for promotion. Evidence suggests that
departments have a complete discretion in promotion which leads to
complaints of occasional favouritism and nepotism. These complaints
grow as one goes down the ladder. Most officials are dissatisfied
with the promotion criteria arrangement used in the Service. Although
many variables were involved in promotions, clearly the most significant
factor was seniority. As a consequence of this -Factor a large number
of officials have moved into a certain level of the hierarchy. They
now find themselves with a rather limited professional career ahead
of them. The challenge to the Service is how these vitally needed
people can be further advanced and their ability retained. Emphasis
on seniority tends to defeat any attempts to reward merit which could
extend the career prospects of many officials.
Under present circumstances, officials governed by different
promotion arrangements, all complain that there are not adequate
promotion opportunities for them. The Survey shows those who
benefitted most under both central and departmental arrangements for
promotion are officials who are at any time in grades closest to
the top. This is because all systems favour faster movement at
higher grades. This creates relative disincentives for staff as a
whole. However, promotion opportunities have been affected by many
variables	 the type of the department, type of personnel (generalist
or specialist), occupation, the rate of the departmental growth, the
implications for staffing, turnover, job satisfaction, grading
structur9s and manpower planning, etc.
Assessment of candidates for promotion depends mainly on the
reporting system. Assessment reports have been confined to the3i:2
classified grades only. Departmental grades have no such central
service-wide arrangements for assessment reports. There is a need
to establish a service-wide system of reporting. Those about
whom reports are compiled complain, however, that reports are not
always written accurately and comprehensively. Ratings are less
specific and less objective than they ought to be. They merely
record superficial impressions, with staff rated primarily according
to their morale and intellectual facilities rather than to perfor-
mance. What such reports reflect most accurately are the varying
personalities of the reporting officers, which tend to colour the
reports at times.
It is not, therefore, surprising that the field work survey
suggests that the reporting system does not indicate competence, and
consequently does not provide an indication of training needs and
suitability for promotion. Nor does it create motivation in the
Service.
The promotion system in Jordan cannot be really effective unless
assessment reports are properly written. Each reporting officer bears
a heavy responsibility in this matter, both from the point of view of
the State and of the official reported on. A report must be fair in
all respects and must be an accurate summary of the performance and
conduct of an official during the period under report.
Another major weakness is that the assessment report is not
discussed or seen by the subordinate concerned. This practice is
obviously inconsistent with the primary goal of the report. Adverse
remarks pointing a remediable defect should invariably be communicated
to the subordinate, so that he may be made aware of his shortcomings313
and may be given the opportunity of improving himself.
In improving the reporting system in Jordan, the following
points need to be borne in mind. Appraisers hove to be trained, jobs
have to be analysed, job descriptions must be developed, and perfor-
mance be set. The forms of reports should be designed not only to
provide columns for judging the skill or competence of a person but
also for assessing his personality and fitness for promotion. It
must follow a pattern deliberately set to elicit the essential
information regarding the worth, ability and character of the
candidate. Finally, there must be modification of the form to take
account o-F performance at different levels of responsibility.
Competitive examination as a method of promotion is not used
in Jordan. This might be used, supplemented by interviews, in
preference to the existing system. Two advantages could be obtained
by using this method. First, it has the supreme merit of making the
selection thoroughly impartial and objective. Second, it provides
opportunities for promotion to the young officers of ability whose
length of Service is so short that assessment reports cannot reveal
their true worth. The use of interviews can give a more comprehensive
idea of the personality and a better picture of the relative fitness
of the candidates for promotion than does reliance on mere assessment
reports.
These measures might introduce the element of promotion by
nt (incorporating seniority) which most respondents consider
important. Those who are able must be provided with adequate oppor-
tunities for the utilization of their ability. The spirit and enthusiasm
of the able and the efficient must not be allowed to be drained away
by being held down at the end of a long queue. In this, increased
opportunities, providing greater responsibilities and interest, are even314
more important than actual advancement. However, not only does
adequacy of promotion opportunities deserve more attention in the
interest of incentives and morale, but the principles of promotion
and its policy as a whole also need re-orientation. In addition,
the machinery for promotion must be above suspicion. It should
satisfy all concerned that however defective and faulty, it at least
seeks to reward "merit'; that it is genuinely inspired by the
interest of the Service and that it seeks no personal or private
ends. Emphasis on objective assessment of performance is called for.
Another important factor in career development is training.
Nevertheless, the survey suggests serious handicaps in this crucial
area. These include relating the criteria for promotion to the
objectives of training; absence of systematic planning and supervised
execution; lack of specific information about the content and
requirements of occupations; and shortage of qualified trainers.
There is also no training budget adequate for the development of a
significant degree of training related to career needs. Neither is
there a central training committee nor civil service training
regulations.
As a result, there is no unified training policy. The Civil
Service Department's responsibility in respect of national training
is limited to receiving offers for training courses from abroad and
circulating these offers to the departments. The survey shows the
unusual role played by the National Planning Council in the training
function. Since the NRC is the link between Jordan and training
agencies abroad, most training courses offered by outside institutions315
are arranged by the NPC. However, co-operation and co-ordination
between CSO and NRC are too limited. As a result, the effectiveness
of training is severely affected.
On the other hand, co-operation and co-ordination between the
CSD as the department responsible for training, and IRA ascentral
training agency are weak. The latter designs its own training
programmes and decides the future plans of training in the absence
of the former. In the same way, there is a lack of co-ordination
between the CSD and departmental training institutions. Therefore,
the CSD exercises a limited influence in the mnpower development
process as a whole. To the extent that the CSD does influence man-
power development, it does so through the Institute of Public
Administration.
5e
The IRA itself has certain limitations.jthe shortage of exper-
ienced instructors and trainers; lack of the necessary financial
and administrative autonomy which its activities require; salaries,
career and promotion prospects, still do not compare with similar
organisations inside the country; and high turnover of the staff.
Departments do not assign officers in sufficient numbers to fill the
Institute's quotas for available courses. The Institute still faces
difficulty in defining the actual training needs of the public
service.
In order to carry out its functions most effectively, the status
of the Institute is a matter of great significance. Unless it is
highly regarded by the government, it will not secure the attention
and respect of the employees in general. The revitalisation.
re-orientation and reorganisation of the Institute might be an essential315
part of any proposed administrative reform programme. The work
programme of the Institute could be an important part of the admin-
istrative reform programme and closely geared to its requirements.
It is necessary to consider and decide on the objectives and goals
of the training to know who to train and for what before training is
started. It is of little use and may give negative results if
instructors are trained in old and obsolete regulations and procedures.
It is worth testing the use of participatory training methods and
techniques.
On the other hand, to build up the Institute for a new role,
the salary conditions and promotion prospects of its staff should be
equivalent to those of the universities and other institutions which
are concGrned with the training of individuals who work for private
enterprises and public autonomous corporations. It might be more
useful for the Institute to focus on administrative reform programmes,
specialised courses, developing trainers and instructors of other
institutions, advising and consulting in management services and to
give full attention to the development of senior management staff.
The Institute could also have a major responsibility for a new training
programme for new entrants into the .Se,'ce	 The value of such
training is to give the officer a professional approach to his
responsibility to enable him to evaluate more readily the experience
he gains on the job.
The survey shows that most training activities in Jordan are
conducted by individual departments for meeting their own needs.
However, departmental training institutes face some shortcomings.
These include: they rely exclusively on the lecture method; courses317
are too theoretical, too short; based upon inadequate selection of
trainees. There is also lack of facilities and financial support;
irrelevant syllabus; unqualified administrative staff; and lack of
concern with attitudes towards dealing with the public.
Furthermore, there is an obvious lack of contact between
departments and central training agencies. It is essential for the
latter to assess and know departmental needs so that they can cater
fully for these needs. It is also equally essential for the former
to demonstrate these needs and to have them fully catered for. It
is only through such two-way communication that central and depart-
mental training can fully achieve their objectives.
On the whole, our survey provides the following findings. Central
training hardly exists and has no clear objectives. This results from
the failure to organise clear objectives in the field of recruitment
and promotion. This emphasises again the decentralised nature of
organisation and control within the government service.
The first thing that all developing countries such as Jordan,
discover in developing their programmes is the need to manage a large
budget. The mechanism of budgetary control, auditing and evaluation,
would be accepted naturally within all departments we have investigated.
By complete contrast, the management of human resources is a function
which has been entirely neglected as a central management function.
Control, auditing and evaluating of manpower need to be centralised
(as in the case of financial resources) for effective career development.318
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APPENDIX 1
Assessment Report Form for Classified Grades used by_the Government
Service of Jordan
The Hashmite Kingdom of Jordan,
Assessment Report
19—
Ministry .....................
Department ...........................
1. Full name s	2. Date of birth.
Confidential
3. Marital Status.
4. Job title.	 5. Place of work.
6. Date of appointment to the Service. 	 7. Present grade.
8. Basic salary.	 9. Date of promotion to the present grade.
10. Academic qualifications.
11. Special qualifications.
12. Other experience.
(A) Duties of the official
(B) Periodical work done by the official once or twice etc. monthly
13. Additional work done by the official without allowance or pay
14. Additional work done by the official with allowance or pay (Specify
the amount of the pay or allowance)
15. The amount of technical allowance being paid monthly to the specialist
(e.g. doctor, engineer)
I attest that the above information is correct to the best of my
knowledge.
Date:	 Official Signature. .........................
I certify that I have investigated and found the above information
is correct. (If the ininediate supervisor finds the above information
incorrect, he should state the precise information below).
Immediate Official Supervisor
Name in Full
Signature	
Date1	 Efficiency and capability of the Official
.j U
4-'	 o
C 0
a)	 0
-1	 b	 E
a)	 >	 0	 •-	 -
U	 -.	 0	 0	 to
X	 Q)	 0	 0)	 0)
ui > o 2:
A. Ability
1. Knowledge of the job.
2. Work performance and assumption of responsibility
3. Execution of instructions.
4. Assumption of greater responsibility.
5. Independent thinking and innovation.
6. Depth of understanding.
B. Dealing with others and Punctuality.
1. Public.
2. Supervisors.
3. Colleagues.
4. Subordinates.
5. Observance of working time.
C. Work Ethics (Integrity and Conduct)
Ii Work (For teachers only)
1. Keeping discipline in classroom and school.
2. Method of teaching.
3. Results of his teaching.
4. Degree of adherence to policy.
17. Your general assessment of the official: Excellent, Very Good, Good,
Medium, Weak (circle the most appropriate description of the official).
18. IJo you think the holder is suitable for his current job, or do you recom-
mend his transfer to another job (Specify the reasons and the job
recommended).
19. Any other remarks.	 ......................................................321
20. In the light of my personal knowledge of this official's work and
relying on information which I have concluded on his conditions,
I certify in my belief and knowledge that the information above is
correct and the rating of his ability is the most appropriate.
Signature of Immediate Supervisor .................	 Date..............
21. The opinion of Education Director (for teachers only)
22. The opinion of the Assessment Committee of the Official
Chairman of the Committee	
Member
	 Member
(Permanent Secretary or	 position	 position
Director-General)
Date ................
Directions:
(1) The Official fills the first page of this report which is then
sent to the immediate supervisor for his review.
(2) The immediate supervisor fills the part which applies to him in
pages 12. In the case of the Ministry of Education of-Ficials,the
report is sent to the Education Director and the Assessment Corrniittee.
(3) The following words shall be used in rating the official's work:
Excellent, Very Good, Good, Medium, Weak.
(4) This report should be completed in duplicate. One copy should be
sent to the Head of the Civil Service Department every October and
the other kept by the department concerned. (In the case of teachers,
the report should be in triplicate, one of them should be kept with
the Education Director).
(6) When the ability of an official has been reported to be "Medium",
the official will be notified of this rating; and the official whose
ability has been reported to be "Weak" shall be warned. In both of
these cases, the official concerned shall be impressed by the need to
show improvement in their work and to avoid any failure therein. A
copy of the letter of warning shall be sent to the Head of the Civil
Service Department (Civil Service Regulations No. 23, 1966, Article 59).
N.B.	 This is an unofficial translation from the original ArabicFor official
use only
El
Li
Li
Li
Li
LII
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
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APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is boing issued as part of a research
project undertaken at the University of Glasgow. It is designed
to elicit information on the career development, work and attitudes
of	
personnel. All information obtained will be kept
strictly confidential and used only for the purpose of research.
Department ..................................
Q2
	
Position ....................................
Q3
	
Jobtitle ...................................
Q4
	
ManagementLevel ............................
Elass.......................................
Q6
	
Grade .......................................
Q7
	
Sex:	 Male	 Female
Marital Status	 Single LII	
Married [ii]
Q9Age .........................................
QiD Age at Entrance to the Service ..............
QilLevel of Education ..........................
Q12 Accidernic Specialisation .....................
Q13 Occupation: Managerial	 Professional El
Q14 Duties/Functions
Q15 Length of Service in the government .........For Official
Use Only
LI 11B	 Length of Service in the current department
Q17	 Number a-F government departments in which you
haveworked .......................................
t18	 Number of government departments with which you
deal in your official work ........................
Q19	 How frequently do you have contact with other
government departments:
1. Never.	 11111
2. Not very often.
3. Frequently.
4. Very frequently.
20
	
Number of years of non-government experience
21	 For which employer did you work the longest before
joining the government service?
1. The private sector.
2. Luasi-government corporations.
3. Local government.
4. Regional/international organisations.
S. Independent profession.
6. Self-employment.
Q22
	
State whether the relationship between your work
inside and outside the government is:
1. No relationship.
2. Weak relationship.	 LIII
3. Strong relationship.
4. Identical relationship.
LII
LII
LII
LII
LIIB. Inability to communicate
effectively with the public No	 Don'tEJ
know
Yes El
Li
7. Cramped physical working
conditions NoE Don'tj
know
8. Lack of adequate technical
support No	 Don't
know
Y es LI
LI
LI
El
LI
U
Lii
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Q23 Indicate whether or not the problems listed
below are relevant to your department.
1. Inability to recruit suitably
qualified personal	 Yesü No	 Don'tE
know
2. Large turnover a-F qualified
personnel	 YesJ	 No	 Don'tIIl
know
3. Conflict between administra-
tive and professional personnl
over authorities and respons-
ibilities	 YesI	 NoEl Don'tEJ
know
4. Decisions made for political
rather than pragmatic reasons Yes[J N0E Don'tfl
know
5. Lack of co-ordination between
agencies involved in the
department's activities	 Yes	 NoEl Don'tL
know
E
LI
LI
El
Li
Q24 Indicate whether any of changes described below is relevant
toyour department since you have served there.
1. The number of personnel has	 Yes	 NoE Don't1
increased more than 20%	 know
2. Many jobs have beuome more	 Yesj	 Nofl Don'tD
specialised or technical	 know
3. My own duties and respons-	 YesE NoEl Don'tTl
ibij.ities have been increased	 know
4. The budget of the department Yes El NoEl Don'tjfl
has been increased by 20%	 know U
5. There has been greater commun-
ication and co-ordination	 YesEl No[1 Don'tTl
know UJ within the department
6. The quality of personnel has YesEJ Nofl Don'trl
improved	 knowcii
325
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25 How -Frequently do you have contact with your
Minister in the -Formal course of day-to-day work?
1. Almost every day.	 LII
2. More than once per month.
3. About once per month.	 LIII
4. Less than once per months
5. Never.	
III!
26 By whom do you think that important decisions
relating to policy making should be taken:
1. By the officer in charge of the
department, without inviting or
taking account of the views of
subordinates.
2. By the officer in charge of the
department in consultation only
with all the senior officials
whether or not concerned with
the decision.
3. By the officer in charge of the
department in consultation only
with those officials directly
concerned with the policy whether
senior or junior.
Q27 By whom do you think that decisions involved in
the implementation of policy should be taken:
1. By the officer in charge of the
department, without inviting or
taking account of the views of
the subordinates.
2. By the officer in charge of the
department in consultation only
with all senior officials whether
or not concerned with the
decision.	
cliii
3. By the officer in charge of the
department in consultation only
with those officials directly
concerned with the decision whether
senior or junior.
LII
LII
Eli[II
LII
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Q28 Some officials are primarily responsible for the
-Formulation of policy,while others are primarily
responsible for implementation of policy. With
r8spect to your own job, which of the following
statements most accurately defines your role in
regard to policy?
1. My role is almost exclusively that
of developing and formulating policy.
2. My job involves both the formulation
and implementation of policy.
3. I implement policies made by others.	
n
Q29 How many people do you supervise?
Q3O How much of your time is spent dealing directly
with the public?
1. None.
2. Up to 10%.
3. Between 10-25%.
4. 25-50%.	 LJ
5. 50-75%.
6. Over 75%.	 LII
31 Which of the -Following statements best conveys the
attitudes c-F the public towards government
officials:
1. As persons who 'rule' the people.
2. As persons charged with protection
of the 'State interest' on behalf
of the State.
3. As 'guardians' of individual rights
and interests.
4. As public 'educators' who encourage
correct understanding of government
policy.
5. Other	 (specify) ..........................
[1
I
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c132	 Do you think that all categories of employees
should be amalgamated into one unified class?
Yes [	 NeuLral	 No LIII
Q33	 Indicate to what extent you agree with the
statement: 'in practical terms women are not
well suited for government service work.'
1. Agree strongly.	 E
2. Agree.
3. Neutral/No opinion.
4. Disagree.
5. Disagree strongly.
t34	 Had your post been advertised at time of your
appointment?	 Yes	 No E
I35	 How were you selected for your job at time of
appointment?
N0E
3. By an interview.	 Yes[J	 No
4	 After telling management
about my qualifications and
experience.	 Yes E	 No
5.	 Dther (specify)	 ...................
1. By submitting an application. YesLi
2. After taking competitive
examination.	 Yes LIII! _ Nofl
LII
LI
LI
LI
LII
I-i
i-i
Q36	 Why did you decide to accept government service?
1. No alternative employer	 Yes	 No 
111111
2. No possibility of suitable
employment in the private
sector for my skills or
qualifications.	 Yes	 J	 No
3. /..
ITIn
Li
LII
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Q3B
3. remperamentally not inclined to
work in the private sector.	 Yes
4. For prestige and status/or for
power to influence public policy. Yes
5. Good prospects of promotion.	 Yes
. For prospective pension benefits. Yes LIlE
7. Family tradition of government
service.	 Yes LII
8. Less hard work than private
enterprise or private practice
as a profession.	 Yes
9. Qualifications required for
other trade, profession or
occupation not possessed.	 YesD
10. Obligation to work with the
government (indenture).	 Yes
11. To get experience/training to
work outside the government
Nofl
NoE
No
No
No
Nofl
No
No
Li
Li
E
E
service.	 Yes	 No([
12. Lack of direction.	 Yes	 Nofl
Q37 Under what circumstances would you voluntarily leave
the Service?
1. Better paying job elsewhere.	 YesE	 NoEl
2. Better opportunity to utilize
skills elsewhere.	 YesD Nofl
3. Poor civil service prospects.	 Yes	 No
4. Better opportunities to obtain
skill, training, additional
education elsewhere.	 YesE	 NoIJ
5. Improved non-wage benefits
elsewhere.	 Ye51J	
Nof
B. Frustration and discontent
within the Service.	 YesEl	 N0E
7. Bad internal structure and
processes.	 Yes[J	 NoF
8. Other.	 (Specify) .................................
E
LII
El
LII379
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38	 Do you think that your decision in entering
government service was wise?	 Yesj	 NoEl
	
Q39	 If you had to choose -For yourself now, in the
light of your experience in the government,
which of the following would you choose:
1. Government service.
2. Foreign-owned private concern.
3. Jordanian private concern.
	 Ii
4. Anywhere in the private concern.
	
Q40	 What is your monthly government salary 7 ............	 I	 I
	Q41	 Are you satisfied with your government salary?
Yesfil	 NoU
	
t42	 Do you receive an allowance? YesE	 NoEl
If so, specify the type and amount .................
Ii
	43	 How many persons are economically dependent upon
yourearnings7 .....................................
	
Q44	 Do you have income -From other sources additional
to your government salary, such as buildings,
land or investment of any kind? YesD	 NoEl
	
45	 Do you think that the government should permit
all public servants to hold second jobs outside
the Civil Service, or to undertake part-time
private business in addition to working -For
government?
Yes	 Neutral	 No
	
4B	 Do you hold other job or undertake side-business
in addition to your government job? YesJ	 NoD331)
For official
use only
Q47	 Rank the following criteria of promotion in order
of your personal preference.
- competence	 IJ
- education	 L_J
- seniority
- training	 IIITI
- favouritism	 L_j
- personality traits Liii
	
E
Q48	 The way promotions are made is often different from
the way that one considers ideal. Would you
examine the six criteria again? This time rank them
the way you think the Service makes promotions.
- competence	 11111
- education	 L_J
- seniority	 liii
- training
	
LI
- -favouritism	 liii
	
LI
- personality traits
	
LI
Q49	 For Managers and Supervisors
What kind of advice would you extend to an official
entering the Service on how to advance and succeed?
	
LI
Li
5O	 Explain your understanding of the value (i.e.
purpose of the reporting system.
1. To control staff.	 Yes	 No
	
El
2. To motivate staff
	
Yes El No El
	
LI
3. To ensure appropriate staff
deployment.	 YesU NoEl
	
Lii
4. To prepare staff for promotion	 YesEl NoEl
	
LI
5. To indicate training needs	 Yesfl N0E
	
U
6. Other (Specify) .................................. 	
LII331
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Q51	 Would you say that to show assessment report
to the subordinate is:
1. Highly desirable.
2. Probably a good idea. Liii
3. Neutral/No opinion.
	 Li
4. Probably a bad idea.
5. quite wrong.	 Li
52.	 For Managerial Staff
Does the reporting system used in the Service
give an indication as to the ability and com-
petence of the subordinate, and consequently
provide an indication of training needs and
suitability for promotion?
Yes	 Neutrals	 Nofl
	
El
Q53	 For Non-Managerial Staff
In your view, does the reporting system create
motivation in the Service?
	
YesU NeutralE NoLi
	
El
Q54	 For Supervisors
Have you ever had a training course in staff
assessment?	 Yes	 NoflJ
	
El
Q55	 Do you regard the format of the assessment report
is:
1. Relevant.	 LII
2. Neutral.
	 El
3. Irrelevant. LI332
For official
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Q5B	 Do you think that each class or level of manage-
ment should have a separate assessment report form?
Yes [II	 Neutral	 No Li
	
El
• IJ57	 Did you join an initial training course when you
were first appointed in the government?
Yes	 No Li
Q53 How many training courses did you attend during
your career service?
1. Inside the department. 
I
2. Outside the department. L I
Q59	 People undertake training either voluntarily or as
a requirement. Indicate your purpose in taking
training:
1. To learn the job	 YesLi	 N0E
2. To prepare for promotion	 YesO	 NoE
3. To gain money (bonus)	 YesEl	 No
4. To seek more knowledge	 Yesfl	 NoLi
5. Other .	 Specify	 ........................
QSO	 Would the training you received in the government
enable you to obtain work outside the Service?
Yes Li	 NoLi Don't knowE
61 Should there be any institutional training at
all (whether departmental, central or abroad)
to supplement on-the-job training?
Yes [1111	 Neutral [1]	 No [J
62	 Should institutional training be:
1. Given in departmental training
institutions.
2. Contracted out to universities
and other academic institutions.
Lii
ri	 i
lU
LII
I-i
LiiEl
El
LI
LI
LI
LI
El
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Q63	 Which of the following criticisms (if any) related
to your experience o-F training:
1. Not relevant to the job.	 Yes Eli	 Nol
2. Too theoretical.	 Yes 111111	 NoD
3. Not career related (i.e.
promotion or needs)	 YesEJ N0U
4. Not provided by qualified
instructors.	 YesD	 NoJJ
5. Poorly managed courses (bad
organisation).	 Yesf	 NoD
6. Inadequate selection of
participants.	 YesEJ	 No
7. Too short	 Yesj	 NoD
6. Too long	 Yes	 NoEl
9.	 Other. (Specify) ..............................
Q64	 How many times have you been transferred in the
following ways:
1. Within the same department ...................
2. Between departments ..........................
3. To-From public autonomous
corporations, nationalised
industries, quasi-government
enterprises ..................................
4. Secondment to-from the local
government ...................................
5. Secondment to-from the private
sector. ......................................
6. Other (Specify)
rn
LfI
rn
111
Liii
ri	 I.334
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Q65	 What were the reasons for the transfer?
1. Administrative considerations.	
YeslEl No
2. Improvement of financial
position.	 Yes	 Nofl
3. Grade-to-grade promotion.	 Yes LII No LII
4. Disciplinary action.	 Yes	 NoEl
5. Departmental friction.	 Yes El No [Ill
	
LII
B. The need for my qualifications
	
Yes	 No [I]
7. The nature of the work.	 Yes	 No LIII
8. For training and experience	 Yes JJ NoIf
	
El
9. Other (Specify) ................................
BB	 On average, how frequently have you been transferred
(i.e. time between transfers in months)?
QB7	 Do you think that public servants should form their
own staff associations?
Yes	 Neutral	 No LIIJ
	L188	 Are you a member of Staff association/professional
association in connection with your job?
ves E	 No1
	
S9	 If the answer above is 'yes', state whether the
association is:
1. Active.
2. Active only in particular issues. 1III[
3. Inactive.
lull
El
El
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7D	 The -Following question relates to alternative
policies -For stc9ff development and the career
patterns open to different government officials.
Indicate	 which of the following statements
you agree, bearing in mind the effects of such
a policy in your department.
1. Technical specialists should hold
only technical posts.
2. Technical specialists should be able
to hold any post in a department,
whether technical qualifications are
required or not.
3. Technical specialists should be pre-
ferred -For appointment and promotion
in technical departments, (e.g.
doctors in Health Department).
4. In departments where technical expertise
is important, managerial personnel should
require training before appointment or
promotion to posts involving supervision
of technically complex work.
Agree Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
_________________ ________ _________ ___________ strongly
1
2
3
4
LI
LI
LI336
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